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President Clinton has declared that the promotion of democracy is the key to ensuring
America's security in the post-Cold War world. This assertion is based upon an international
relations theory called the "democratic peace." Expressed simply, it states that democracies
are reluctant to engage one another in war; therefore, increasing the number of democracies
worldwide will promote peace and, ultimately, America's security. Although it is a
seductive theory, the notion of the democratic peace has many pitfalls. The goal of this
thesis is to demonstrate that the democratic peace theory is not an appropriate foundation for
U.S. national security strategy. First, I establish that "democracy" is not universally
desirable. Instead, cultural factors, ethnic nationalism, and economics create imperatives that
thwart efforts to develop democracy. Second, I cite the actions of the intelligence services
of democratic states against fellow democracies - including espionage, economic espionage,
and covert action - to illustrate that peace is not without peril. Ultimately, pursuit of a
democratic peace may jeopardize national security because it threatens to entangle the United
States in costly foreign interventions. Additionally, the false sense of security it engenders
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
President Clinton has declared the promotion of democracy to be one of the keys to
ensuring America's security in the post-Cold War era. This assertion is based on the principles
of an international relations theory commonly referred to as the "democratic peace." Simply put,
this theory states that democracies have demonstrated a remarkable reluctance to go to war with
one another; therefore, expanding the rolls of democracies will promote world peace and, thus,
America's security. However, the promise of democratic peace is by no means a sure thing.
Indeed, it is fraught with potential pitfalls. Indeed, an examination of the tenets of this theory
demonstrates that eager adherence to the democratic peace is a precarious and potentially
perilous foundation upon which to build U. S. security.
The manner in which U.S. national security strategy adapts democratic peace theory
rests on two assumptions. The first is the belief that democracy is welcome across the globe and
can therefore be easily exported. This faith in the ready desirability of democracy, however, is
unfounded. Global variables, such as divergent cultural values, ethno-nationalist passions, and
economic imperatives, while they cannot be said to invalidate this notion, can act to inhibit the
spread of democracy and, even where it is embraced, serve to create a variety of systems under
the umbrella label of "democracy." The worth ascribed to democracy is of paramount
importance. While it may be universally possible, the manner in which democracy is assessed
and valued is not necessarily uniform. Therefore, a democratic crusade ensconced in a cloud of
rhetoric has the potential to entangle the United States in costly and counterproductive foreign
interventions.
The second assumption of U.S. security strategy is that the global spread of democracy -
and with it the democratic peace - is sufficient to ensure this nation's security. This is also a
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fallacy. Democracies, like all states, pursue objectives that they believe to be in their interests in
an attempt to compete and ensure their self-preservation in the international realm. In doing so
they engage in many activities, to include covert action, espionage, and economic espionage, that
may impinge on the sovereignty and threaten the security of other states, including fellow
democracies. And, while these acts hardly produce the havoc and destruction that accompany
war, they are nonetheless capable of threatening the relative well-being of another state. That
democracies frequently indulge in these less-than-benign acts against other democracies serves
to demonstrate that the promise of a democratic peace is hollow: the "peace" that is proffered is
not without perils, and indeed it can often be exceptionally menacing.
Thus, contrary to the President's assurances, democracy is neither a universally desirable
commodity nor the key to an inherently peaceful and secure world. This mismatch between U.S.
national security strategy and the challenges and menaces that will continue to lurk in the
international realm has clear consequences for the tools of national security strategy - that is,
U.S. foreign policy, national military strategy, and the efforts of America's intelligence
community. To realize national security, each of these implements must be employed in a
coordinated and cogent manner. Currently, they are engaged in a vain pursuit of "democracy"
that garners little in exchange for the time, energy, and resources expended. This misguided
quest, in an era of decreasing budgets, has potentially grave implications, particularly with
regard to the military's capability to respond to actual threats to U.S. security. U.S. national
security strategy can accommodate idealism, but in the end it must be grounded in self-interest.
Otherwise, it courts peril.
xiv
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It is indeed an animating thought, that while we are securing the rights
of ourselves and our posterity, we are pointing out the way to struggling nations,
who wish like us to emerge from their tyrannies also. 1
President Clinton, in A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement,
declared the promotion of democracy to be one of the keys to ensuring America's security in the
post-Cold War world:
Our national security strategy [NSS] is...based on enlarging the
community of market democracies while deterring and limiting a range of
threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and
political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in
countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the
more our people are likely to prosper.2
The most recent guidance from the White House, A National Security Strategyfor a New
Century, echoes this sentiment, stating that "the trend toward democracy and free markets
throughout the world advances American interests."3
The ideal of fostering peace and (ultimately) security through democracy is a recurring
theme throughout U.S. history. President Reagan, in a June 1982 speech before the British
Parliament, urged "a global campaign for democratic development." He considered the "crusade
'President Thomas Jefferson, correspondence "To Hunter," 1790, in Saul K. Padover, ed.,
Democracy (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939), 42.
President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement
(Washington D.C.: The White House, 1996), 2-3.
'President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategyfor a New Century (Washington D.C.
The White House, 1997), 2.
for freedom" to be crucial to the development of world peace.4 Indeed, even as early as April
1917, President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed (somewhat more eloquently than either Reagan or
Clinton) that: "Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the
life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and
self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth
ensure the observance of those principles."5
President Clinton's assertions, as well as those of his predecessors, are based upon the
principles of a proposition of international relations theory commonly referred to as the
"democratic peace." Expressed simply, this theory states that democracies have demonstrated a
remarkable reluctance to go to war with one another and that, therefore, expanding the rolls of
democracies will promote world peace and thus, ultimately, America's security. 6
That democratic states are inherently peaceful, at least in their relations with other
democracies, is not a novel observation. More than two centuries ago, the German philosopher
Immanuel Kant noted that republics were reluctant to go to war against each other and theorized
President Ronald W. Reagan, New York Times, 9 June 1982; quoted in Michael W. Doyle, "Kant,
Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller,
eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), 3.
'President Woodrow Wilson, War Message of 2 April 1917; in Albert Shaw, ed., The Messages
and Papers of Woodrow Wilson (New York: The Review of Reviews, 1924), 378; quoted in Doyle, "Kant,
Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,'T3.
6Although there is substantial overlap between "democratic peace" and "liberal peace" (also
expressed as "liberal international theory"), the terms are not synonymous. The difference lies in the
mechanics of governance. Strictly defined, a democracy involves government by the people, either
directly or through elected representatives, with some provision for civil rights. Liberalism, in contrast, is
primarily concerned with guaranteeing individual rights or freedoms from government control and does not
necessarily include stipulations for popular government. Liberal rights are civil, religious, and importantly,
political in nature. This is where the confusion begins: freedom to actively participate in government is
often cited as a protected liberal right. Therefore, "liberalism" is frequently (albeit imprecisely) used
interchangeably with "democracy." Yet, it is quite possible to have a liberal state that is not democratic.
The permutations and variegations of the term democracy, in conjunction with liberal rights, will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapter II.
that they would, therefore, be likely to enjoy a "perpetual peace" with each other. Competing
ideologies have, however, impeded the practical application of this theory. President Wilson's
goal of worldwide democratic self-determination and peace was thwarted, in part, by the rise to
prominence of fascism. Following the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II, the specter of
communism loomed as an ominous and disruptive force.
In 1983, Michael Doyle, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton
University, resurrected the idea of a "democratic peace" in an article entitled "Kant, Liberal
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." This article, as well as the promise of lasting peace among
democracies, languished in relative obscurity until the collapse of communism and the
dismantlement of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Prior to these pivotal events, U.S. policymakers were
consumed with the rhetoric and animosity of the Cold War. Subsequently, it was unrealistic to
even consider the potential for a democratic peace. Doyle's work and democratic peace theory
as a whole were dismissed as wishful thinking that was simply not pertinent to the circumstances
present in the international realm at that time. But, "To everything there is a season...." 7 While
fascism and communism have been exposed as bankrupt ideologies, democracy is enjoying a
resurgence of respectability, and Doyle and the democratic peace have become causes celebres.
According to Francis Fukuyama, former Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S.
State Department and a resident consultant at the RAND Corporation, democracy is the only
viable political ideology remaining:
As Mankind approaches the end of the millennium, the twin crises of
authoritarianism and socialist central planning have left only one competitor
standing in the ring as an ideology of potential universal validity: liberal
democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty. Two
7Ecclesiastes 3:1, Hebrew Bible, in Columbia Dictionary ofQuotations (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993), compiled in Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.
hundred years after they first animated the French and American revolutions, the
principles of liberty and equality have proven not just durable but resurgent. 8
The resurgence of democracy, viewed through the prism of democratic peace theory, has
fueled unbridled enthusiasm about the potential for resolving conflict in a world populated by
democratic states. Indeed, Policymakers and pundits alike have embraced the democratic peace
as a sure thing: "The absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have
to an empirical law in international relations."9 Thus, what was once an irrelevant theory of
international relations is now not only accepted as common knowledge, but has been codified in
U.S. national security strategy.
As an added bonus, the implementation of democratic peace theory through
"Engagement and Enlargement" is a welcome opportunity to abandon realpolitik in favor of the
pursuit of a U.S. foreign policy that matches the ideals upon which this country was built. For
the American public, the notion of ending wars by promoting democracy is certainly a palatable
prescription for national security. According to Strobe Talbot, Deputy Secretary of State, it
combines just the right mix of ideology, enthusiasm, and optimism:
The American people have never accepted traditional geopolitics or pure
balance-of-power calculations as sufficient reason to expend national treasure or
to dispatch American soldiers to foreign lands. Throughout this century the U.S.
government has explained its decisions to send troops "over there" with some
invocation of democracy and its defense. 10
"Francis Fukuyama, The End ofHistory and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 42.
9Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds.,
The Origin and Prevention ofMajor Wars (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 88;
quoted in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E.
Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), ix.
10Strobe Talbot, "Democracy and the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 6
(November/December 1996): 49.
Not surprisingly, Doyle concurs, adding that:
[I] in the United States, and in other liberal states to a lesser degree,
public policy derives its legitimacy from its concordance with liberal principles.
Policies not rooted in liberal principles generally fail to sustain long term [sic]
public support. 11
Yet, rejoicing over the propriety and promise of a democratic peace is premature.
Although extremely seductive, democratic peace is in fact not a sure thing. Rather, it is fraught
with potential pitfalls. Democratic ideals, however appealing they are to the American public,
are not assured of unchallenged supremacy. Nor are they guaranteed to bring about a more
peaceful world. Therefore, rather than the final step on the path to lasting peace, the crusade to
spread and nurture democratic values worldwide is an unproductive drain on resources which
obscures realistic and obtainable foreign policy goals. Ultimately, "Engagement and
Enlargement" may jeopardize national security because it entangles the United States in "costly
and counterproductive foreign interventions." 12 And, the opposite end of the spectrum may be
even more dangerous: the false sense of security engendered by a "democratic peace" may lull
the U.S. into a state of complacency and unpreparedness from which it will unable to respond to
national security challenges.
The object of this thesis is to demonstrate that democratic peace theory is not an
appropriate foundation for crafting U.S. national security strategy. My approach will be two-
pronged: first, I will establish that democracy, as the term is understood by Americans, is not a
"Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M.
Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press,
1996), 49.
12Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E.
Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), xiv.
universally desirable export. Instead, as I will demonstrate, cultural factors, ethnic nationalism,
and economics create imperatives that can (alone or in combination) thwart efforts to develop
democracy. Second, I will cite the actions taken by the intelligence services of democratic states
against fellow democracies - to include espionage, economic espionage, and covert action - to
illustrate that peace is not without peril.
The tack I will employ in my examination of democratic peace theory is indirect and
somewhat unsusual. I do not intend to challenge the primary claim of the democratic peace -
namely that democracies do not go to war with each other - for two reasons. First, such an
exercise does not appear to lend itself to satisfactorily definitive pronouncements. Indeed,
learned academicians have endlessly debated the democratic peace in scholarly journals and
books, yet have been unable to derive an unequivocal conclusion regarding its veracity. 13
Second, it is my contention that whether or not the assertions of a democratic peace can be
accepted at face value is irrelevant. Even if democratic peace is a valid phenomenom, it is not
sufficient to guarantee U.S. national security as many of the potential perils that exist in the
international realm are not mitigated by its principles. Therefore, blind adherence to and
application of the tenets of this theory remain problematic. Ultimately, I will demonstrate that
democratic peace theory is a perilous foundation upon which to build U.S. security strategy.
I3A number of important essays that deliberate the possibility of a democratic peace have been
collected and compiled by the editors of International Security in a volume entitled Debating the
Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).
II. BACKGROUND
A. DEFINING DEMOCRACY
Equality of rights spelled liberalism, equality of votes democracy,
equality of goods socialism. 14
An evaluation of the tenets of the democratic peace would be incomplete without first
identifying just what "democracy" is. The term, as defined by Webster's, is fairly
straightforward and, at first, seems readily acceptable: "a government in which the supreme
power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of
representation [usually] involving periodically held free elections." 15 This definition, however,
belies the excess baggage in the form of aspirations and expectations that has become attached to
democracy. Rather than simply a means to an end (representative government), democracy has
been embraced as a cure-all for a variety of ills, to include inequality, inefficiency, injustice,
conflict, and limitations on freedom. Indeed, according to Roland N. Stromberg, former
professor of history and now prolific author, democracy is everything to everyone:
[In] popular parlance, democracy has become confused or amalgamated
or overlaid with other ideas. There is a puzzling conflation of things logically
separate or even contradictory in what is commonly called democracy. 16
MRoland N. Stromberg, Democracy: A Short Analytical History (Armonk, N.Y.:
M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996), 7. Stromberg is the author of numerous books, including European Intellectual
History since 1 789 and Europe in the Twentieth Century. He has taught at the University of Maryland and
Southern Illinois University, and is now retired from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
15
'Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1985 ed.
16Stromberg, 7.
Philippe Schmitter, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, dismisses the illusion
that democracy is the answer to all political ills: "the mere advent of democracy does not also
bring freedom and equality, growth and equity, security and opportunity, efficiency and
responsiveness, autonomy and accountability...." 17 Indeed, if the will of the majority reigns
supreme, it may impinge upon individual freedoms (such as those guaranteed in the U.S. Bill of
Rights). And while equality at the ballot box provides all citizens a voice in government, it does
not always ensure equal opportunity with regard to the distribution of economic benefits.
Finally, while the consultative nature of democracy aims to allocate resources in a manner which
effectively reflects need, the process of compromise itself can be inherently time-consuming and
inefficient.
Clearly democracy, at least as it is practiced in the United States, is not a simple
phenomenon which lends itself easily to a single-sentence definition. Rather, it is a complicated,
delicate, constantly evolving balance between contradictions - rights and responsibilities,
limitations and possibilities - that is derived from several centuries of experimentation and
adjustment. Despite this intricacy, by revisiting Webster's definition and re-examining it in
detail, one can achieve a greater understanding with regard to the characteristics and implications
of democracy. This understanding will be crucial to an accurate assessment of the universality
of democracy and, ultimately, the overall value of a democratic peace.
l7Philippe C. Schmitter, "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy," Journal ofDemocracy 5, no. 2
(April 1994): 61-62.
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1. Power Vested in the People
A government "of the people, by the people, and for the people" 18 begs the question:
Which people? Who is to be considered a legitimate participant in the governance of the state? 19
Historically, philosophers, writers, and leaders have viewed the common man with equal parts
suspicion, fear, and loathing. As late as the mid- 19th century Ralph Waldo Emerson decried the
roiling masses to be "rude, lame, unmade, [and] pernicious in their demands and influence...."20
Henry David Thoreau concurred, concluding that the populace, en masse, "never comes up to the
standard of its best member, but on the contrary degrades itself to a level with the lowest."21
Until the middle of the 20th century, democracy, particularly near-universal franchise, was
viewed as a radical and dangerous idea. Not surprisingly, the privilege of voting was reserved
for citizens who owned property (and therefore had a legitimate stake in ensuring sound
government) and occasionally for those who were educated enough to exercise the right wisely.
Closely linked to the arbitrary and unpredictable nature of the masses was the fear of a
"tyranny of the majority." In 1787, James Madison, then a member of the Continental Congress,
warned of the potential for measures to be decided "not according to the rules ofjustice, and the
18President Abraham Lincoln, "Gettysburg Address," in The Dictionary ofCultural Literacy, 1991
ed. This speech was presented on November 19, 1863 during the dedication of a cemetery for soldiers at
the site of the Battle of Gettysburg.
19David Held, "Democracy: from City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?," in David Held, ed.,
Prospectsfor Democracy (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1993), 20.
20Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Considerations By the Way," The Conduct ofLife, in Columbia
Dictionary ofQuotations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), compiled in Microsoft Office
Professional 7.0/Bookshelf 1995 edition. CD-ROM.
21Henry David Thoreau, Journals (entry for March 14, 1838), in Columbia Dictionary of
Quotations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), compiled in Microsoft Office Professional
7.0/Bookshelf 1995 edition. CD-ROM.
rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority."22
French novelist Gustave Flaubert lamented approximately 100 years later that "It will no longer
be a despot that oppresses the individual, but the masses."23 Clearly measures that mitigated the
potential capriciousness of democracy were warranted. The effort to develop such measures -
which would protect individual freedoms and guarantee the rights of citizens against the
capriciousness of an intolerant faction (whether a majority or a minority of the whole) - was,
once again, championed by Madison: "To secure the public good and private rights against the
danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of populace
government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed."24 This desire to forge a
compromise between government by the people (democracy) and individual rights and freedom
from government control (liberalism) has resulted in the tradition referred to as "liberal
democracy."25 Ultimately, it entails a never-ending balancing act between the rights of the
individual and responsibility to the community.
The United States is indisputably a liberal democracy. Yet, while liberalism "gives
democracy moral depth by insisting on the inviolability of basic human rights and on the
protection of minorities and dissenting individuals,"26 most Americans do not differentiate
between the two concepts. They are viewed as one in the same. This fact has interesting and
important implications - which will be developed further - for the universal export of democracy.
"President James Madison, "No. 10," in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, & James Madison, The
Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), 77.
23Gustave Flaubert, quoted in Stromberg, 36.
24Madison, 80.
25This dichotomy is also referred to as the "positive" and "negative" aspects of democracy. The
former involves facilitation of popular participation; the latter is a tool to combat tyranny.
26Held, 166.
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2. Exercised Directly or Indirectly
Democracy, as developed and practiced by Greek city-states some twenty-four hundred
years ago, involved "continuous participation of the people in the direct exercise of power...."27
Society consisted of individuals, equal before the law, who personally exercised rights to protect
their interests. Although the demos included only free-born citizens - slaves, and certainly
women were excluded - the direct democracy "of antiquity was undoubtedly the closest possible
approximation to a literal democracy in which governors and governed stood side by side and
dealt with each other face to face."28 Because of its simplicity and seemingly incontrovertible
fairness, direct democracy has been lionized as the ideal democracy. Yet, even as practiced by
the ancient Greeks, direct democracy was flawed: "there is not the same emphasis as in liberal
democracy on protecting the individual against the power of the state, since the will of the
majority is paramount and the state exists to execute that will."29 An additional, perhaps more
pertinent shortcoming relates to the feasibility of employing participatory democracy to govern
the large, diverse, and dispersed polities that exist today. According to Giovanni Sartori,
Professor of Humanities at Columbia University:
[D]irect, real self-government cannot be presumed; it requires the actual
presence and participation of the people concerned. It is impossible to have
direct democracy at a distance and meaningful self-government among
absentees.... Thus, when vast territories and entire nations are involved, direct
democracy becomes an unusable formula. 30
"Giovanni Sartori, The Theory ofDemocracy Revisited (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House
Publishers, Inc., 1987), 280.
28
Ibid. Direct democracy is also referred to as monistic, totalitarian, organic, radical, or
participatory democracy.





While vestiges survive in the form of referendums, city councils, and school boards, direct
democracy is largely an anachronism in today's world.31
If direct democracy is inappropriate and unobtainable for modern states, the only other
democratic alternative is modern democracy, where the will of the people is exercised indirectly
through elected representatives.32 While direct democracy emphasizes conformity and consensus
building, representational democracy consists primarily of confrontation and competition
between different interest groups. The state does not exist to execute the will of the majority, but
rather serves "as a referee to ensure the representation and protection of [these] diverse
interests."33 While the protection of individual rights and the prevention of the tyranny of the
majority is the primary concern of modern democracy, effective representation and protection of
interests is a close (and not unrelated) second concern. A third goal is effective management of
the process of competition and confrontation between interest groups. The trick is to balance the
right for all pertinent voices to be heard against the desire to reach an amenable course of action
in a timely manner. This is a difficult task, which, according to Madison, requires considerable
calculation and thought:
In the first place it is to be remarked that however small the Republic
may be the representatives must be raised to a certain number in order to guard
against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be they must be
limited to a certain number in order to guard against the confusion of a
multitude.34
-"Pinkney, 8. Stromberg adds that direct democracy continues to be exercised in a few Swiss
cantons.




Proponents must concede that representational democracy is not always able to avoid
confusion when weighing the varied interests of the multitude. And outright critics fume that
representational democracy is a misnomer: far from being representational, modern democracy
is instead an oligarchy of elites that benefits from privileged political connections and an unequal
distribution of resources. Although these are valid criticisms, representational democracy
remains the most effective way to implement a government of the people, by the people, for the
people.
3. Free Elections
Samuel Huntington, Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard University, has
declared that "Elections, open, free, and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine
qua non."35 Although not inaccurate, this point requires further elaboration. While elections are
certainly necessary, they alone are not a sufficient condition of democracy36 This is because
elections can be flawed, manipulated, or just plain ignored by the regime currently in power.
Therefore, Huntington's distinction of "free" and "fair" elections is significant.
Voting and elections are mechanisms for citizens to register their opinions, to come to a
decision regarding candidates specifically, and issues in general. Ideally voters will make
informed decisions. But upon what do they base their views? Clearly, the open exchange of
35Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991),
9. Huntington is also the Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard. For those
who, like the author of this thesis, did not have the benefit of an education in classical Latin, sine qua non
refers to an essential element or condition.
36Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems ofDemocratic Transition and Consolidation
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 4. Linz and Stepan refer to the mistaken assumption
that a necessary condition of democracy, free elections, is a sufficient condition of democracy as the
"electoralist fallacy."
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ideas that precedes elections is crucial to the democratic process:
Voting has a prevoting background. While we must not downgrade the
importance of elections, we cannot isolate the electoral event from the whole
circuit of the opinion-forming process. Electoral power per se is the mechanical
guarantee of democracy; but the substantive guarantee is given by the conditions
under which the citizen gets information and is exposed to the pressure of
opinion makers. 37
Therefore, free elections are those in which the "civil and political freedoms to speak, publish,
assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral
campaigns"38 are not constrained. This point is crucial. In essence, you cannot truly have
democracy unless it is supported by appropriate liberal rights and freedoms. Ultimately, without
an open exchange of ideas, elections are not "free" nor is it likely that they are relevant.
Fairness is the second prerequisite which must be met for elections, and ultimately for
democracy, to be considered valid. Fairness implies competing for political power by the rules
and abiding by the electoral outcome even though it may not directly serve one's self-interest.
Adam Przeworski, an eminent political scientist, expresses it as the process of institutionalizing
uncertainty:
In an authoritarian regime, some groups, typically the armed forces,
have the capacity of intervening whenever the result of a conflict is contrary to
their program or their interests. In a democracy, no group is able to intervene
when outcomes of conflicts violate their self-perceived interests. Democracy
means that all groups must subject themselves to uncertainty.39
"Sartori, 86.
"Huntington, The Third Wave, 1.
39Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy," in Guillermo
O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule, Volume III of IV (Baltimore,
Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 58.
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Uncertainty begins at the ballot box and is repeated at each stage of the decision-making process.
Democratic fair-play demands that self-interests be willingly subjected to such ambiguity.
In summation, the American democratic experience is representational in nature,
involving near-universal suffrage that is exercised through regular, free, and fair elections.
Additionally, particular emphasis is placed on liberal freedoms to both guarantee the rights of
individuals and support the integrity of the process. A discussion of whether this particular brand
of democracy is suitable for export will be reserved for Chapter III, however, unless otherwise
stated, "democracy" in this thesis will refer to the general definition reached in the preceding
pages.
B. DEMOCRATIC PEACE
Virtue and interest are inseparable.40
An examination of democratic peace theory should begin with a dissection of the terms
of its principle tenet, namely, that sovereign states that have successfully consolidated
democracy do not go to war with each other.41 As the concept of democracy has already been
rigorously examined, let us turn to the idea of sovereignty. Bruce Russett, a Dean Acheson
Professor of International Relations and Political Science at Yale University, defines sovereign
states as those entities which are "internationally recognized as such by other states, including by
40President Thomas Jefferson, correspondence "To Logan," 1816, in Saul K. Padover, ed.,
Democracy (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1939), 42.
41As mention briefly in Chapter I, there are similarities between the notions of a democratic peace
and a liberal peace (i.e., peace between liberal states). However, as the range of what may be considered a
liberal state is quite broad, the latter is a far more difficult proposition to defend than the former.
Additionally, U.S. national security strategy (NSS) is specifically concerned with enlarging the number of
democracies. Accordingly, this thesis will investigate only the implications for NSS with regard to a
democratic peace.
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major powers whose recognitions of a government typically confers de facto statehood."42 The
idea of state sovereignty, in combination with citizens who posses political and economic
freedom and exercise their legal rights to choose a representative government, is crucial to
democratic peace theory: "Since morally autonomous citizens hold rights to liberty, the states
that democratically represent them have the right to exercise political independence."43
Therefore, out of mutual respect, other democratic states must refrain from intervening in their
affairs. This assertion will be pivotal to a later discussion of the malevolent actions taken by
democracies against like states.
While theorists argue that democracies do not go to war with democracies, they do not
suggest that they are passive by nature. On the contrary, democracies have shown a remarkable
propensity and, at times, even an eagerness to go to war with nondemocratic states. As
mentioned previously, the key is mutual respect between like states. But recognition must
precede respect. If two democracies do not recognize each other as such, they are no less likely
to engage in conflict than would a democracy and a nondemocratic state at an impasse over
competing national interests. This point is significant with regard to the interaction of culture
and democracy. Will the adaption of democratic principles, values, and institutions to the
characteristics of one culture be recognized and accepted by another? While a general definition
of democracy has been proffered in the preceding section, it remains to be seen if it can and will
be applied across cultural lines.
Continuing with the explanation of terms, democratic peace is caveated by the
stipulation that the democracies in question must be "consolidated" or "constitutionally secure."
42Bruce Russett, "The Fact of Democratic Peace," in Michael E. Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and
Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), 71.
43Doyle, "Kant, Liberal legacies, and Foreign Affairs," 10.
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That is, democracy must be "the only game in town."44 As explained by political scientists Juan
J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, this occurs when:
all the actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political
conflict will be resolved according to the established norms and that violations
of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly.... [W]ith
consolidation, democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social,
institutional, and even psychological life, as well as in calculations for achieving
success.
45
War, our final term, is defined by Russett as "large-scale institutionally organized lethal
violence."46 And what is large-scale? J. David Singer and Melvin Small, social scientists who
have compiled an authoritative and exhaustive compendium of statistics from interstate wars for
the period of 1816-1965, offer the following guidelines:
Conflict involving at least one member of [the] interstate system [i.e., a
sovereign state] on each side of the war, resulting in a total of 1000 or more
battle deaths. Thresholds for individual nation's participation are at least 100
battle deaths or at least 1 000 troops in active combat.47
It is of great significance that war, as defined above, is the only measure that concerns
democratic peace theorists in their attempts to gauge the potential for hostility between
democracies. Other offenses, such as covert action to overthrow a legitimately elected




46Russett, "The Fact of Democratic Peace," 69.
47
J. David Singer and Melvin Small, The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), 381.
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Second, they are not subjected to the public's scrutiny and, therefore, possible disapproval:
This definition...excludes, on theoretical grounds, covert actions in
which one government secretly undertakes activities, including the use of lethal
violence and the support of violent actors within the other government's
territory, either to coerce or to overthrow that government.... [T]hese activities
[and others relating to intelligence], precisely because they are [secretive and ]
denied at the time by the government that undertakes them, imply very different
political processes than does a war publicly and officially undertaken.48
This is a myopic viewpoint: it ignores the fact that publicly-elected representatives provide
oversight for such acts, and it underestimates the impact of such actions on the stability and
security of the target nation. A incisive question from a learned colleague reinforces this point:
Does it really make a difference to a country whether it loses its
sovereignty through war or covert action? In the end, it still relinquishes
sovereignty. 49
The dangers to national security - short of war - that are perpetually present in the international
realm, even during peacetime, will receive further elaboration in Chapter IV of this thesis.
1. Institutional Constraints
With our terminology now in order, it is possible to examine the unique characteristics
of democracies that purportedly constrain them from engaging in war with one another. There
are three commonly-accepted explanations for the special relationship attributed to democratic
states. The first, the structural or institutional constraints model, is summarized by Christopher
Layne, a faculty member of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey:
[Democratic governments are reluctant to go to war because they must
answer to their citizens. Citizens pay the price for war in blood and treasure; if
48Russet, "The Fact of a Democratic Peace," 71.
49David McAllister, classroom discussion, Research Colloquium, Monterey, 6 June 1997.
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the price of conflict is high, democratic governments may fall victim to electoral
retribution. Moreover, in democratic states, foreign policy decisions carrying
the risk of war are debated openly and not made behind closed doors, which
means that both the public and policymakers are sensitized to costs of fighting. 50
A second postulate of the international constraints argument focuses on the checks and
balances that are a common characteristic of democracies. Of particular importance are
institutional constraints which may restrict the primary decision-maker's ability to act:
When the authority and power to decide for war rests in the hands of a
single person and that leader opts for war, the state is committed to fight. If
institutions or individuals other than the executive must also approve such a
decision, less belligerent elements of society have a greater chance of
moderating policy.51
Ultimately, the citizens of a democracy, through public opinion and the voice of their
electoral representatives, control when they will engage in armed conflict. If they are to brave
the calamities and devastation of war, it will not be in response to the whims of an authoritarian
ruler, but rather an exceptional cause of their own choosing.
2. Normative Values
Enter the second factor which constrains democracies from warring against each other:
normative values. Because democracies share common values, specifically a pacific means for
resolving conflict and a predisposition to cooperate, their citizens are unlikely to view a fellow
50Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," in Michael E. Brown,
Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass: MIT
Press, 1996), 160-1. Layne is summarizing the arguments of Michael Doyle, who, in turn, elaborates upon
the writings of the 18th century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant.
5I T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints,
and War," Journal ofConflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 191
.
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democracy as a threat, particularly one so exceptional as to warrant risking the ravages of war.52
Russett concurs: "the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the
peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence within countries come to apply
across national boundaries toward other democratic countries."53 The end result is a fraternal
relationship characterized by mutual respect and appreciation that is resistant to the urge to settle
differences with force. As one might expect, democratic states do not have nearly so inherently
amicable relationships with non-democratic states. According to Russett, suspicion, rather than
respect, is the initial response:
According to democratic norms, authoritarian states do not rest on the
proper consent of the governed, and thus they cannot properly represent the will
of their peoples - if they did, they would not need to rule through undemocratic,
authoritarian institutions. Rulers who control their own people by such means,
who do not behave in a just way that respects their own people's rights to self-




The third and final constraint upon warlike behavior between democracies is economic
interdependence. According to Doyle, economic incentives serve as a self-perpetuating boost to
normative values: "When states respect each other's rights, individuals are free to establish
private international ties without state interference. Profitable exchanges between merchants
and educational exchanges among scholars then create a web of mutual advantages and
52
In an authoritarian government, leadership decisions are the prerogative of a select few.
Democratic leadership, in contrast, is shaped by the will of the majority. Therefore, in an effort to forge
this majority, decisions are products of concessions, compromises, and cooperation.
"Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 31.
54Bruce Russett, "Why Democratic Peace," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and
Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), 93.
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commitments that bolsters sentiments of public respect."55 As this "web" of advantages and
commitments becomes larger and more intricate, states will become increasingly reluctant to act
in a manner which jeopardizes this valuable interaction.
C. REALIST CRITIQUE
First and foremost we are to make the world safe for ourselves.56
Where democratic peace theorists believe that common institutions and values
encourage cooperation, realists declare that competition is king. This is because international
politics is anarchic by nature, governed only by the law of self-preservation:
[TJhere is no central authority capable of making and enforcing rules of
behavior on the international system's units (states). The absence of a rule-
making and enforcing authority means that each unit in the system is
responsible for ensuring its own survival and also free to define its own
interests and to employ means of its own choice in pursuing them. 57
Pursuit of self-interest as a means to ensure self-preservation includes, but is not limited to,
engaging in preemptive wars. Trust and cooperation, meanwhile, become unaffordable
luxuries. Survival as a state is predicated solely on the ability to compete successfully in the
international realm. Failure has grave consequences: "In international politics, states that come
55Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," 10.
56President Theodore Roosevelt, quoted in Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in
America's Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 264; quoted in Joshua
Muravchik, Exporting Democracy (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1992), 19. This was Roosevelt's
response to Wilson's idealistic rhetoric about entering World War I to make the world safe for democracy.
"Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," 163.
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out on the short end of political competition face potentially.. .extreme outcomes, ranging from
constraints on autonomy to occupation to extinction."58
Not surprisingly, realists quickly dismiss the causal logic that forms the basis for
democratic peace theory. The emphasis on institutional constraints as a means to prevent wars
between democracies is viewed as inadequate. Christopher Layne explains:
If democratic public opinion really had the effect ascribed to it,
democracies would be peaceful in their relations with all states, whether
democratic or not. If citizens and policymakers of a democracy were especially
sensitive to the human and material costs of war, that sensitivity should be
evident whenever their state is on the verge of war, regardless of whether the
adversary is democratic: the lives lost and money spent will be the same.59
Democratic norms and culture are also found to be flawed. Respect and appreciation
for similar perceptions, values, institutions, and culture are believed to prevent democratic
states from going to war with each other. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the more
uniform these common characteristics are, the less likely conflict is to occur. The U.S. Civil
War, however, casts serious doubts upon this assertion: "if democratic norms and culture fail to
prevent the outbreak of civil war within democracies, what reason is there to believe that they
will prevent the outbreak of interstate wars between democracies?"60
Finally, with regard to the imperatives of economic interdependence, realists
acknowledge that it is difficult to relinquish the considerable advantages of international trade:
"States are surely concerned about prosperity, and thus economic calculations are hardly trivial
58Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace, 163. Layne adds that international
competition "differs crucially from domestic politics in liberal societies, where the losers can accept an






for them."61 However, realists are also quick to reiterate that states exist in an anarchical system
where survival is the primary goal. Therefore, "when push comes to shove, international
political considerations [rather than economic concerns] will be paramount in the minds of
decision-makers."62
Despite this assertion, there is considerable empirical evidence that suggests that
democracies have not in fact gone to war with each other. Realists dismiss this body of work
for several reasons. First, they argue that definitions of "democracy" and "war" are moving
targets which are routinely skewed to accommodate what otherwise would have been
exceptions to the democratic peace. Second, they point out that not only are wars an infrequent
occurrence, but that there have been, until recently, few democracies and even fewer cases
where they were in a position to fight:
Until 1871, liberal democracies did not account for more than five
percent of the total number of nation-state dyads, and the figure did not top ten
percent until this century. Democracies were rare, but so were wars. During 44
of the years between 1816 and 1899 there were no wars at all, and there was
only one dyad at war during 21 of the years. While the number and percentage
of liberal dyads grew during the nineteenth century, war remained infrequent....
[Pjeace was too common an occurrence to require explanation by variation in
the number of liberal democracies.63
Lastly, any correlation between democracy and peace in the past does not ensure its projection
into the future. As the composition of the international system of states changes, and as
6,John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," in Sean M.
Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospectsfor Peace (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1993), 180.
"Ibid.
63David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-
Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996),
220.
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democracies become more prevalent, the very characteristics which are alleged to prevent
democracies from engaging in fratricide may be replaced by seeds of discontent:
In the absence of a communist or fascist block of enemies, there will be
less need for democracies to huddle together for survival.... And, almost
inevitably, as more liberal states crowd into the world, the more they will
quarrel over things states always quarrel over: territorial ambitions, economic
interests, spheres of influence, feuding allies, arms build-ups, irredentist
minorities, nationalist grievances and so on.64
Clearly, with regard to the dynamics of international relations, there is a fundamental
disagreement between democratic peace theorists and realists. After one has endured dizzying
salvoes of point and counter-point from learned academicians, there still does not appear to be a
decisive answer as to whether democracies do or do not go to war with each other. The
exclusive focus on this question, however, may be clouding our understanding of the
relationships between democracies. War is a violent, costly, and definitive act; yet it is only
one reference point by which to measure the relationship between states. Unfortunately,
democratic peace theorists are preoccupied with this single (usually calamitous) intersection
between states and have disregarded less dramatic forms of inter-state relations which, while
they do not meet the threshold of "war," are still significant indicators of how all states,
including democratic ones, interact with each other. Thus, while democratic peace may actually
accurately account for the absence of war (as defined by Singer and Small) between
democracies, it is not able to explain why these same states demonstrate little compunction
about engaging in lesser acts of aggression against their brethren. Many of these lesser acts, to
include espionage and covert action, fall under the purview of a state's intelligence services.
Their existence contradicts the claim that relationships between democracies are characterized
^"Democracies and War: The Politics of Peace," The Economist, 1 April 1995, p. 18.
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by mutual respect, cooperation, and non-interference. As will be demonstrated in Chapter IV,
the activities of secret services are part enigma and part anathema to democratic peace theorists.
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III. IS DEMOCRACY UNIVERSAL?
One thing at Moscow, one at Rome
A third in Sudan and a fourth at home.65
U.S. national security strategy blithely advocates a messianic mission to promote
democracy throughout the world: "Our responsibility is to build the world of tomorrow by
embarking on a period of construction - one based on current realities but [also] enduring American
values and interests."66 Global commitment to the values of freedom and respect for human rights
are heralded as "not only just, but pragmatic, for strengthened democratic institutions benefit the
U.S. and the world."67 This certainly plays well in Peoria, but is it applicable to the rest of the
world? Is democracy a universal truth? It should be noted that democracy in the United States has
received the benefit of two centuries of development, and is now institutionalized and ingrained
in the American psyche. Yet, as indicated by Stromberg, it is assumed that it can be exported with
ease:
Other societies, which have not undergone the peculiar centuries-long
experience of Western Europe, Great Britain, and the United States, are expected
to absorb this [concept of democracy] overnight, taking, as it were, a prescription
filled out in Washington and bought at the World Bank pharmacy and that was
supposed to act immediately.68
The intricate theoretical implications of democracy are extremely difficult to grasp conceptually.
"Christopher Hollis, quoted in Stromberg, 4.
"President William Clinton, "Preface," A National Security Strategyfor a New Century





To practice them effectively, however, often becomes a herculean task. Indeed, despite
considerable practical experience, democracy does not appear to "work particularly well even for
us."
69 Elections in the United States are commonly perceived to be exercises in futility. Candidates
would rather sling mud than discuss issues, special interest groups exercise overwhelming
influence, choices are often limited to the lesser of two evils, and, even if one does utilize the right
to vote, there is a perception that nothing ever changes. As Gore Vidal observed, democracy "is
a place where numerous elections are held at great cost without issues and with interchangeable
candidates."70 Consequently, voter apathy is a common malaise: less than half of America's
eligible American voters participated in the last presidential election. 71 According to J.P. Monroe,
a Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, this does not bode well for democracy:
Here you have halfthe eligible voters electing the most important political
official in the country. That carries tremendous implications. When more and
more people don't participate, you cease to be a democracy. 72
To make matters worse, many believe the democratic balance between civil liberties and the good
of the community has been irrevocably altered in favor of rampant individualism.
69Stromberg, 136.
70Gore Vidal, "Gods and Greens," Observer (London), 27 Aug. 1989; in Columbia Dictionary of
Quotations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), compiled in Microsoft Office Professional
7.0/Bookshelf. 1995 edition. CD-ROM.
7l
"Voter Turnout Lowest Since 1924," Associated Press. Online. Freedom Communications, Inc.
Newspaper, no date. Available HTTP: http://www.limanews.com/electionpkj/natvote.html. 7 June 1997.
The American Voter Coalition, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization "dedicated to registering, educating
and inspiring all Americans to vote" notes that participation in the electoral process has steadily declined
for the last fifty years and estimates that currently 70 million eligible Americans are not registered to vote.
See "National Voter Registration Day," American Voter Coalition - Campaign '96. Online. Global Web
Publishing, no date. Available HTTP: http://www.avc.org/camp'96/nvrd.htm. 6 June 1997.
72
J. P. Monroe, quoted in "Voter Turnout Lowest since 1924." The flips side of this argument is
that people are comfortable and confident with the status quo and will vote only if and when they feel their
interests are threatened.
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IfAmerican democracy is in such disarray, is it appropriate for the United States to embark
on a proselytizing crusade for democratic values? The answer from many parts of the globe is a
resounding "no." Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, certainly believes that America's
effort to impose democracy is an egregious error:
It is not my business to tell people what's wrong with their system. It is
my business to tell people not to foist their system indiscriminately on societies in
which it will not work.73
Lee believes that cultural values, specifically "Asian values," prohibit the adoption of democracy
in many societies. There are additional factors, specifically ethnic nationalism and economic
deprivation, which may impinge on the exportability of democracy. The purpose of this chapter
is to determine the degree to which each of these elements, alone or in combination, present a
barrier to the implementation of democracy.
A. CULTURE
Culture is the one thing that we cannot deliberately aim at. It is the
product of variety of more or less harmonious activities, each pursued for its own
sake. 74
In contrast to T. S. Eliot's definition, Webster's Dictionary offers a somewhat more staid
explanation of culture, defining it as "the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a
"Lee Kuan Yew, in Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,"
Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 1 10. Lee Kuan Yew was the prime minster of Singapore
from its independence in 1959 until 1990. After stepping aside he bestowed himself with the title of Senior
Minster and, as such, still exercise considerable influence upon government affairs in Singapore.
Additionally, while the Senior Minister feigns reluctance to point out the flaws of other people's systems of
government, it appears to take very little to coax him into a diatribe on what is wrong with the U.S.: "guns,
drugs, violent crime, vagrancy, unbecoming behavior in public - in sum the breakdown of civil society."
See Zakaria, 111.
74
T. S. Eliot, Notes Towards the Definition ofCulture, in Rhoda Thomas Tripp, ed., International
Thesaurus ofQuotations (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 129.
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racial, religious, or social group."75 Even with assistance from both of these sources, culture, like
democracy, remains an elusive term "which has as much concrete definition as a snowflake in
June."76 To begin with, it is difficult to separate, identify, and delineate the factors that are integral
to a generic concept of culture. Additionally, assigning each factor a relative weight of importance
as it is blended to create "culture" further increases the degree of difficulty associated with defining
this term. If the general concept of culture defies satisfactory definition, it follows that it will be
particularly vexing (and perhaps impossible) to definitively identify and delineate the specific
cultural characteristics of a given population. And yet, it is readily apparent and commonly
acknowledged that there are differences between cultures around the world. Clearly, the
amorphous nature of culture presents difficulties. In one sense, it is comparable to former U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's comments with regard to pornography: it is difficult to
define intelligibly but you know it when you see it. 77
Fukuyama, in his article entitled "The Primacy of Culture," identifies four distinct levels -
ideology, institutions, civil society, and culture - at which consolidation must occur for democracy
to be successfully implemented. Of these levels, culture is deemed the deepest and the most
difficult to change. It is also the most important. If democracy does not fit a society's cultural
values, and these aberrant values resist change, then democracy will not succeed: "The almost
instantaneous change in normative beliefs generated great expectations that could not be met,
75 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1985 ed.
76Bruce Nussbaum, "Capital, Not Culture," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997): 165.
Nussbaum is the editorial page editor at BusinessWeek. This article was one of a number of responses to
Huntington's Clash ofCivilizations.
"Justice Potter Stewart, quoted in Albert B. Gerber, Sex, Pornography, and Justice (New York:
Lyle Stuart Inc., 1965), 173. Justice Stewart, grappling with the concept of pornography in Jacobellis v.
Ohio (1964), stated "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.
But I know it when I see it...."
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owing to the greater degree of recalcitrance encountered at successively deeper levels."78
Huntington, somewhat pessimistically, concurs that culture is a significant variable. Stating that
"cultural characteristics are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than
political and economic ones," he ominously predicts that the "great divisions among humankind
and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural."79
Not all however, subscribe to the deleterious effects of culture with regard to democracy.
Indeed, one must be careful to distinguish between culture itself and the wildly subjective claims
made in its name. It seems to be the latter, rather than the former, that has assumed a weighty role
in the debate concerning the possibility of successfully exporting democracy to a given polity.
Michael J. Mazarr, editor of The Washington Quarterly, concurs, arguing that culture is merely "a
tactic, a tool, not a fundamental cause of conflict itself; and the necessary policy responses are to
address, not culture on its own terms, but the socioeconomic circumstances that bring culture to the
fore."80 Ironically, Mazaar then cites The End of History and the Last Man to contradict
Fukuyama's assertions concerning the primacy of culture:
This brilliant work contends that free markets and free politics are the
basic aspirations of all humankind. The "unfolding of modern natural science,"
it argues, "has had a uniform effect on all societies that have experienced it....
This process guarantees an increasing homogenization of all human societies,
regardless of their historical origins or cultural inheritances."81
78Francis Fukuyama, "The Primacy of Culture," Journal ofDemocracy 6, no. 1 (January 1995): 9.
"Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (May/June
1993): 22. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPH. 27 May 1997.
80Michael J. Mazarr, "Culture and International Relations," Current, no. 382 (May 1996): 23.
Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPH. 27 May 1997.
81
Ibid. Mazarr does concede that Fukuyama does not completely contradict himself from one book
to another, but concludes that "if history becomes a competition among rival cultures, it hardly seems that
the transition Fukuyama talked about in 1992 means very much.... By the same token, a world-historical
force of technology and economics that crushes mighty ideologies and powerful dictatorships in its path
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Clearly, the impact of culture on democracy can be as confusing as it is divisive. Is culture
an immovable object in the face of democracy's irresistible force? Or can different cultures
accommodate democracy? In an attempt to shed some light on both the meaning and mutability
of culture, this thesis will examine the impact of "Asian values," Russian traditions of
authoritarianism, and Islam on attempts to promote democracy.
1. "Asian Values"
You are just an evil man, prone to do evil things, and you have to be
stopped from doing them.82
Proponents of Asian values assert that different circumstances dictate different values.
Bilahari Kausikan, Singapore's permanent representative to the United Nations in New York,
argues that "diversity is an empirical fact - countries have different histories, values, and problems -
and thus each nation must find its own best social and political arrangements by means of a
pragmatic and continuous process of experimentation."83 The implication is clear: Asians do not
want or need to import American values. Lee Kuan Yew, perhaps the most emphatic critic of the
contention that democracy is universal, explains:
The expansion of the right of the individual to behave or misbehave as he
pleases has come at the expense of orderly society. In the East the main object is
to have a well-ordered society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment
cannot be expected to stop quietly on the doorstep of culture."
82Lee Kuan Yew, in Zakaria, 112.
"Bilahari Kausikan, "Governance That Works," Journal ofDemocracy 8, no. 2 (April 1997): 27.
Bilahari' s article is accompanied by a disclaimer which states that the opinions expressed are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore. Yet, given
the restrictive style of Singapore's government, in combination with Bilahari's status, it is extremely
unlikely that he would contemplate publishing anything which contradicts government policy.
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of his freedoms. This freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a
natural state of contention and anarchy. 84
For Lee, " belief in thrift, hard work, filial piety and loyalty in the extended family, and most of all,
the respect for scholarship and learning"85 form the backbone of his ideal value system. Others
reserve almost religious reverence for a political system that combines stability and order but
allows the unfettered pursuit of the almighty profit (pun intended). This type of value system may
be considered base, but it is certainly no less compelling than the beliefs expressed by the Senior
Minister of Singapore. In either case, the attraction to democracy exported from America is
virtually nonexistent. Lurking just below the surface of this debate on the malleability of culture
is a backlash against what is perceived to be "Western democratic imperialism."86 Indeed, the
rallying cry of "Asian values" has been characterized as "largely a reaction to the lack of Western
sensitivity."87 John Naisbitt, international businessman and best-selling author, offers insight:
Asia has come of age. It seeks to determine its own agenda, to do things
in the Asian way. Throughout the continent, the voices of Asia are saying good-
bye to Western domination, politically, culturally and economically.... Any
policymakers, government or private, who fail to see this fundamental change in
mindset will be greatly disadvantaged in their dealings with Asia and Asians. 88




"Unidentified Singaporean researcher, quoted in John Naisbitt, Megatrends Asia (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1997), 60. Naisbitt has authored several books, including the best-selling and
internationally acclaimed Megatrends. He is a Distinguished International Fellow at the Institute of
Strategic and International Studies in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
88Naisbitt, 55.
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It should be noted that caution must be exercised when referring to "Asian values" or an
"Asian model," or simply treating the continent as a single, cohesive entity. This is because it is
difficult to characterize a region as large, populous, and diverse as Asia according to a single set
of policies, intentions, or values (whether hospitable to democracy or not). The term "Asian
values" is at best a gross generalization; at worst it is a mindless misnomer. Indeed, when Lee
Kuan Yew discusses values, he is reluctant to refer specifically to an all-encompassing "Asian
model." But before democracy advocates celebrate they should know that this sword can cut both
ways. Donald K. Emmerson, Professor of Political Science and Southeast Asian Studies at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, clarifies:
It is absurd to affirm the existence of Asian values if by that we mean to
ascribe a single set of beliefs to some 3.4 billion people - spread across dozens of
countries, believing in different if not contradictory religions, speaking mutually
unintelligible tongues - and contrast that set with an altogether different list of
Western values supposedly held by nearly a billion also diverse humans in Europe,
the United States, and other places largely settled by Europeans. 89
Emmerson considers both universal democracy and "Asian values" to be extreme arguments and
believes attempting to defend either position (without compromise) is a ludicrous proposition.
Instead, he advocates finding a common ground between these polar opposites.
Now, returning to the values that Lee outlined, these are essentially Confucian in nature.
Confucianism is "a set of ethical precepts for the management of society"90 which views the
individual only in relation to society as a whole. Peter Moody, political scientist and author,
89Donald K. Emmerson, "Singapore and the 'Asian Values' Debate," Journal ofDemocracy 6, no.
4 (October 1995): 100.
'""Confucianism," The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1995), compiled in Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf 1995 edition. CD-ROM.
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explains:
...Confucianism is said to look not at the individual, but at the person, the
human being enmeshed in a set of relations with other human beings. Society is
not a contract among previously unconnected individuals. Rather, society,
especially the family, is the state of nature, and we manifest our own nature
through our relations with others. Almost all of these relationships are
hierarchical.... Proper behavior.. .is action in a manner consistent with the
relationship we have with others. We should be magnanimous toward those of
lower status and respectful of those in superior position....91
The practical applications of this philosophy contrast starkly with the reverence that is reserved for
individual rights in a liberal democracy:
Human rights thinking looks at what is owed to me: You can't do that -
I've got my rights. The Confucian stress, rather, is on what I owe others. I ought
to worry less, as Confucius says that others show me respect, and more about
whether I show respect for others.92
Confucian values certainly have political implications, to include the "tyranny...of deference, the
willing obedience of people to higher authority and their conformity to a rigid set of social
norms,"
93
and the absence of clearly articulated civil rights. But, the impact of Confucianism falls
primarily on social structures, affecting interpersonal relationships within the realm of family,
work, and community. Therefore, according to Fukuyama, traditional "political Confucianism,
which mandated the imperial system with its elaborate hierarchy of mandarins and gentleman-
scholars, could be jettisoned relatively easily and replaced with a variety of political-institutional




93Fukuyama, The End ofHistory, 243.
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forms without causing society to lose its essential coherence."94 He adds that Confucian values
should be able to peacefully coexist with democratic political institutions and concludes that the
true value of social structures and cultural mores such as Confucianism lies in their "ability to
balance or moderate the atomizing individualism that is inherent in traditional liberal doctrine...."95
Fukuyama's and Emmerson's confidence in the possibility of finding a middle ground
between Confucianism and democracy seems well placed. It is difficult to dismiss the idea that
people are interested in having a say in the manner in which they are governed. Indeed, the Dalai
Lama asserts that the "West does not have a monopoly on democratic aspirations," adding that the
"quest for equal rights and speech and thought and education and political pluralism based on the
input of all the people applies everywhere."96 And, the portrayal of democracy as an inflexible
constant does not jibe with its essential essence, namely that, because there are no universal truths,
decision-making must incorporate the mechanisms of compromise and consensus.97 Robin Wright,
global-affairs correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, concurs, noting that one of "democracy's
strengths has been its ability to adapt to local conditions."98
Even advocates of the impenetrability of culture are willing to make small concessions to
the rationale of a middle ground. Bilahari Kausikan offers that democracy is "a very flexible
concept, because it must adapt to specific sets of circumstances and evolve as those circumstances
94Fukuyama, "The Primacy of Culture," 12.
95
Ibid., 13.
96Dalai Lama, quoted in Robin Wright, "Democracies in Peril: Oldest Cultures Pose Biggest
Hurdles to Liberalization," Los Angeles Times, 18 February 1997, p. Al. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library:
NEWS. File: LAT. 30 May 1997.
97Stromberg, 27.
98Wright, "Democracies in Peril: Oldest Cultures Pose Biggest Hurdles to Liberalization."
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change."99 Huntington, in turn, acknowledges that culture also has some wiggle room:
[GJreat historic cultural traditions...are highly complex bodies of ideas,
beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, writings, and behavior patterns. Any major
culture, including even Confucianism, has some elements that are compatible with
democracy, just as both Protestantism and Catholicism have elements that are
clearly undemocratic. Confucian democracy may be a contradiction in terms, but
democracy in a Confucian society need not be. 100
Ultimately, it is intuitively reasonable that, in a world filled with many gray areas, the answer to
this particular debate appears to lie somewhere between two extremes.
Achieving a balance between popular participation and the Confucian values of consensus
and community seems, at least theoretically, quite possible. Actually establishing such a system
of governance and having it operate in an effective manner, however, is a challenging proposition.
What does democracy in a Confucian society look like? Certainly it would be adapted so that there
is not as great an emphasis on the protection of individual rights (to the detriment of the
community). There are, however, limits. Civil liberties that are necessary to ensure "free" and
"fair" elections, as those terms were discussed earlier in this paper, are a minimal requirement.
Otherwise, the system cannot truly be considered democratic. Huntington looks to democracy in
Japan as a model for other Asian countries to follow. Despite a level-playing field in which there
is open competition for political power, and freedom of speech, press, and assembly, it is extremely
difficult to depose the party in power:
[The] dominant-party systems that may be emerging seem to involve
competition for power but not alteration in power, and participation in elections
for all, but participation in office only for those in the "mainstream" party. It is
democracy without turnover.... This type of political system represents an
"Bilahari, 25.
100Huntington, The Third Wave, 310.
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adaption of Western democratic practices to serve Asian or Confucian political
values. Democratic institutions work not to promote Western values of
competition and change but Confucian values of consensus and stability. 101
Huntington notes that dominant-party systems are practiced widely throughout Asia, but
that Japan represents the more democratic end of the spectrum. In sharp contrast are the many
authoritarian rulers who manipulate both elections and the "Asian values" dialogue to advance their
interests. Aung San Suu Kyi, recipient of the 1991 Nobel Prize for Peace and leader of Burma's
National League for Democracy, describes a scenario with which she is all too familiar:
It is often in the name of cultural integrity as well as social stability and
national security that democratic reforms based on human rights are resisted by
authoritarian governments. It is insinuated that some of the worst ills of Western
society are the result of democracy, which is seen as the progenitor of unbridled
freedom and selfish individualism. It is claimed, usually without adequate
evidence, that democratic values and human rights run counter to the national
culture, and therefore to be beneficial they need to be modified - perhaps to the
extent that they are barely recognizable. 102
Conveniently, this description is tailor-made for Indonesia's brand of paternalistic authoritarianism.
a. Case Study: Indonesia's New Order
With one and only one road already mapped out, why should we then have
nine different cars? 103
Indonesia professes to be a democratic state that emphasizes consensus and
cooperation in accordance with ancient Javanese cultural traditions. In actuality, the state is
""Huntington, The Third Wave, 306.
102Aung San Suu Kyi, "Freedom. Development, and Human Worth," Journal ofDemocracy 6, no.
2 (April 1995): 14.
'"Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words, and Deeds: An Autobiography, (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung
Persada, 1991), 221; quoted in Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (Boulder, Col:
Westview Press, 1994), 32. Also spelled Suharto.
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governed by a self-serving authoritarian regime which maintains stability and control through the
combination of economic growth and the fierce repression of dissent. President Soeharto's New
Order, now over thirty years in the making, has demonstrated consistent economic success which,
in turn has translated into impressive staying power for his government. But now, the legitimacy
of the regime appears to be threatened as economic inequities, corruption, and frustration with the
lack of representation in government begin to build.
Despite the authoritarian nature of its government, Indonesia possesses many of
the implements of democracy, including political parties, regular elections, and a constitution.
These, however, are a part of a facade which exists, in combination with frequent references to
cultural values, to legitimize centralized authority. Of particular importance to regime
legitimization is the 1945 constitution. As opposed to subsequent constitutions that were drafted
in 1949 and 1950 but then deemed inappropriate and discarded, the 1945 constitution borrows
extensively from popular conceptions of Javanese culture. This document was reinstated after
President Sukarno took power in 1959 and rescinded parliamentary democracy:
The 1945 Constitution is the genuine reflection of the identity of the
Indonesian nation, who since ancient times based their system of Government on
musjawarah [deliberation] and mufakat [consensus] with the leadership of one
central authority in the hands of a "sesepuh" - an elder - who did not dictate, but
led, and protected. 104
The system of governance to which Sukarno refers is based on traditional Javanese concepts of
power and state. The state, according to Adam Schwarz, a correspondent for the Far Eastern
l04Sukarno, "Political Manifesto," speech delivered 17 August 1959; in Harry J. Benda and John
A. Larkin, eds., The World ofSoutheast Asia (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 248.
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Economic Review, is viewed as a family led by a paternalistic figure:
Family matters can be discussed, though politely, but in the end, the father
makes the decisions. Continued opposition to, or excessively blunt criticism of his
decisions is considered destabilising, disloyal and in extreme cases subversive and
unpatriotic. 105
Perhaps more important, however, is the manifestation of power. According to Schwarz, it is an
all-encompassing commodity:
The Javanese ruler does not have some of the power, he has all of it.
Power is a zero-sum game: to get it, you have to take it from someone else. There
is no sense of broadening your scope of power by seeking a mandate from your
subjects. 106
Thus, Javanese cultural traditions appear to be a mixed-bag with regard to their
ability to accommodate democracy. The concept of politics as a win-lose proposition, combined
with the overriding authority of the president, is troubling. Yet, the provisions for consultation and
consensus suggest that there is room for popular participation. It is not inconceivable for consensus
and consultation to be modified to incorporate participation, through representation, for all of the
citizens of Indonesia, in manner that limits the overwhelming authority of the chief executive.
Until this occurs, however, Indonesia's president will be eager to hearken back to his extremely
advantageous interpretation of ancient cultural traditions for, even though he is required to go
through the motions of consultation and consensus, he is the ultimate authority on any decision.




Sukarno illustrated this point quite effectively:
The Guider...incorporates a spoonful of so-an-so's opinions with a dash
of such-and-such, always taking care to incorporate a soupcon of the opposition.
Then he cooks it and serves his final summation with "OK, now my dear brothers,
it is like this and I hope you agree...." It's still democratic because everybody has
given his comments. 107
Contrary to his assurances, what Sukarno described is clearly not democracy.
Ironically, it is not even indicative of what really transpires in Indonesian politics. Despite
convoluted references to cultural traditions that vest the preponderance of power in the chief
executive, the president of Indonesia - whether Sukarno or Soeharto (his successor via military
coup) - has never really troubled himself with the trivialities of seeking consultation or forming a
consensus. What the president wants, the president gets. Generally, according to Filipino
columnist Ricardo Malay, the primary goal is self-enrichment:
...Suharto's kleptocracy has made Marcos look like a petty pilferer of
paper clips and pencils. For that is the outstanding reality that has prevailed in
Indonesia for years: a dictator helping himself to the country's vast economic
spoils with help from his extensive family, his Golkar political party, and his
Chinese business cronies. 108
Therefore, any allusion to governing in accordance with Javanese cultural traditions is somewhat
107Sukarno, Sukarno: An Autobiography As Told to Cindy Adams (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 1965) 279; quoted in Schwarz, 16-17. Sukarno referred to this system of governance as
"Guided democracy." Though the concept remains unchanged, in an effort to distance himself from his
predecessor, Soeharto refers to it as "Pancasila democracy." Pancasila is a national ideology based on the
principles of "belief in one supreme god; justice and civility among peoples; the unity of Indonesia;
democracy through deliberation and consensus among representatives; [and] social justice for all." See
Indonesian Source Book (Jakarta: National Development Information Office, 1992), 13; in Schwarz, 10.
,08Ricardo Malay, "Suharto Losing His Cool," Manila Chronicle, 19 August 1996, p. 4. Online.
FBIS. Available HTTP: http://ibis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve. 29 May 1997. The term "kleptocrat" was
coined by Jeffrey A. Winters in his Ph.D. dissertation for Yale University. See "Structural Power and
Investor Mobility: Capital Control and State Policy in Indonesia, 1965-1990," December 1991.
41
contrived:
...Indonesia is far from the ideal of Pancasila democracy.... The
imperative of "consensus at all costs" leaves Indonesians with little scope to
disagree with official policy. The dismantling of political parties, the
manipulation of the People's Assembly, the controls placed on the press, and the
enforced weakness of the legal system have done much more than empower the
guardians of the community. They have created a government that is far more
authoritarian...than democratic. 109
While cultural values are just a thin veneer, Indonesia does have pressing concerns
that provide a much more convincing argument for the justification of a strong hand at the helm
of government. These concerns include the administration of an immense archipelagic state, a
correspondingly large and ethnically diverse population, and economic deprivation. Sukarno
suspended parliamentary democracy in 1959 because it was ineffective in dealing with factions and
promoting economic development. Soeharto, in turn, deposed Sukarno because of his growing
inability to balance the competing demands of the military, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
and Muslim activists.
Soeharto maintains power today through the combination of an ideology that limits
dissent (Pancasila), an intricate system of officially-sanctioned corruption and patronage, and
consistent economic growth. This last characteristic is the foundation upon which his regime rests:
Whatever we do will be meaningless for the people if there is no
improvement in their life. Everything we do will be useful if the people's welfare
improves. 110
109Schwarz, 292.
""Soeharto, transcript of Independence Day speech, broadcast from the House of Representatives,
Jakarta TVRI Televison Network, 16 August 1996. Online. FBIS. Available HTTP:http://fbis.fedworld.
gov/cgi-bin/retrieve. 29 May 1997.
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And the people's welfare certainly has improved. According to Soeharto, economic growth has
averaged seven percent over the last two decades, while, in real terms, per capita income "has
increased by more than three times." 111 Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Aurelia E. Brazeal, offers a slightly more neutral (though nonetheless favorable)
assessment:
Although some question the income level that should be defined as poor,
everyone agrees that poverty has declined dramatically. Looked at another way,
Indonesia has moved from an income base about half that of India's in the mid-
1960's to a per capita income ($1,000) more than twice that of India today. 112
Continued economic growth and a subsequent increase in standard of living for all
Indonesians is necessary for the Soeharto regime to retain stability. According to Bilahari, this is
because the '"acid test' of all governments everywhere in the real world is not adherence to any
particular political theory or ideal but whether they can govern effectively, fairly, and in a way that
increase the general welfare." 113 Fukuyama disagrees, stating that if a regime has legitimate
authority - that is, authority derived from the consent of those who are ruled - it can ride out
perturbations in the welfare of the populace. On the other hand, the absence of this characteristic
spells trouble:
The absence of legitimate authority has meant that when an authoritarian
government met with failure in some area of policy, there was no higher principle
to which the regime could appeal. Some have compared legitimacy to a kind of
cash reserve. All governments, democratic and authoritarian, have their ups and
11
'Soeharto, transcript of Independence Day speech.
" 2Aurelia E. Brazeal, "U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia," testimony before House International
Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 7 May 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS.
Library: NEWS. File: HILLPR. 30 May 1997.
" 3Bilahari,29.
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downs; but only legitimate governments have this reserve to draw on in times of
crisis.
114
In the case of Indonesia, the point may be moot. Economic growth does not appear to be sufficient
to sustain the current regime's legitimacy. Despite consistent improvements in the health,
education, and welfare of the Indonesian people, there are rumblings of dissent throughout the
populace. Muslim activists want greater attention to Islamic issues, students clamor for democracy,
and regional states want greater autonomy from Jakarta. Perhaps the most vocal critics of the
current regime are businessmen unhappy with the overbearing burden of corruption and nepotism:
[T]he activities of Indonesia's top crony businessmen and their partners
in government are a source of deep resentment and disillusionment for many
Indonesians. Rampant corruption, particularly of the big-ticket variety, is more
than merely disillusioning, of course. It has profound implications for Indonesia's
economy and political future. Corruption is profitable for the few and expensive
for the many. Bureaucratic inefficiencies and large-scale corruption both add to
the cost of making products in Indonesia and, more broadly, retard the growth of
the economy. 115
While the demand for change rings clear in Indonesia, there is uncertainty about
the pace or direction in which to proceed. According to Paul Wolfowitz, former U.S. Ambassador
to Indonesia, there is a "complex balance between the desire for change and the desire for stability
in Indonesia that Americans, who are able to take stability for granted, have difficulty
1 14Fukuyama, The End ofHistory, 39.
" 5Schwarz, 137.
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understanding." 116 Dewi Fotuna, a political scientist at the Indonesian Institute of Science, concurs:
Everyone agrees that for the government not to respond to the pressures
[for change] will be dangerous. But how far to respond is the question. There is
a lot of disagreement about how fast to do it, and to what degree." 7
Democracy is not an obvious choice for most Indonesians. The need for a strong
state to guide development and quell ethnic and religious disturbances is commonly acknowledged.
Additionally, since more than half of the population had not yet even been born at the time of
Indonesia's ill-fated attempt at parliamentary democracy, most are unfamiliar with the concept:
A well functioning democracy requires a shared awareness of what
democracy is about. It requires an ability to publicly debate - and disagree on -
important matters of state without rendering the government of the day impotent;
it presumes knowledge ofwhat it means to win and lose on the political battlefield;
and it assumes a common understanding of citizen's rights and responsibilities.
These conditions do not apply to Indonesia. 118
Finally, democracy is not necessarily the beacon of hope that most Americans assume it to be; it
is not even the political model of choice in Southeast Asia. Many states, including Indonesia, have
successfully experimented with authoritarianism in combination with economic liberalization.
They have seen, as expressed emphatically by yet another colleague, that "authoritarianism
ll6Paul Wolfowitz, "U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia," testimony before House International
Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 7 May 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS.
Library: NEWS. File: FEDNEW. 30 May 1997.
n7Dewi Fortuna, quoted in Keith B. Richburg, "After 30 Years, Is the Suharto Government
Showing 'Regime Fatigue'?," International Herald Tribune, 26 May 1997, p. 4. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS.
Library: NEWS. File: IHT. 30 May 1997.
118Schwarz, 295.
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and economics [can] work!" 119 Therefore, Indonesians may be much more interested in reforming
rather than replacing their current authoritarian regime.
b. Summation
The Indonesian case study interestingly represents multiple dimensions of the
debate between democracy and "Asian values," to include accommodation, denial, and ultimately,
disinterest. Javanese cultural traditions, much like Confucian values, appear to be flexible enough
to accommodate the principles of democracy. 120 However, the president of Indonesia, much like
the leaders of other Asian states, denies this possibility. Instead, traditional cultural values are
interpreted and invoked in an attempt to cloak authoritarian practices:
[It is] pretty clear that the like of Lee Kwan Yew and Suharto want their
people to believe that culture is an immutable object to be protected like a national
treasure in a museum. Hence, there cannot be changes (like democratic reform)
without harming the treasure. 121
Finally, despite dissatisfaction with the current government, the people of Indonesia are not
prepared for - nor would they necessarily welcome - democracy. This is also the case for other
states in Asia. Indeed, while democracy is theoretically possible, it should not be implied that it
is universally desirable.
" 9Wayne Hugar, classroom discussion, Government and Politics in Southeast Asia (NS3667), 1
1
June 1997.
120This statement is caveated by the condition that any attempt to implement democracy, in order
to be successful, must take care to incorporate the particular needs and values of the culture in which it is to
take root.
l21Mary P. Callahan, "Critique of Research Paper," Memorandum, 12 July 1997, 1. Callahan is an
Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
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2. Russian Traditions of Authoritarianism
In Russia there has been no Revolution. All of the past is repeating itself
and acts only behind new masks. 122
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the alleged development of a nascent
democracy in Russia have been viewed by many with enthusiasm verging on euphoria. The mortal
enemy of truth, freedom and the American way has disappeared and in its place is a regime
attempting to emulate values quite similar to our own. Not all, however, have observed
developments in Russia with optimism. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has
cautioned that a leopard cannot easily change it's spots:
Russia has never been a Democracy. Russia has never had a market
economy. Russia has always been an empire. Russia has always dominated or
tried to dominate its surrounding state. Russia has never had a separation of
church and state, so that church has really been a state institution. And all of these
factors have produced a tremendous tendency towards a solatarianism and towards
conquest. And when a nation behaves in a certain way for 400 years you have to
assume that it has a certain proclivity in that direction.... 123
Kissinger's wariness is based on the belief that it is difficult to overcome cultural predilections
established and reinforced over the course of several centuries. Russian difficulty and, at times,
seeming indifference toward consolidating democracy since the dissolution of the Soviet state
122Nikolai Berdyayev, quoted in Jane Burbank, Intelligentsia and Revolution, Russian views of
Bolshevism, 1917-22 (London: Oxford University Press, 1986), 194; quoted in Jonathan Steele, Eternal
Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), xiv. Berdyayev penned these words after the
seizure of the Winter Palace and the collapse of the provisional government in November 1917.
123Henry Kissinger, "United States Foreign Policy: The Future of International Relations Depends
Largely On Ourselves," address delivered at the 106th Landon Lecture, Kansas State University,
Manhattan, Kansas, 29 April, 1996; published in Vital Speeches ofthe Day 62, no. 16
(1 June 1996): 487.
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appear to justify Kissinger's pessimistic outlook. Others argue, however, that while Russian
cultural values are an obstruction, they will not prohibit the establishment of democracy.
Whether optimistic or pessimistic about the possibility for a democratic future, all who
observe the current Russian political situation are alarmed by the actions of President Boris Yeltsin.
Once hailed as the white knight in shining armor who would rescue the damsel democracy from
the communist dragon, Yelstin is starting to look a lot like a dragon himself. Tim McDaniel,
Professor of Sociology at the University of California, San Diego, concurs:
Yeltsin's actions have never flowed from any kind of commitment to
democracy, and they have nurtured neither a democratic culture nor democratic
institutions. Rather, his primitive understanding of democracy and capitalism as
simply the negation of the Communist past has been matched by an overriding,
and sometimes ruthless, commitment to his own political survival. 124
Yeltsin's efforts to consolidate control of the government apparatus have largely been
successful: he has incorporated the "power" ministries - defense, foreign affairs, interior, and
security - into a powerful Security Council beholden only to him. Although there is a functioning
Parliament, Yeltsin governs largely by decree because the legislative branch is "largely powerless,
neutered by a Constitution [which he rewrote in 1993] that gives effective control to the president
and makes even the legislature's own finances entirely dependent on the executive branch." 125
Finally, the notion of an independent judiciary which scrutinizes laws and decrees and then
124Tim McDaniel, "Out of the Past," The New Republic 215, issue 20 (1 1 November 1996): 16.
McDaniel's most recent book is entitled The Agony ofthe Russian Idea.
l25Katrina Vanden Heuvel, "Yeltsin Survives; Will Democracy?," The Nation 260, issue 8 (27
February 1995): 271.
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impartially issues rulings is but an arcane dream:
There is no significant experience in Russia with an independent legal
system. Despite occasional attempts at reform, the legal system remains a creature
of the state. 126
Fred Weir, a journalist living in Moscow, has assessed this situation and concludes that Yeltsin has
largely revived "Russia's traditional system of autocratic, one-man rule resting upon an omnipotent
security/bureaucratic apparatus." 127
That Yeltsin appears to be barreling down the road toward authoritarianism is
disconcerting, particularly, it seems, for former U.S. policymakers. Kissinger has already warned
us about Russian cultural proclivities, to include the absolutist tendencies of Russian leaders.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to President Carter, agrees, noting that
"President Yeltsin's inclination toward authoritarianism has transformed the new constitution for
a democratic Russia into a document that can easily be used to legitimize arbitrary personal rule." 128
He adds, rather gloomily, that "Insurance is needed against the possibility - one might even argue
the probability - that the weight of history will not soon permit Russia to stabilize as a democracy,
and that the single-minded cultivation of a partnership with Russia, while downgrading our other
interests, will simply accelerate the reemergence of an ominously familiar imperial challenge to
126James D. Stewart and Neil G. Kacena, "Trapped by History: From Totalitarianism to
Democracy," in William C. Martel and Theodore C. Hailes, eds., Russia's Democratic Moment?
(Montgomery, Ala.: Air War College Project on Russian Democratic Reform, 1995), 11. This is the
second of Air War College Studies in National Security. The studies were established as a forum for
research on topics related to U.S. national security.
127Fred Weir, "Boris's Big Bash," The Nation 260, issue 20 (22 May 1995): 708. Weir writes
regularly for the Canadian Press, Hindustan Times, and In These Times.
128Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March/April
1994): 71.
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Europe's security." 129 Kissinger's and Brzezinski's apprehensions about Yeltsin's authoritarian
leanings are derived from the fact that absolutism in the domestic realm is often equated with the
increased potential for adventurism in foreign policy. This phenomenon, in turn, can be attributed
to the absence of internal institutional constraints to ameliorate the capricious acts and intentions
of a dictator. Indeed, Yeltsin's authoritarian actions can be seen as a symptoms of a far greater
malaise: the failure to develop institutions that balance against the overwhelming authority of the
chief executive.
For centuries, a lack of domestic institutional constraints has been the rule for Russia.
Beginning with the first Tsar, the distinctions between state, church, and leader were blurred to the
extent that potential competing institutions - whether legislative, judicial, religious, or civic - were
either underdeveloped or coopted. Subsequently, the authority of the Tsar was unequivocal,
unassailable, and unbounded. Jonathan Steele, author of Eternal Russia, notes that this is unique
when compared to the statuses of other monarchs in Europe:
They [the Russian Tsars] operated on the basis that the Tsar owned his
realm. The medieval Western European distinction between ownership
("dominium") and authority ("imperium") did not apply. Russian Tsars, moving
out from their original territory in Kiev, acquired their land by conquest. The Tsar
was both proprietor and sovereign, unlike kings in Western Europe who were [at
least] bound to respect their subjects' property. 130
The Bolshevik revolution and the overthrow of Tsar Nicholas II in November 1917 did
little to change the relationship between the state and the people it governed. Names have changed
- the Russian empire became the Soviet Republic, the authority and power ofthe Tsar was assumed
by the General Secretary of the Communist Party, and the domineering mysticism of the Russian
l29Brzezinski, 79.
130Jonathan Steele, Eternal Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 47.
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Orthodox Church was replaced by the equally repressive ideology of Marxist-Leninism - but the
set-up essentially remained the same. Authority was still administered from above while
submission and subservience was demanded from below. According to Yuri N. Afanasyev, a
Russian historian, this authoritarian legacy has crippled present efforts to develop an understanding
of the rights and responsibilities of an individual in the context of civic participation:
The main reason the Russian people have not escaped totalitarian systems,
before or since 1917, has been a lack of civil society. The state monopolized every
activity, and no autonomous society existed apart from its all-pervasive scope. 131
Afanasyev adds that while the oppressive and pervasive nature of the state has limited the
development of moderating domestic institutions, the lack of such institutions, in turn, has
encouraged the authoritarian legacy about which he laments. In essence, the Russian people
continue to be trapped in a vicious cycle. 132 Ironically, Yeltsin, in a speech to the legislative
assembly, agreed with this assessment:
Without a developed civil society state power inevitably takes on a
despotic, totalitarian character. Only owing to a civil society is this power subject
to serving the individual and becomes a protecting mechanism for freedom. 133
A 1993 report by the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe underscores the
present inability ofthe Russian people to understand, aspire to, or protect democratic principles and
22.
'Yuri N. Afanasyev, "Russian Reform is Dead," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (March/April 1994):
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institutions:
Simply put, democracy remains a foreign concept to a substantial portion
of the population. It did not emerge from experience, it was simply declared.
Hence, even under optimal circumstances, it will take time to develop a "culture"
of democracy. While the form of the totalitarian state has disappeared, the
substance has not. 134
The prospects for democracy in Russia, however, are not uniformly bleak. Russian
citizens, for the first time ever, possess the freedoms of speech and press. And, although political
parties are characterized by "little organization, low membership and only minimal structures
outside Moscow and St. Petersburg," 135 they nonetheless exist. They are the genesis of an
opposition which will serve as a countervailing balance to the president's power. Finally,
according to David Remnick, a staff writer at The New Yorker, the most encouraging sign is that
Russia's "citizens show every indication of refusing a return to the maximalism of communism or
the xenophobia of hard-line nationalism." 136 Thus, it appears that democracy is at least making
halting headway in Russia. While the centuries-old imprint of authoritarianism is an obstacle, it
is probably not the biggest impediment to consolidation of democracy in Russia. More
consequential is the exhaustion of the Russian people.
Battered by crime, frustrated with corruption, and suffering from a drastically lowered
standard of living, the only thing Russian citizens can count on at the present is an uncertain future.
Thus, it is plausible that the ideals of democracy could be sacrificed for simple stability. Anatoli
nAHuman Rights and Democratization, 50; quoted in Amy Knight, Spies Without Cloaks
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 181. Knight is a Senior Research Analyst at the
Library of Congress.
'"Steele, xv.
136David Remnick, "Can Russia Change?," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (January/February 1997): 48.
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Lieven, a Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington D.C., observes that
"the great mass or ordinary Russians has a deep yearning for stability and order," adding that "this
feeling at present outweighs even the desire for social justice." 137 This desire for stability is
evidenced by the general acquiescence of the population in response to decrees by Yeltsin that
restrict civil liberties and reestablish much ofthe former Soviet Union's vaunted security apparatus.
Ostensibly implemented to combat crime and corruption, as well as external threats, these actions
were welcomed by many weary citizens. Yet, unless employed judiciously, they are certain to have
a deleterious effect on the development of democracy.
a. Case Study: Russia's Security Service
A democratic state needs strong and effective security services, especially
during the period when it is becoming established. 138
Security can be defined as "measures adopted by a government to prevent
espionage, sabotage, or attack." 139 The ultimate goal of a security service is to protect the
sovereignty of the state. This is accomplished, in part, through the investigation, interrogation, and
arrest of suspects; in short, by impinging upon the liberty of those who are accused of threatening
state security. An important precept of democracy, in contrast, involves promoting liberty, that is,
freedom from excessive government restriction or control. Clearly there is bound to be natural
tension between those who seek to excel at the craft of enforcing security and those who wish to
'"Anatoli Lieven, "Freedom and Anarchy: Russia Stumbles Toward the Twenty-First Century,"
Washington Quarterly 20, no. 1 (Winter 1997). Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: WASHQR.
30 May 1997.
I38Sergei Stepashin, quoted in Knight, 41. At the time Stepashin was the Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security. He eventually took charge of the Federal
Counterintelligence Service (FSK).
U9The American Heritage Dictionary ofthe English Language (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1992). Compiled in Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf 1995 edition. CD-ROM.
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promote the civil liberties affirmed by a democratic state. Without juridical rights and legislative
oversight, the exuberance of security professionals can have serious consequences. Douglas Porch,
a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, illustrates this point nicely. Although he
refers specifically to counterintelligence ( a subset of security), the idea is applicable across the full
spectrum of operations conducted by security services:
[DJomestic spying can institutionalize a dangerous mind-set in that portion
of the secret services responsible for it. As metiers go, counterintelligence should
require a hazardous-to-your-health warning. The search for spies and
revolutionaries can, if perpetual and left unevaluated, result in a dangerous
psychological disequilibrium, an eternal mole hunt in which the state treats its own
citizens as potential subversives. 140
The need for security in Russia has not diminished since the demise of the
communist state. If anything, disorder and chaos are a growth industry. Internal threats to order
and stability come from the Russian mafia, reawakened ethnic nationalism, economic crimes, and
corruption. As for external threats, despite the end of the Cold War, the intelligence business of
spying and countering spies apparently continues unabated. As General Andrei Chernenko, Head
of the Ministry of Security (MB) Public Relations Department, explained in October 1992:
Our adversary prefers a very simple and old-fashioned method - the
recruitment of agents from among Russian citizens. Unfortunately, it succeeds. 141
With threats abounding everywhere, it is not difficult to become obsessed with security. Such an
,40Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1995), 429.
141Andrei Chernenko, October 1992 interview; quoted in Knight, 49-50. The Committee for State
Security( KGB) was formerly responsible for conducting foreign intelligence and providing for internal
security. After its disestablishment in December 1991 these two roles were split between the Foreign
Intelligence Service (FIS) and the Ministry for Security (MB). Duties include counterintelligence, anti-
terrorism, and combating economic crimes. The MB was renamed and reorganized in 1993, and again in
1995. It is now referred to as the Federal Security Service (FSB).
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obsession, however, requires a heavy commitment of resources to counter all enemies, whether
seen or unseen. John Dziak, a Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO) assigned to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), describes a phenomenon he refers to as the counterintelligence state:
The fixation with enemies and threats to the security of the party-state
involved a very heavy internal commitment of the state resources. Further, this
fixation demanded the creation of a state security service that penetrated and
suffused all societal institutions (including the military), but not always the
claimant to monopoly power, usually a self-proclaimed "revolutionary" party.
This security service became the principal guardian of the party; the two together
constituted a permanent counterintelligence enterprise to which all major political,
social and economic questions were subordinated. The well-being (civic,
economic or otherwise) of society at large was not the principled objective of such
an amalgam of ensconced power and palace guard; self-perpetuation was. 142
Although Dziak speaks in the past tense, "newly-democratic" Russia is a good
example of the counter-intelligence state. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the election of
President Yeltsin has brought sweeping changes for the country as a whole, and the Committee for
State Security (KGB) in particular. The attempt to transition from communism to "democracy" has
included a flurry of legislative activity and numerous reorganizations directed at the secret services.
And, according to Amy Knight, author of Spies Without Cloaks, glasnost has undeniably left its
imprint:
[T]he security police can no longer enforce silence through censorship.
The abuses and offenses of the security police are openly criticized in the press.
Gone are the days when bothersome dissidents could be dealt with easily by
whisking them off to labor camps or psychiatric hospitals without answering to a
court or judge. And the security services do not have the unlimited resources that
were at their disposal during the Soviet era. They too have to worry about their
budgets. 143
M2John J. Dziak, "Reflections on the Counterintelligence State," in Walter Pforzheimer, Hayden
B. Peake, and Samuel Halpern, eds., In the Name ofIntelligence (NIBC Press, 1994), 263.
143Knight, 4.
55
But a closer examination reveals that many of the changes to the Russian security services were
merely cosmetic. Despite the removal ofKGB leaders, budget constraints, cutbacks in personnel,
and a dispersal of functions, the new Russian security services have demonstrated remarkable
resilience. Indeed, rather than "curbing the powers of the security services and narrowing their
functions," attempts to reorganize these institutions and codify their activities "have only served
to broaden their role." 144
Perhaps the only significant transformation that the effort to develop democracy
has wrought upon the Russian security services is a shift in allegiance. The Russian president,
rather than the Communist Party, now exercises complete control over each of the intelligence
services. This span of authority, unimpeded by effective legislative or judicial oversight, does not
bode well for the retention of legal guarantees and individual freedoms that are normally associated
with a democratic state. It should be noted that Yeltsin's unchallenged dominance of the Russian
security services is not a quirk of fate. Rather than reform the intelligence apparatus, he sought to
coopt and shape it to serve as an effective tool to further his political agenda:
For all his democratic leanings, Yeltsin was not prepared to relinquish this
potentially powerful political weapon that was now in his hands.... Yeltsin was to
become increasingly dependent on the security services to fend off opposition and
carry through with his programs. Instead of restricting the powers of his security
apparatus, he would do just the opposite. 145
This is not an unusual turn of events for a leader who at times has been beleaguered and fighting
for his political survival, even one who professes to embrace the principles of democracy. Roy





Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), concurs:
[When] the legitimacy of the government is readily challenged, the ruler's
relationship to the ruled is based on preserving and expanding power - with the
ruler viewing the ruled as though they were actual or potential enemies. Security
and counterintelligence become the paramount intelligence elements. 146
Yeltsin's monopoly control over the security services has received only ineffectual
challenges from the Russian parliament. This is because deputies have been unable to reach
consensus on the roles, power, and pertinent relationships of these organizations. This may be
viewed, in part, as a legacy of Russia's authoritarian past: politics are approached as a highly
personalized zero-sum competition for power. The familiar give-and-take of democracy is
nonexistent. Therefore, while one group of deputies has sought to circumscribe the power of the
security service in order to protect individual rights, a second, more conservative, block has been
less than cooperative. According to Knight, they are "not interested in furthering democratic
reforms of the security services," but instead seek "to assert their own influence over them in order
to compete successfully against Yeltsin for political power." 147 This parliamentary impasse has
inhibited the development of meaningful legislative oversight of the security forces. And, without
appropriate oversight authority, the legal rights and individual freedoms that accompany
democratization cannot be guaranteed.
As mentioned previously, two additional factors have worked in tandem to impede
juridical control of the Russian security services: the skyrocketing crime rate and an inadequate
legal system. The former has been used to justify harsh anti-crime decrees that impinge upon basic
civil liberties, including searches without warrants, and the detention of suspects for up to thirty
,46Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1995), 250.
147Knight, 39.
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days before formal charges are filed. The latter, as Knight explains, fails to balance the excesses
of the security forces:
What is required is the legal infrastructure - criminal codes, procedural
laws, judicial systems, lawyers - to support restraints on the security police, as well
as an effective system of parliamentary oversight. Although the government and
parliament have made progress in reforming the laws, this has been a painfully
slow process, and Russia still lacks many of the fundamentals necessary for an
effective and democratic system ofjustice. 148
This does not overly concern Sergei Stepashin, former Director of the Federal Security Service
(FSB): "We. ..talk about expanding the rights of individuals without understanding that today, in
the environment of the disintegration of the USSR and the growing criminal element that is
encroaching on political power, we must to some extent give up the standard concept of human
rights." 149
Apparently, many Russian citizens agree. A recent U.S. News & WorldReport poll
conducted in Russia revealed that more than half of the respondents would be willing to give up
basic constitutional rights in order to help control crime. 150 Although this poll result can surely be
attributed to the yearning for stability discussed earlier, it reflects a trend that is dangerous to the
development of democracy - namely, a lack of understanding with regard to the value and
inviolability of these rights.
148Knight, 251.
149Sergei Stepashin, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 26 May 1994, p. 1,5; quoted in Knight, 92.
,50
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58
b. Summation
There have been many positive signs to indicate that democracy is feasible in
Russia, to include freedom of speech and of the press, the development of political parties and,
above all, a steadfast refusal to return to a communist past. Yet there is still a tremendous amount
ofwork to be done. Sergei Kovalyov, a biologist who was imprisoned during Brezhnev's tenure
and later helped lead the human rights movement, confesses that the enormity of the task has
shattered the previous fanciful illusions concerning the ease with which democracy could be
implemented:
The quality ofdemocracy depends heavily on the quality of the democrats.
We have to wait for a critical mass of people with democratic principles to
accumulate. It's like a nuclear explosion: the critical mass has to accrue. Without
this, everything will be like it is now, always in fits and starts. Our era of romantic
democracy is long over. We have finally fallen to earth. 151
While traditions of authoritarianism do not appear to prohibit the establishment of
democracy outright, they have clearly impeded Russian attempts to effect the transition.
Ultimately, it is a mistake to assume that the long and arduous procession toward democracy will
successfully overcome all of the pitfalls in its path, to include a powerful, potentially authoritarian
chief executive, an impotent parliament, a desire for stability (at the expense of individual liberties)
that has bolstered the role of the security services, and a disturbing lack of appreciation for a civil
society in which citizens actively exercise rights and responsibilities. These are tremendous
obstacles. Therefore, although democracy in Russia is possible, it is foolish to claim it is
inevitable.
,51 Sergei Kovalyov, quoted in Remnick, 38.
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Yet, many U.S. policymakers have rationalized any and all authoritarian
perturbations and certified Russia as well on its way to democracy. This rush to erase the
unpleasant memory of the evil empire and capitalize on political opportunities presents an
interesting dilemma for democratic peace theorists. The desire to welcome another democratic
state into the fold is tempered by misgivings about the true nature of democracy in Russia. Will
a "democratic" Russia act in harmony with other democracies? Will other democratic states
recognize Russia as a kindred soul and, therefore, refrain from engaging in conflict? Although
Aesop cannot provide the answer to these questions, his fables offer a telling comment:
A doubtful friend is worse than a certain enemy. Let a man be one thing
or the other, and we then know how to meet him. 152
3. Islam
The word Islam does not need adjectives such as democratic. Precisely
because Islam is everything, it means everything. It is sad for us to add another
word near the word Islam, which is perfect. 153
For most Americans, Islam is associated with fanaticism, violence, and hatred. The word
immediately evokes vivid images: U.S. hostages in Tehran, carnage at the U.S. Marine barracks
in Beirut, chaos following the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, and the
tremendous crater left by the truck bomb at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Islam has become so
feared and misunderstood in the United States that it is often utilized to fill the "threat vacuum" that
152Aesop, "The Hound and the Hare," Fables, trans. Thomas James, in Tripp, 232.
'"Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, quoted in International Herald Tribune, 15 October 1979, p. 5;
quoted in Theda Skocpol, Social Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 252.
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was created after the fall of the Soviet Union and the disapprobation of communism. 154 Islam,
however, is not a simple, one-dimensional phenomenon. Radical fundamentalism is but a single
strain of Islam, though, as noted by Robin Wright, it unfortunately garners most of the headlines:
Reactive groups - motivated by political or economic insecurity, questions
of identity, or territorial disputes - are most visible because of their aggressiveness.
Extremists have manipulated, misconstrued, and even hijacked Muslim tenets....
[Yet, at] the opposite end of the spectrum are proactive individuals and groups
working for constructive change 155
John L. Esposito, world-renowned Professor of Religion and International Affairs at Georgetown
University, concurs, adding that viewing "Islam and events in the Muslim world. ..primarily through
the prism of violence and terrorism...has resulted in a failure to see the breadth and depth of
contemporary Islam." 156
Indeed, not only does Islam provide a broad scope of instruction and guidance for believers,
but it engulfs a large, diverse, geographically-dispersed population. Therefore, as explained by
Bernard Lewis, Professor (emeritus) ofNear Eastern Studies at Princeton University, Islam, much
like the term "Asian values," does not lend itself easily to generic characterization:
If we talk about Islam as a historical phenomenon, we are speaking of a
community that now numbers more than a billion people, most ofwhom are spread
l54John L. Esposito "Political Islam: Beyond the Green Menace," Current History 93, no. 579
(January 1994): 19. Online. MSANEWS Ohio State University. Available HTTP:http://www.mynet.net/
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September 1996. Online. Islamic Intellectual Forum. Available HTTP: http://www.islamforum.org/
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along a vast arc stretching almost 10,000 miles from Morocco to Mindanao; that
has a 14-century long history; and that is the defining characteristic of the 53
sovereign states that currently belong to the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC). For obvious reasons it is extremely difficult (though not
impossible) to make any kind of valid generalization about a reality of such age,
size, and complexity. 157
Rather than characterizing Islamic theology as violent, radical, and threatening; Zachary Karabell,
a contributing editor of the Boston Book Review, prefers to liken it to hot iron caught between a
blacksmith's hammer and anvil:
Any successful ideology is malleable, and [Islam] is no exception. It does
not dictate specific action and can - in the hands of adept leaders or intellectuals -
justify almost any behavior. 158
And "any behavior," contrary to the perceptions of the American people, can include democratic
principles, institutions, and practices.
Elements of Islamic tradition that can be construed as encouraging the development of
democracy include an acceptance of diversity, a wealth of political literature that discusses the
rights as well as responsibilities of both the ruler and the ruled, strong disapproval of arbitrary
authority, and mutual toleration of differences of opinion. Indeed, with regard to the last
characteristic, the Prophet Muhammad is said to have declared that "Difference of opinion within
my community is a sign of God's mercy." 159 There are also specific Islamic practices such as
ijtihad (personal interpretation of God's word), ijima (consensus), and shura (consultation) which
'"Bernard Lewis, "A Historical Overview," Journal ofDemocracy 7, no. 2 (April 1996): 54.
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suggest a skeletal structure of political pluralism. 160 Finally, Islamic tenets do not articulate a
specific structure for governance, as it is meant to be a "universal religion for all times and
climes." 161 Therefore, according to Olivier Roy, a researcher at the Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique in Paris, "the principles of political Islam can be embodied in a variety of
constitutional formulas (including something that resembles Western democracy, with a parliament
and elections)." 162
But there is a catch. There must be a catch, otherwise the feasibility of implementing
democracy in an Islamic state would not merit analysis or discussion (and as well, on a related but
somewhat more mundane level, this section of the thesis would be unnecessary). Roy continues:
What counts is neither the form nor the strength of the institution, but
rather the manner in which the institution effaces itself before the establishment
of Islamic principles, which then must govern the hearts and actions of men. The
key to politics is in a "social morality." 163
Social morality is embodied in the shari'a, or Islamic law, and, according to Esposito, one of the
few hard and fast requirements for the governance of an Islamic state is that the ruler is to "govern
160The principle of consultation (shura) refers to the fact that "all sane adult Muslims, male and
female, are viceregents (agents of God)" who must "delegate their authority to the ruler and whose opinion
must also be sought in the conduct of state." This is generally done through an elected representative body.
See Esposito, Islam and Politics, 149. Ijtihad refers to the interpretation of God's law by early Muslim
judges and jurists. These interpretations became incorporated into law books. Ijima (consensus) refers to
agreement of the Islamic community - usually religious scholars of a particular era - on a certain point of
law. By the tenth century, however, in the opinion of clerics, Islamic law had been institutionalized and
finalized. Therefore, technically speaking, Islamic law is no longer "interpreted," it is only "applied." See
Esposito, Islam and Politics, 20-21
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University Press, 1994), 61.
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according to and assure implementation of the Shariah to which ruler and ruled alike are bound." 164
Mohamed Elachmi Hamdi, a Tunisian-born writer and a doctoral candidate at the University of
London, reemphasizes this point, unequivocally declaring that "no Islamic state can be legitimate
in the eyes of its subjects without obeying the main teachings of the shari'a." 165
Clearly, this presents some difficulties with regard to the implementation of democratic
principles and institutions. As defined in Chapter II, democracy involves government by the
people; there is no higher authority than the citizens of the state. In an Islamic state, however, the
law of God, as embodied in the shari'a, reigns supreme. Mohammed Sid Ahmed, a secular
Egyptian political analyst, clarifies:
When you start from the idea that there is a divine body of doctrine, man
is reduced to consultative status.... Democracy starts from the theory that nothing
should be accepted a priori; it puts no constraints on any given strain of thought.
This cannot be in Islam. 166
While man may be subject to God's law, someone of this world must interpret and apply
the Almighty's divine wisdom. This fact presents an interesting problem:
For who is it, after all, who hears and applies God's law if not men and
women ruled by their passions and subject to the limitations of their
understanding? Law, it has been stated often enough, does not apply itself, but is
applied by fallible human beings. 167
164John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 283.
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This dilemma is exacerbated by the inherent ambiguity of the shari'a: much of it is quite general
in nature so that it may be applied comprehensibly and timelessly to all aspects of Islamic life. As
Roy explains, this characteristic leads to an amorphous, extremely flexible entity:
[T]he fatwa, formal legal opinions that decide matters not mentioned in
the text, are always pronounced in the here and now and can be annulled by a
subsequent authority.... [Therefore the] sharia is never closed, for it is based not
on a core of concepts, but rather on an ensemble of precepts which is at times
general, at times precise, and which expands to include the totality of human acts
through induction, analogy, extension, commentary, and interpretation. While the
basic precepts, as they are explicitly formulated, cannot be called into question,
their extension is a matter of casuistics. 168
Because the shari'a is such an open-ended body of law, it is possible to apply (or
manipulate and sidestep) it in a manner that suits the purposes of the incumbent power. Therefore,
the shari'a could be employed, theoretically, in a manner which enthusiastically supports the
principles and practices of democracy. Certainly it would require innovative
leadership (and a superior ability to apply semantics) to manipulate a body of law concerned solely
with glorifying God's name on earth, but it appears possible.
The reality of the matter, however, is altogether quite different. For an explanation as to
why this is so, we must return to the question of who interprets the shari'a. While there is no
"clergy" in Islam, there is "a body of lettered men, doctors of law - the ulamas - whose corpus and
curriculum display remarkable stability in space and time, and who have had a quasi-monopoly on
intellectual production and teaching." 169 These doctors of law advise the ruler on the nature of good
168Roy, 10.
169Roy, 28. Although Islam does not recognize the concept of a clergy per se, it is common for
westerners to equate the ulama with clerics. For simplicity's sake, the terms clergy, cleric, and ulama will
be used interchangeably in this thesis. Additionally, the word "ulama" is commonly used for both singular
and plural, however, it is not incorrect to refer to ulamas as the plural.
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government (in the context of the shari'a). Failure to adhere to this advice brings the penalty of
censure and threatens the legitimacy of the regime. Therefore, while the ulama have no greater
privileges than anyone else and certainly no a priori right to rule, 170 they do exercise considerable
political power:
[The end result] is a council of experts deciding on the grounds of
"objective" (Islamically valid) right and wrong, judging on the basis of the
common good (al-maslaha al-'amma) only, and not a political assembly
representing conflicting opinion and interest. The ideal amounts to an
expertocracy headed by a Just Ruler. 171
And, for the ulama, the insuppressible desire to retain political power is concomitant to its
possession. Accordingly, while there is certainly an interest in applying the shari'a in a manner that
is consistent with God's will and revelation (to ensure that all believers obtain eternal salvation),
the ulama are also motivated by a reluctance to relinquish their considerable influence. Therefore,
any attempt to implement changes which threaten either of these imperatives - to include the
advancement of the concept of popular will through democracy - will be resisted.
a. Case Study: Iran's "Ayatollah Gorbachev"
Since the people love the clergy, have faith in the clergy, want to be
guided by the clergy, it is right that the supreme religious authority should oversee
the work ofthe prime minister or of the president ofthe republic, to make sure that
they don't make mistakes or go against the Koran. 172
170Abdul Karim Soroush, in Wright, "Two Visions of Reformation," 70. Soroush is an Iranian
academic who supported the 1979 revolution but has since articulated ideas concerning Islamic governance
that are controversial and unwelcome by the current regime in Iran.
171Kramer, 78.
172Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, quoted in International Herald Tribune, 15 October 1979, p. 5;
quoted in Theda Skocpol, 251-252. Although Khomeini refers to the post of Prime Minster, that position
was abolished through constitutional amendments in 1989.
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While the previous section explains the theoretical intricacies of governance in an
Islamic state, this section will be devoted to explaining how Iran fails to conform to those same
precepts. It is as if the government of Iran enjoys being contrary. Certainly the Islamic Republic
must derive great satisfaction from confounding and frustrating the efforts of those - such as the
author of this thesis - who would pigeonhole its system of government.
Iran is viewed by many as a rogue nation because support of terrorism has been a
key component of its foreign policy. Yet, in the domestic arena, the regime, at least by Islamic
standards, is quite enlightened. The people exercise a voice in government through the regular
election (every four years) of a legislative assembly and the president of the state. 173 Iranian
citizens exercised this right fully in May of this year when 94 percent of eligible voters turned out
to elect a surprisingly moderate candidate to the office of president. 174 Mohammed Khatemi, a
Muslim cleric who had been forced from his previous position of Culture Minister because of
overly permissive policies, won a landslide victory over the favored candidate, Ali Akbar Nateq
Nouri. 175
Khatami, dubbed "Ayatollah Gorbachev" by those who anticipate he will initiate
sweeping changes to Iran's political system, is certainly more broad-minded than many of his more
conservative clerical peers. He campaigned on a platform of tolerance and social reform,
highlighting the need to ensure civil rights and replace fanaticism with an appreciation for diversity
and variety. Clearly, his campaign struck a chord with Iranian voters. Cyrus Mozaffarian, a
173Suffrage is granted to all Iranians, regardless of gender, over the age of sixteen.
l74John Lancaster, "Iranians Voted for New Ideas, Not New System," Washington Post, 26 May
1997, p. Al. Online. Available HTTP: http//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm
/iran/iranlect.htm. 26 May 1997. With 32 million voters eligible, over 29 million ballots were cast.
175
Ibid. Despite the fact that Nateq Nouri was supported by Iran's religious establishment, Khatami
won more than 20 million votes - 69 percent of the total.
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jewelry and crafts vendor in Tehran, explains:
This was a referendum about freedom. The voters were saying that we're
tired of people snooping into our private lives. What we do at home is our own
business. With Khatami in power, the government is going to stop telling us what
we can read, what we can watch and what we can do. We voted for change, and
the government will have to give it to us. 176
But, whether change will actually occur, and if so at what pace, are debatable
issues. First, while Khatami is undeniably a breath of fresh air for Iranian politics, the fact that he
met the stringent ideological criteria for presidential candidates signifies that he too is a member
of the establishment. 177 As reported by the Washington Post, Khatami "is not a man from the
outside, but a man from the inside." 178 Second, even if he has the best of intentions, Khatami must
work within a system where, as the popular representative of the people, he has only an ancillary
voice in government. This is because the Islamic Republic of Iran, as indicated by its name, is first
and foremost Islamic: "There is a dualism in the Iranian constitution between the sovereignty of
the people (derived from the dominant political discourses of modernity) and the sovereignty of
God, through the principle of vilayet-i-faqih." 179 A republican form of governance is desired, but
it remains a secondary goal and it is subject to the limits imposed by Islam.
I76Cyrus Mozaffarian, quoted in Stephen Kinzer, "Many Iranians Hope Mandate Brings Change,"
New York Times, 26 May 1997. Online. Available HTTP: http//www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/world/
iran-rdp.html. 26 May 1997.
177
A11 political candidates must be vetted by the Council of Guardians, an entity which is tasked
with upholding the sanctity of Islamic law. The Council consists of twelve members: half are clerics
appointed by the supreme religious leader, half are Muslim lawyers who are approved by the legislative
assembly. The Council also ensures that legislation conforms to Islamic tenets.
178
"A 'Moderate' in Tehran," Washington Post, 26 May 1997, p. A 18. Online. Available HTTP:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/wplate/1997-05/000L-052697-idx.html. 26 May 1997.
179Sami Zubaida, "Is Iran an Islamic State?," in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., Political Islam:
Essaysfrom the Middle East Report (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997): 106.
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Vilayet-i-faqih - leadership of a just and pious jurist - was an innovation of
Khomeini that was subsequently incorporated into the constitution: "The governance and leadership
of the nation devolve upon the just and pious Faqih who is acquainted with the circumstances of
his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and recognized and
accepted as leader by the majority of the people." 180 The Faqih provides policy guidance and is the
ultimate arbitrator of competing views. He is also responsible for appointing clerics to the Council
of Guardians, has the authority to unilaterally overturn legislation, and can dismiss the president
if he is found to be negligent in his duties. He is supported by a phalanx of loyal clerics who
dominate the legislative assembly, the judiciary, and the position in the cabinet of the chief
executive. Thus, the Faqih, backed by his religious coterie, is the highest authority in the land:
[T]he people's capacity to determine their own social destiny through the
institutions of the majles [parliament] and other constitutional mechanisms are
[sic] nonetheless constrained by the faqih.... In short, while the constitution
stipulates a "limited" notion of popular sovereignty, it elevates the Velayat-e-Faqih
to prominance [sic] and thus denies the supremacy of the will of the people 181
Subsequently, the nephew of Mozaffarian (the vendor) is probably accurate when he rebuts his
180Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, quoted in Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad
Mashayekhi, "Introduction: Iran's Political Culture," in Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi, eds.




uncle concerning the potential of the new president:
Khatami is not the boss and never will be. In this country the president
does not decide. Maybe Khatami has certain ideas, but he won't have real
power. 182
Apparently the U.S. government agrees. Earlier this year the U.S. State
Department issued a report concerning Iranian human rights practices which was less-than-
complimentary with regard to the ability of Iranian citizens to change their government:
[This right] is severely compromised by the leadership ofthe Government,
which effectively manipulates the electoral system to its advantage. Iran is ruled
by a group of religious leaders and their lay associates who share a belief in the
legitimacy of a theocratic state based on Ayatollah Khomeini's interpretation of
Shi'a Islam. There is no separation of state and religion. The clerics dominate all
branches of government. The Government represses any movement seeking to
separate state and religion, or to alter the State's existing theocratic foundation. 183
Despite the election of Khatami, the U.S. is not convinced that Iran will alter the manner in which
it conducts the business of governance. A White House spokesperson reveals the wait-and-see
attitude which is now prevalent:
We're watching the situation carefully and have no opposition to the
Iranian people or an Islamic government. We need to see if there will be actual
change in behavior in those issues which have concerned us in the past such as
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and human rights. 184
2Kinzer, "Many Iranians Hope Mandate Brings Change." The nephew is not referred to by
name.
183U.S. Department of State, Iran Report on Human Rights Practicesfor 1996. Online. Available
HTTP: http://www.state.gov/wvvw/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/iran.html. 26 May 1997.
l84Stephen Kinzer, "Moderate Leader is Elected in Iran by a Wide Margin," New York Times, 25
May 1997. Online. Available HTTP: http//www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/early/052iran-election.html. 26
May 1997. The White House spokesperson was not named in the article.
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As reflected in the United States's noncommital stance, the deck appears to be
stacked against both Khatami and the possibility of any consequential change in Iranian domestic
politics. Yet, for two reasons, the situation is not clear-cut. First, while the shari'a is prominently
reflected in the Iranian constitution, it is not, of and by itself, the sole guidance for governance of
the state. Roy explains:
[T]he constitution sets the place of the sharia, and not vice-versa.... The
new Islamic state developed a positive law that became "Islamic"by virtue of the
sole fact that the state was Islamic: it thus marked the end of the sharia as the sole
foundation for the judicial norm. 185
This point was punctuated by Khomeini himself when he issued an edict stating that the
"government is authorized unilaterally.. .to prevent any matter, be it spiritual or material, that poses
a threat to its interests," including even the essential elements of Islam such as "prayer, fasting, and
pilgrimage to Mecca." 186 Daniel Pipes, editor of the Middle East Quarterly, notes that this
subordination of Islam to the state has radically diminished the importance of the shari'a and, in
turn, the power of the clergy. 187 Sami Zubaida, contributing editor of the Middle East Report
,
185Roy, 177.
186Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, quoted in Daniel Pipes, "The Western Mind of Radical Islam,"
First Things, issue 58 (December 1995). Online. Christian Leadership Ministries, 9 June 1996. Available
HTTP: http://www.leadem.coin/mssues/ft912/pipes.html. 25 May 1997. Khomeini's motivation in issuing
this edict is unclear. The justification given was that the interests of the Islamic Republic were
synonymous with the interests of Islam and, therefore, the Republic was to be maintained at all costs.
However, Pipes claims that the real reason "lies in the fact that, like countless other twentieth-century
rulers, he sought [uncontested] control of his country's spiritual life." Khomeini was apparently leery of
the power represented in the Council of Guardians' responsibility to review and abrogate legislation,
particularly initiatives that he supported. This edict can be seen as a move to circumvent that possibility.
First Things is "an interreligious, nonpartisan research and education institute whose purpose is to advance
a religiously informed public philosophy for the ordering of society."
187
Pipes, "The Western Mind of Radical Islam."
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concurs:
This far-reaching ruling gives the government and the Leader the
competence to decide when the provisions of Muslim law, however, interpreted,
are or are not binding. Given that the "tenets of Islam" are the ultimate
constitutional limit on legislation and government power, their effective removal
gives the government and parliament unlimited powers. 188
Zubaida's assessment may be overstated, but it is clear that, due perhaps to
internecine rivalry, the overall power of the clergy has suffered a blow. If this is the initial reason
why the winds of political change cannot be ignored, the second is the relative diminution of the
position of Leader. Khomeini's successor is Ali Khamenei, a comparatively junior cleric who
formerly served as Iran's president. Khamenei, who possesses neither the religious credentials nor
the popularity of his predecessor, is having difficulty following in the footsteps of an icon. Zubaida
explains:
While Khomeini as Leader stood above factional strife (and manipulated
it), Khamene'i leads one faction against the others. The effect is to make the
Leader just another politician and thus to denude the position of faqih of its
sanctity and charisma. 189
b. Summation
The promise of democracy swirls about Islam like the wind-borne down of a
dandelion. Whether the seed takes root in fertile ground remains more a factor of circumstances
and luck than careful planning and preparation. This is certainly the case in Iran. Now, with the
election of a moderate as president, the potential for democracy in the Islamic Republic is greater





Khatami's candidacy was approved by religious leaders who deemed the presidential hopeful to
be politically (or, more accurately, religiously) correct. This stamp of approval casts aspersion on
Khatami's desire to effect real political changes. Even if Khatami is willing, it is difficult to be
optimistic about his chances for success because of the seemingly insurmountable inertia created
by the imposing application of religion. According to Zubaida, despite hairline cracks in its
previously impervious ramparts, institutionalized Islam remains an overwhelming force:
[T]he government is Islamic in its personnel. The clerics are in control of
the highest echelons of state, government, and public life.... Their political
discourse is couched in religious terms, and their conflicts often conducted with
religious rhetoric. 190
Religion and the legitimacy of the regime are hopelessly entangled. Therefore, Iran remains a
theocracy. As it will for some time to come. Ultimately, the impact of Khatami's landslide victory,
rather than a signal to replace the excessive emphasis on Islam, is likely to be limited to the
initiation of "new ideas, new people, [and a] more responsive government" 191within the current
religious framework.
4. Culture vs. Democracy: The Unequivocal Verdict
Democracy is the most widely admired type of political system but also
perhaps the most difficult to maintain.... Democratic polities inevitably find
themselves saddled with certain "built-in" paradoxes or contradictions. The
tensions these cause are not easy to reconcile, and every country that would be
democratic must find its own way of doing so. 192
190Zubaida, 118.
'""Lancaster, "Iranians Voted for New Ideas, Not New System."
192Larry Diamond, "Three Paradoxes of Democracy," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner,
eds., The Global Resurgence ofDemocracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 95.
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Culture does not necessarily prohibit democracy. Instead, returning to Huntington's
assertion, most cultural traditions are complex and diverse amalgamations of beliefs, values, and
behaviors that, in some shape or form, can reach accommodation with democracy. 193 The key is
how the ambiguous concept of culture is defined. Employed by those who seek political reform,
culture may very well be the key that unlocks the door to democracy. In the hands of authoritarian
leaders such as Lee Kwan Yew, Soeharto, or Ayatollah Khamenei, however, culture can be wielded
as a bludgeon against those who agitate for democratic values and institutions. Therefore,
ironically, the same cultural amalgamation that accommodates democracy can also serve as an
obstacle to its implementation.
Perhaps the most concrete statement that can be made with regard to culture and democracy
is that mixing the two together is bound to alter each one. According to Bhikhu Parekh, a political
scientist of Indian descent, to "insist on the [immutable] universality of liberal democracy is to
deny the west's [sic] own historical experiences and to betray the liberal principles of mutual
respect and love of cultural diversity." 194
Democracy it is not a single, solid, uniform, seamless, insoluble, mass-produced
commodity. Rather, it is a elaborate set of values
,
principles, practices, and institutions which are
linked in a flexible, wholly adaptable, and ever-changing manner. Therefore, a culture can alter
the face of democracy simply by choosing to change the emphasis that is placed on any of these
integral linkages or characteristics. And, as Parekh notes, this is a natural and inevitable tendency:
How a polity combines liberalism and democracy or how liberal and
democratic it chooses to be depends on its history, traditions, values, problems and
needs. A polity is not a chance and fluctuating collection of individuals but has
l93Huntington, The Third Wave, 310.
194Bhikhu Parekh, "The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy," in Held, 167-168.
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a history and character, and needs to work out its political destiny in its own
distinct way. 195
Emmerson concurs, noting that manner in which different cultures implement democracy
may force a re-evaluation of how the term is perceived:
For if differing societies may democratically implement differing views
of the relative importance of social order versus individual rights, it follows that
alongside right-tilted or liberal democracies there could be
nonliberal - or at any rate less liberal - variants of democracy that are, compared
to their liberal counterparts, more order-inclined. 196
While different cultures will revise the concept of democracy to suit their needs, the
acceptance of this ideology invariably alters the pace and direction in which the adopting societies
evolve. Democracy ensures access to different ideas, views, and information. These spark a
gradual, but inevitable, change in the beliefs, values, and institutions that imbue a particular culture.
Carried to its logical end, this process will result in the assimilation of all cultures. Benjamin
Barber, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, vividly describes such a scenario:
"[The future is painted] in shimmering pastels, a busy portrait of onrushing economic,
technological, and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize
peoples everywhere with fast music, fast computers, and fast food - MTV, Macintosh, and
McDonald's - pressing nations together into one homogenous global theme park, one McWorld tied





Barber's description may be extreme, but it evokes some interesting questions with regard
to attempts to intertwine democracy with different cultures. First, can a mutually satisfactory
compromise be reached between the defenders of cultural tradition and advocates of the principles
and practices of democracy? Phrased in a more explicit (but certainly no more concise) manner
,
is there a democratic "half-way house," or once the process has been started, will it snowball until
either full-fledged liberal rights are achieved or drastic authoritarian measures are imposed to
reverse the course of events? The historical experience of the United States does not provide any
clear-cut answers: although there has been an overriding advance toward greater liberalism in this
country, it has been in fits and starts, and the process, on occasion, has been reversed. If the trend
toward homogenization of both democracy and culture can be thwarted, then a second, equally
compelling question must be answered: will culturally diverse democracies recognize each other
as like entities (and therefore refrain from fighting each other)? As mentioned previously, U.S.
citizens imprecisely equate liberalism with democracy. Will the United States recognize and
respect other, less-liberal democracies? Although all of the aforementioned questions are vital to
the tenets of democratic peace theory, they may not be answerable. They certainly imply, however,
that democratic peace theory is not a simple either/or proposition.
Discussions concerning democracy and culture frequently revolve around how these two
entities can be merged, rather than addressing whether or not they should be merged. That
democracy is good for everyone is assumed; all that remains is to determine how it should be
implemented. It is a common (and not uniquely American) tendency for the members of one
culture to presume that the values that they hold near and dear are equally cherished by another
culture. In the name of democracy, however, the United States has elevated this banal and
egregiously ethnocentric practice to the level of formal government policy. Stromberg warns that
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this is a mistake:
Democracy fits somewhere into the faith of the American people, and
perhaps the faith of others. It is a word that has taken root in the structure of
popular linguistic consciousness with sacred communal connotations. But it has
this quality in few other societies. We believe in democracy as a kind of national
faith, without rational grounds. We should refrain from temptations to force our
particular values on others. 198
While it cannot be said that culture prohibits democracy, it is a mistake to assume that all
cultures welcome democracy. The fact that Americans have chosen to embrace popular
representation, extensive freedom, and individualism over all other values does not mean that other
societies will make the same choices. Given the diversity that is present in the world, it is a safe
bet that different people will choose to stress different values. These values may reflect a desire
for order and stability, or a predilection towards family, community, or religion. As discussed
earlier, these values can alter the appearance of democracy. But, if they are sufficiently
accentuated, they can also prevent its acceptance outright.
Certainly one does not need to travel the globe to witness the divisive impact of divergent
values. Differences of opinion, even with regard to the balance of rights and responsibilities that
are integral to democracy, can be found in the United States. For instance, Americans profess to
value freedom of expression, yet they cannot agree on whether it should extend to burning the
national flag. We believe in protecting individual rights and due process, but are frustrated with
the crime rate and a perceived coddling of criminals. Intrinsically we accept that the rights and
freedoms we are granted are our most valuable possessions but, for most of us, these concepts
remain abstract as we struggle with our workload, finances, and other more mundane aspects of
everyday life. Americans cannot even agree on the most sacrosanct rite of democracy: the right
8Stromberg, 161.
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to elect the leaders of this country. While most American citizens would not limit their own
choices, they may quietly wish to eliminate possibilities for society as whole. Their motivation?
To avoid the middling mind of the masses. As James Fenmore Cooper once noted, the "tendency
of democracies is, in all things, to mediocrity." 199 Given the lack of consensus in the United States,
it should not be surprising to Americans that the melange of ideas and values we call democracy
is not readily accepted by each and every culture to which it is presented.
The idea of cultural relativism, where the citizens of a particular state (and culture) choose
not to embrace democracy, is not accepted by everyone. In fact, according to scholar and author
Joshua Muravchik, it is a logical fallacy:
The reason it is wrong to impose [democracy] on others, presumably, is
because it violates their will. But, absent democracy, how can their will be
known? Moreover, why care about violating people's will unless one begins with
the democratic premise that popular will ought to be sovereign?200
Muravchik's point - choosing against democracy in and of itself implies democratic criteria - is
persuasive. However, he incorrectly equates the ability to influence a government's decisions with
democracy. Even citizens of the most authoritarian state have some means to express popular will,
whether it be through violence, protest, passive resistance, or communal non-participation.
Additionally, Muravchik states that "adult human beings ought not to be governed without their
consent"201 and suggests that, if they are given the ability to exercise a voice in government, they
certainly will not relinquish or restrict such a freedom.
'"James Fenmore Cooper, "On the Disadvantages of Democracy," The American Democrat; in
Columbia Dictionary ofQuotations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), compiled in Microsoft





Demonstrating that a particular culture categorically prohibits democracy is a difficult, if
not impossible, proposition. Conversely, it is equally problematic to advance the idea that
democratic values are universally welcome. Instead, if and when accommodation is reached
between a particular culture and democracy, it is always a unique affiliation that often falls
somewhere between the extremes of each partner. Cultures that do adopt democracy adapt the
characteristics that they deem appropriate - a fitting end for a concept that, above all, espouses
compromise.
B. ETHNIC NATIONALISM
[Will self-determination not] breed discontent, disorder and rebellion?
The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never
be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. What a calamity that the phrase
was ever uttered! What misery it will cause! 202
While the collapse of the Soviet Union signified the end of the communist menace, the
jubilation surrounding that event was short-lived. The specter of unbridled ethnic nationalism
quickly assumed prominence in its stead. Ethnic nationalism is essentially a volatile mixture of
culture and democracy, each in its most concentrated form: "communities of blood rooted in
exclusion and hatred"203 that manipulate and distort the democratic principle of self-determination
to the nth degree. The result, as described by Barber, is a future that offers "the grim prospect of
a retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened balkanization
of nation-states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against people, tribe against tribe,
a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdependence,
202Robert L. Lansing, in David Blinder, "Trouble Spots"; quoted in Barber, 10. Lansing was the
Secretary of State for President Woodrow Wilson. Aghast at the provision in Wilson's Fourteen Points
which called for self-determination, Lansing actively sought to undermine this policy. See Barber, 312.
203Barber, 6.
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every kind of artificial social cooperation and mutuality...."204 According to J. Brian Atwood, an
administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development, traditional institutions and
beliefs, particularly the notion of statehood, are effortlessly swept away in the face of this
onslaught:
[Disintegrating societies and failed states.. .have emerged as the greatest
menace to global stability. Increasingly, we are confronted by states without
leadership, without order, without governance itself. 205
The phenomenon on ethnic nationalism, which can be characterized as virulent, pervasive,
and indifferent to appeals of compromise or reason, seems to poses a particular threat to the
implementation of democracy. According to Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, co-editors of
the Journalfor Democracy, "More than other forms of government, democracy, as a system of
institutionalized competition and conflict, requires a reliable means for managing conflict
peacefully and constitutionally, keeping it within certain boundaries of decency, order, and
restraint."206 Inherently, this involves the acceptance of the institutionalization of "uncertainty" (as
discussed earlier in Chapter II - page 15).
Democracies are founded on the bases of consent and cohesion. According to Diamond,
they require that "citizens assert themselves, but also that they accept the government's
204Barber, 4. Jihad is an Islamic term which can be interpreted as either a struggle on behalf of
religious faith or a fanatical holy war. Barber borrows the latter definition and broadly applies it to
"suggest dogmatic and violent particularism of a kind known to Christians no less than Muslims, to
Germans and Hindis as well to Arabs." See Barber, 9.
205
J. Brian Atwood, "Suddenly Chaos," Washington Post, 13 July 1994; quoted Stephen J. Del
Rosso, Jr., "The Insecure State: What Future for the State?," Daedalus 124, no. 2 (22 March 1995): 175.
Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 May 1997.
206Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, "Introduction," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner,
eds., Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), xix.
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authority."207 Acceptance of authority is derived from trust. Trust combines the belief that the
actions of other actors will not be exceedingly or unfairly detrimental to your own interests with
confidence that the system of governance will not exclude you from power or resources. Only
when there is trust will there be the acceptance of the uncertainty inherent to democracy. Diamond
and Plattner note, however, that ethnic nationalism is antithetical to trust: "Once deep ethnic
divisions are mobilized into electoral and party politics.. .they tend to produce suspicion rather than
trust, acrimony rather than civility, polarization rather than accommodation, and victimization
rather than toleration."208 Excluded minorities do not trust either the system or their fellow actors.
Compromise, another principle that is integral to democracy, is also a casualty of ethnic
nationalism. Nationalists have a tendency to view compromise as only a one-way street: they
demand it from others, but refuse to embrace it themselves. This can be attributed to the incendiary
mixture of intense racial, ethnic, religious, and communal feelings that the concepts of ethnicity
and nationalism incorporate. Therefore, according to Plattner, compromise is not an option:
Ethnicity is the most difficult type of cleavage for a democracy to manage.
Because ethnicity taps cultural and symbolic issues - basic notions of identity and
the self, of individual and group worth and entitlement - the conflicts it generates
are less amenable to compromise than those revolving around material issues.209
Plattner suggests that if only ethnic nationalism is tied to economics then the problem
would become eminently easier to solve. What Plattner expresses as wishful thinking, however,
is a certainty for others. Many commentators view power and economic inequities as the true
207Diamond, "Three Paradoxes of Democracy," 1 03
.
208Diamond and Plattner, "Introduction," xix.
209Marc F. Plattner, quoted in Robin Wright, "Democracies in Peril: Freedom's Excesses Reduce
Democracy's Life Span," Los Angeles Times, 17 February 1997, p. Al. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library:
NEWS. File: LAT. 30 May 1997.
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source of ethnic nationalist passions. John R. Bowen, Professor of Anthropology at Washington
University in St. Louis, concedes that some "conflicts involve ethnic or cultural identity, but most
are about getting more power, land, or resources."210 Culture, race, religion and ethnicity are just
employed as a convenient emotional means to bring attention to inequities and lobby for change.
Bowen adds that the perception of ethnic nationalism as a product of ancient historical animosities
is false. In fact, ethnic nationalism is a fairly recent phenomenon:
[Ejthnicity is a product of modern politics. Although people have had
identities - deriving from religion, birthplace, language, and so on - for as long as
humans have had culture, they have begun to see themselves as members of vast
ethnic groups, opposed to other such groups, only during the modern period of
colonization and state-building.211
A particularly divisive colonial custom involved the practice of "divide and rule." Colonizers
segregated the population along ethnic lines and then embarked on a "partnership" with one of the
newly-cognizant ethnic groups (usually a group in the minority) to administer colonial rule. Not
surprisingly, this special relationship came at the expense of other ethnic groups (often the majority
group). The legacy of this uneven treatment in post-colonial societies, according to Bowen, is the
true motivation behind ethnic nationalism:
Only in living memory have the people who were sorted into these
categories begun to act in concert, as political groups with common interests.
Moreover, their shared interests have been those of political autonomy, access to
education and jobs, and control of local resources. Far from reflecting ancient





ethnic or tribal loyalties, their cohesion and action are products of the modern
state's demand that people make themselves heard as powerful groups or else risk
suffering disadvantages.212
If the origins of ethnic nationalism can indeed be attributed to the institutionalized
preference of one group over another, rather than to historical animosity, then it seems plausible
that ethnic conflict can be resolved by simply addressing existing inequities in the distribution of
power and resources.213 Ironically, given the previous discussion concerning its shortcomings in
the eyes of nationalists, democracy is probably the best mechanism with which to accomplish this
endeavor. As noted earlier in this thesis, democracy is a flexible concept. It can be tailored to
allow maximum autonomy and adequate representation for each group while retaining the stability,
structure, and integrity of the state as a whole.
But the answer is not that simple. According to Robert A. Dahl, renowned political
scientist, before you have democracy, you must have an agreement with regard to the nature of the
state:
The criteria ofthe democratic process presupposes the rightfulness of the
unit itself. If the unit itself is not [considered] proper or rightful - if its scope or
domain is not justifiable - then it cannot be made rightful simply by democratic
procedures. 214
212Bowen., 7
213This assumes that the inequities are not carried out in such a fashion and for such a long period
of time that they become a self-fulfilling prophecy, developing into deep-seated historical animosities.
214Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1989),
207, quoted in Linz, 26.
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You need people to stand and support the idea of the state; to affirm their interest in citizenship:
The nation-state is the politics of the first person plural. Its government
can speak for the people because it is part of the "we."... No government, unless
it is prepared to rely entirely on brute force, can do its job properly in the modern
world if the people it governs do not have a clear-cut sense of identity that they
share with the government - unless, in other words, they are both part of the
"we."
215
But unhappy, agitated ethnic groups will not begin to think in terms of"we" with regard to the state
unless they have a voice in its structure and manifestation. This leaves us with a conundrum similar
to that of the "chicken and the egg." Which comes first? The ideation of a state, the governance
of which will then be subject to the principles of democracy? Or the principles integral to
democracy - particularly the concept of compromise - which will then be employed to forge an
agreement on the shape of the state? Although there may not be a satisfactory answer, it is clear
that both concepts are prerequisites for the lasting resolution of ethnic conflict.
1. Case Study: Ethnic Conflict in Burma
The greatest lesson that the struggle for independence taught us was that
nothing of national significance could be achieved without the wholehearted
participation of all those whose fates are linked to the dignity of the nation.216
The ethnic minorities in Burma appear to have circumvented the conundrum of the
"chicken and the egg." In return for assurances of autonomy and equitable representation, they
have agreed in principle to accept the notion of "we" and are now willingly to participate in a
democratic federal Union of Burma. This is happening despite a long history of autonomy
215
"The Nation-State is Dead. Long Live the Nation-State," The Economist, 23 December 1995, p.
15. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPH. 30 May 1997.
216Aung San Suu Kyi, message to the International Convention for the Restoration of Democracy
in Burma, New Delhi, India, 4 January 1996; in BurmaNet News (Internet), 6 January 1996. Online. FBIS.
Available HTTP: http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve. 3 June 1997.
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interspersed with bouts of antagonism and conflict with the Burman majority. The catalyst that has
allowed Burma's innumerable ethnic minority groups to forge an agreement with Burman citizens
is the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the oppressive military junta that has
ruled Burma since seizing power in 1988. Enmity toward SLORC, combined with a desire to
participate equitably in the governance of the state, are the common denominators that cement this
bond. However, once the junta has been deposed - an occurrence which all groups (except SLORC)
consider inevitable - a large portion of the motivation to work together will also be gone.
Therefore, it remains to be seen if the best intentions of Burmese ethnic minorities and Burman
dissidents will be sufficient to implement democracy and distribute resources and power in a
manner that is satisfactory to all.
Accommodating this diverse population is no mean feat as the numbers of ethnic groups
that reside within the territorial boundaries ofBurma are virtually uncountable. While the minority
ethnic population can be divided into several major groups - to include the Shan, Karen, Arakan,
Mon, Wa, Kachin, Chin, and Kayah - each of these groups can almost be infinitely subdivided into
smaller fragments. According to Martin J. Smith, author of Burma: Insurgency and the Politics
ofEthnicity, Burma possesses perhaps the most complex mix of ethnicity in the world:
Over 100 languages have been identified in Burma. The 1931 census, the
last available to attempt to give any kind of detailed ethnic breakdown,
distinguished 44 ethnic sub-groups amongst the Chin alone.217
Managing the demands of these disparate groups becomes exponentially more difficult when one
217Martin J. Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics ofEthnicity (London: Zed Books, 1991),
30.
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factors in their most disturbing common characteristic - an affinity for armed conflict:
Dissidents from virtually every ethnic and political group have taken up
arms against the central government at some stage since independence [was
granted in 1948].... In short, insurgency has remained endemic and, in many areas
of Burma, the armed struggle is virtually a way of life.218
This ethnic bellicosity is a factor of demographics, colonial rule, and the armed resistance
against the Japanese during World War II. Historically, the rugged upland hills of Burma have
been occupied by ethnic minorities while the Burman majority primarily populated the lowland
plains. Burman rulers occasionally sought to exercise sovereignty over portions of the upland hills,
but these efforts were largely unsuccessful due to the difficult nature of the terrain and the
pugnacity of the people. According to Edmund Leach, former Professor of Anthropology at
Cambridge University, upland ethnic minority groups exercised considerable autonomy:
[T]he control which Valley Princes were able to exercise over Hill subjects
was seldom more than marginal, and the Hill people were quite indiscriminate in
their favors. If it suited his convenience a Hill chieftain would readily avow
loyalty to several different Valley Princes simultaneously.219
This legacy of autonomy remained undisturbed during British colonial rule. The British
administratively partitioned their new colony into Burma Proper or Ministerial Burma, and the
Frontier or Excluded Areas. Colonial subjects that resided in Burma Proper - the Burman majority
and some ethnic minorities - were allowed to exercise limited power in a legislative assembly. The
Excluded Areas, in contrast, were theoretically administered directly by the governor. In reality,
the ethnic groups in these areas were generally left to their own devices.
218Smith, 28.
219Edmund R. Leach, "The Frontiers of 'Burma,'" Comparative Studies in Society and History 3,
no. 1 (October 1960): 59.
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In addition to reinforcing the legacy of autonomy in the Excluded Areas, British colonial
administrators, in a conscious effort to divide and rule, nurtured preexisting seeds of discontent
among Burmese ethnic groups. The litany of grievances includes displeasure with the special
relationship between the Karen and the British, the nonsensical distribution of seats in the assembly
that favored some groups (particularly the Karen) and omitted others (the Mon, Southern Chin, and
Muslims), and the large-scale immigration of Indian laborers and administrators.
Perhaps the most divisive event that fanned the flames of ethnic conflict was the advent of
World War II. Burman nationalists, eager to win independence from Britain, initially fought with
the Japanese. Other ethnic groups, however, remained loyal to the British and fought alongside the
Allies. The inevitable confrontations between the Japanese-trained Burma Independence Army
(BIA) and ethnic minority troops have ensured lasting animosity. For Saw Tha Din, a member of
the Karen Goodwill Mission to London in 1946 and a future leader of the Karen insurrection, the
memory of BIA atrocities will not soon be forgotten:
How could anyone expect the Karen people to trust the Burmans after
what happened during the war - the murder and slaughter of so many Karen people
and the robbing of so many Karen villages? After all this, how could anyone
seriously expect us to trust any Burman government in Rangoon?220
A second, but no less important, consequence of ethnic minority participation in World War II was
the realization of the effectiveness of armed insurgency:
[T]he wartime experience led many young nationalists of very different
political beliefs and persuasions to realise the potential of armed struggle in the
political upheavals to come. Many of the campaigns and battles that have rage
across Burma since independence have eerie echoes ofthe campaigns ofthe war.221
220Saw Tha Din, interview, 23 December, 1985; in Smith, 62.
221 Smith, 64.
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Following the war, Britain decided it would be prudent to grant Burma independence rather
than fight numerous nationalist movements to retain the colony. Most of the Burmese ethnic
groups met in Panglong in 1947 to attempt to draft a constitution for the new state. Armed, trained,
and flush from their victory over the Japanese, each group was reluctant to bargain away their new-
found power. Indeed, many groups, including the Karen, Arakanese, Pao, and Wa did not
participate in the conference at all. Other minority groups demanded special concessions. The
resultant constitution was as lopsided and riddled with inconsistencies as the administration of
British rule that preceded it. 222 Thus, according to Josef Silverstein, former Professor of Political
Science at Rutgers University and acknowledged expert on Burma, that country's entrance onto the
world stage as an independent nation in 1948 was less than graceful: "it had incompletely defined
states, dissatisfaction over the inequality of states, a minority preparing to defend its people against
the Burman majority and a communist party preparing for revolution."223 It is no surprise,
therefore, that almost immediately following independence, the new state of Burma plunged into
civil war. Although the military seized power in 1962, ostensibly to restore order and stability, and
has essentially ruled the state since then, the insurrection continues to this day. If Burma is to ever
successfully implement a democratic government it must find some way to accommodate or
ameliorate the demands of its diverse population and overcome this legacy of armed ethnic strife.
Burma's military regime has battled to retain control of the state in the face of both armed
ethnic insurrection and a peaceful democracy movement. The latter, currently led by Aung San Suu
Kyi, head of the National League for Democracy (NLD), has the support of the majority Burman
222Smith, 79. The 1947 constitution did, however, set one significant precedence: it codified the
concept of autonomy for ethnic states.
223Joseph Silverstein, "Civil Wars and Rebellion in Burma," Journal ofSoutheast Asian Studies
xxi, no. 1 (March 1990): 116.
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population. SLORC, however, does not differentiate between these two challenges, equating both
democracy and continued ethnic uprisings with unmitigated self-determination that will ultimately
lead to chaos.
The regime's attempts to force order and unity from the barrel of a gun have been largely
unsuccessful. SLORC has, however, made headway in recent years by offering ethnic groups
limited autonomy and promises of development in exchange for cease-fires and the acceptance of
Rangoon's sovereignty. These economic and political inducements, in combination with
exhaustion from decades of fighting, have convinced seventeen ethnic organizations to sign cease-
fire agreements. 224 Only four major groups do not have agreements, but the largest of those, the
Karen National Union (KNU), is currently negotiating for an agreement. SLORC's desire for a
cessation of hostilities is primarily motivated by economics - a comprehensive cease-fire will ease
international criticism and increase stability, making Burma more attractive to foreign investment.
Additionally, it will allow access to valuable natural resources in the regions under ethnic control.225
On paper it seems that SLORC's carrot-and-stick approach to Burma's ethnic problems has
a good chance of working. After all, the minority ethnic groups get the autonomy they desire,
while SLORC is able to reap economic benefits. But, when Than Shwe, the leader of the junta,
jubilantly proclaims that in the "Union ofMyanmar [Burma] today, the kind of national solidarity
which was not experienced in the past has been restored,"226 he is uttering a delusional non sequitur.
224
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225Mary P. Callahan, "Burma in 1995: Looking Beyond the Release of Aung San Suu Kyi," Asian
Survey xxxvi, no. 2 (February 1996): 162.
226Than Shwe, quoted in "Aung San Suu Kyi Urges Ethnic, Pro-Democracy Groups to Join
Forces," Agence France Presse, 12 February 1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: AFP. 27
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This is because SLORC's pacification program is fatally flawed. It does not institutionalize the
equitable access to power and resources that is necessary to ensure the long-term satisfaction and
cooperation of ethnic minorities. SLORC treats the cease-fire pacts as surrenders rather than
mutual agreements,227 and abides by their conditions only when it suits them. Subsequently, many
of the minority groups "have grown increasingly disillusioned with SLORC's lack of sincerity,"228
and have thrown their support behind Aung San Suu Kyi and the democracy movement.
Despite past grievances and the fractious nature of Burmese politics, it appears that, if
given the chance, Burma's diverse population is willing to try democracy in the context of a federal
union. Since 1984 members of the National Democratic Front (NDF), a loose alliance of ethnic
organizations that was formed in 1976, have renounced the goal of independence in exchange for
autonomy and equality in a federation of Burmese states. This goal has since been reaffirmed on
many occasions, by many of the ethnic minority groups, most recently in January of 1997 at a
seminar of ethnic nationalities held in KNU territory. At this gathering, which included
representatives from more than sixteen ethnic organizations, the goal of a democratic union was
once again pledged:
We are resolved to carry out democratic changes in accordance with the
will of the people of Burma and to establish a genuine federal union based on the
equality and self-determination of nationalities, in accordance with the will of the
May 1997.
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"Aung San Suu Kyi Urges Ethnic, Pro-Democracy Groups to Join Forces."
228Seri Klinchan Assawin Chumworatayee, "Burma's Minorities Sign Pledge to Fight Against
Junta," Thailand Times, 26 February 1997. Online. The Burma Project, Open Society Institute. No date
Available HTTP: http://www.soros.org/burma/signpldg.html. 30 May 1997.
90
ethnic nationalities.... We ardently support the people's movement led by Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi for democracy and the dismantling of the military
dictatorship. 229
Aung San Suu Kyi, representing the Burman majority group, also recognizes the need for
reconciliation with ethnic minorities and equal representation for all:
National governments must find new ways of enabling their people to
participate more in government and to allow them much greater influence on the
decisions that affect their lives. Unless this is done, and done in time, the
irresistible tide of people's rising aspirations will inevitably clash with inflexible
systems, leading to anarchy and chaos.230
But the agreement between the ethnic nationalities and the NLD on the value of democratic
institutions is not enough. SLORC remains implacable, and even if this obstacle is hurdled,
peaceful coexistence and cooperation are not guaranteed. The cycle of ethnic violence can quickly
begin again if there are perceptions of inequity in the access to and administration of central
authority. As noted by Tin Maung Win, Vice-President of the Democratic Alliance of Burma
(DAB), the balance of power between the proposed federal government and the diverse population
of Burma must be carefully delineated:
The rights of our people, especially the ethnic minorities problem, should
be spelled out clearly and the restrictions placed on the power of the government
229
"Ethnic Nationalities Seminar at Mae Tha Raw Hta,"Burma Project. Online. Open Society
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must be enumerated. From experience, we know not to trust any government with
sufficient power to enslave a nation. 231
2. Democracy: Part Poison, Part Cure
In summary, the problem of ethnic nationalism can be both caused and cured by
democracy. On the one hand, the democratic principle of self-determination, in combination with
a zealous defense of ethnic identity, can lead to dissension and the desire to fling aside
"multicultural wholes in the name of monocultural fragments."232 On the other hand, democracy
offers the flexibility to incorporate and protect that same ethnic identity in a manner that
institutionalizes equitable access to power and resources for all citizens. Before democracy can be
implemented to accomplish this goal, however, there must be agreement with regard to all
participants on the necessity of achieving a unified state. The citizens of Burma appear to have
reached this consensus. The concept of statehood is now expressed in the first person plural. It
remains to be seen, however, if the Burmese can successfully achieve this goal. SLORC remains
a formidable opponent and, even if the junta relinquishes power, building an effective, efficient,
responsive democracy is not a simple task. There will be many opportunities to fail, with each
setback increasing the potential for nationalist sentiments to resurface.
23,Tin Maung Win, interview, in "Burma: Activist Said Confident Democracy to Prevail," Sunday
Post (Bangkok), 12 June 1996, p. 18. Online. FBIS. Available HTTP: http://fbis.fedworld.gov
/cgi-bin/retrieve. 3 June 1997. The Democratic Alliance of Burma is a national coalition of forces for
democracy, to include minorities (represented by the NDF), students, and Buddhist monks. Its announced
goals are "the overthrow of the military regime, establishment of a democratic government, an end to civil
war and the restoration of peace, and the creation of a genuinely federal union." See Silverstein, "Civil




Poverty is a great enemy to human happiness; it certainly destroys liberty,
and it makes some virtues impracticable and others extremely difficult. 233
Democracy is among the virtues commonly thought to be impracticable and extremely
difficult (if not impossible) to cultivate in the presence of poverty. According to Huntington,
poverty "is a principal - probably the principal - obstacle to democratic development."234 Certainly
an examination of the states that have successfully consolidated democracy would reveal that most
are economically advanced.235 Robert Pinkney affirms this axiom: "It is certainly difficult to refute
the fact that virtually all countries of Western Europe, North America, and the Old Commonwealth
have achieved substantial economic development and arrived at the democratic destination, despite
different starting points [and] different problems along the road...."236 The implication is that
development must precede democracy, a mantra that is often used to justify dictatorial regimes.
Pinkney is quick to point out, however, that correlation is not the same as causation. Indeed, many
political and social scientists fervently believe that the practices and institutions of democracy are
not only complementary to economic development, but assert that they will hasten the process.
Clearly this is more than just an academic impasse. At the heart of the matter are attempts to justify
(or criticize) U.S. foreign policy towards less-than-democratic regimes. While both sides - to be
distinguished as "development first" versus "democracy now" - present convincing arguments, the
233Samuel Johnson, 20 July 1763, quoted in James Boswell, Life ofSamuel Johnson (1791); in
Rhod Thomas Tripp, ed., The International Thesaurus ofQuotations (New York: Harper & Row, 1987,
492.
234Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner,
eds., The Global Resurgence ofDemocracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 22.
235India is a clear exception.
236Pinkney, 20.
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issue appears unresolvable. A clear-cut, definitive answer with regard to whether or not economic
imperatives must precede democracy is not discernible.
The lore of democracy holds that the concept of citizen's rights arose in conjunction with
the development of a middle class that sought to protect its economic interests from an absolute
government. Without sufficient economic development there can be no middle class. And, without
a middle class to demand rights, there will be no need for democracy. Corollaries to this theorem
add that the upper class has no need for democracy because it is the ruling elite, while the lower
classes cannot afford to be concerned with abstracts ideas such as democracy - they are preoccupied
with determining how they will get their next meal. Musa Hitam of Malaysia, Chairman of the
United Nations commission for Human Rights, refers to the latter phenomenon as "stomach-ism."
He emphasizes that freedom from hunger is of paramount importance, and urges that this human
right be fulfilled first.237
Economic development has been deemed the cure for all of the aforementioned ills. 238 It
creates a middle class that eventually, through democracy, restrains the excesses of the ruling elite.
It also further enriches the rich so that they are unconcerned about relinquishing some authority.
Finally, it provides the economic opportunity that lifts the poor from their morass. That this
medication often comes in the form of a bitter dictatorial pill is unfortunate but necessary. Arthur
A. Goldsmith, Professor of Management at the University of Massachusetts, summarizes the logic
^Musa Hitam, interview, in "The Rights Debate; It Would gain From Less Big-Power Politics
and More Attention to Economics," Asiaweek, 1 December 1995, p. 55. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library:
NEWS. File: ASIAWK. 27 May 1997.
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S. M. Lipsett conducted a landmark study which attributed the phenomenon of democracy to
economic imperatives. See "Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69-105. Pinkney offers a synopsis of
Lipsett's findings: "With increased wealth. ..the question ofwho ruled became less important, because
governments had less power to affect the 'crucial life chances' of the most powerful groups, who now
enjoyed sources of wealth independently of the state, while poorer groups could secure some redistribution
of wealth relatively painlessly without the rich having to make any great sacrifice." See Pinkney, 20.
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of the "development first" school:
[Democratic politics [reflects the pull of interest groups and] leads to
demand for welfare spending, which in turn blocks social saving and the
accumulation of capital, consequently impeding economic growth.... The two
goals are incompatible - poor countries must choose democratic freedom or
material growth, not both. Since poor countries cannot simultaneously pursue
democracy and a larger national income, authoritarianism serves them better in the
early stages of development. Tough regimes do a superior job of bringing order
to society, and lay a firmer underpinning than democracies can for material
development. Premature efforts to democratise boomerang, for they invite
political instability that drives away investment. 239
Fukuyama adds that authoritarian regimes are better suited to make the tough choices required to
implement the market reform that will spark economic development:
Authoritarian regimes.. .are in principle better able to follow truly liberal
economic policies. They do not have to be accountable to workers in declining
industries, or subsidize inefficient sectors simply because the latter have political
clout. They can actually use the power of the state to hold down consumption in
the interests of long-term growth.240
In contrast, citizens of democracies are fair-weather fans who "may affirm free-market principles
in the abstract, [but] are all too ready to abandon them when their own short-term, economic
interest is at stake."241
Critics of "development first" note that if "the argument that economic development leads
to enhanced political freedoms held, Singapore would be the freest state in Asia."242 Additionally,
239Arthur A. Goldsmith, "Democracy, Property Rights, and Economic Growth," Journal of
Development Studies 32, no. 2 (December, 1995). Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPH.
2 June 1997.
240Fukayama, The End ofHistory, 124.
241
Ibid., 123.
242Sidney Jones, "The Role of Commercial Diplomacy; Human Rights in Asia," Current, no. 390
(February 1997). Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library" NEWS. File: ASAPII. 27 May 1997.
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they point out that it is incorrect to presume that the poor do not have either aspirations for a better
life or a desire to be heard simply because they are poor. Indeed, according to Georges Bernanos,
a French novelist and political writer, a "poor man with nothing in his belly needs hope, illusion,
more than bread."243 Finally, "democracy now" advocates assert that authoritarian regimes are no
better at achieving economic development than nascent democracies. Przeworski, in a study of 135
countries from 1950 to 1990, determined that "transitions to democracy are random with regard to
the level of [economic] development...."244 He concludes that "dictatorships offer no advantage in
attaining the dual goal of development and democracy."245
As opposed to the order and stability that authoritarian regimes offer, "Democracy now"
proponents argue that the freedom of expression and the open exchange of ideas, characteristics of
democracy, are vital to economic development. There is no guarantee that an authoritarian regime
will make the correct choices to spur economic development, and in fact, many squander or pocket
windfalls rather than reinvest in the economy. In contrast, democracies, in conjunction with the
mechanisms of the marketplace, "nurture a climate of open debate that is helpful for the efficient
allocation of resources...."246 Finally, democratic regimes offer long-term stability because they
represent the legitimate interests of the population as a whole, rather than those of a precarious
elite.
243George Bemanos, Diary ofa Country Priest (1936); in Columbia Dictionary ofQuotations
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), compiled in Microsoft Office Professional 7.0/Bookshelf
1995 edition. CD-ROM.
244Adam Przeworski, Aichale Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, "What
Makes Democracies Endure?,"Journal ofDemocracy 7, no. 1 (January 1996): 40.
245
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So which position is correct? Each side of the economic imperatives debate offers an
intrinsically reasonable argument. Each side can also point authoritatively to studies that support
its assertions. Ultimately, after wading through numerous case studies, endless dependent,
independent, and control variables, and numbingly persuasive analyses, there just does not appear
to be a clear-cut answer to this dilemma. In any case, it cannot be said with any degree of certainty
that economic imperatives impede the development of democracy.
1. Case Study: Cambodia's Democratic Moment
There can be no lasting peace without sustainable development, without
endogenous development, through the uprooting of frustration, poverty and
exclusion.247
Battered by decades ofwar and insurrection, the Kingdom ofCambodia is, by any standard,
one of the poorest countries in the world. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is only $290.248
and the United Nations Human Development Report ranks Cambodia 156th out of 174 countries
with regard to its human development index.249 According to conventional wisdom Cambodia
would not be the ideal country in which to try to implement democracy. Yet in 1993, with the help
of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 90 percent of Cambodians
cast a ballot not only for the candidate of their choice, but democracy in general. Now certainly
a single election cannot be equated with democracy, but, despite the crushing weight of poverty,
247Federico Mayor, "Commentary," UNESCO Courier, issue 4 (April 1996): 38. Mayor is the
Director General of UNESCO.
248
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Cambodians have demonstrated persistent interest in participating in the governance of the state.
And, while the slow pace of economic development will remain a chronic challenge, it is the
corrupt, imperious, and belligerent nature of Cambodia's elected leaders that is the biggest obstacle
to the successful implementation and consolidation of democracy. This point was clearly
demonstrated in June when Hun Sen, one of Cambodia's deputy premiers, orchestrated a coup
against his counterpart, Prince Norodom Ranariddh.250
Poverty in Cambodia can be quantified in any number of ways: half of the population has
no health care; the life expectancy ofthe average Cambodian is less than 50 years; one out of every
eight children dies before his first birthday; and less than 20 percent of the population has access
to potable water. 251 Ultimately, according to Fredrick Z. Brown, Professor of Southeast Asian
Studies at Johns Hopkins University, "90 percent of the Cambodian people.. .live in abject
poverty."252 Cambodia has used the influx of international aid in an attempt to ameliorate some of
250Prince Norodom Ranariddh heads the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia or FUNCINPEC, a royalist party loyal to his father, King Norodom
Sihanouk. FUNCINPEC won most of the seats in the parliamentary election of 1993. The Cambodian
People's Party, headed by Hun Sen, came in second in the same election but was able to force a power-
sharing arrangement that was favorable to his party by threatening to resume Cambodia's civil war. As
demonstrated recently, this was a credible threat because the CPP "controls up to 80 percent of the Army
and maintains an iron grip on most key administrative structures." See Yvan Cohen, "Who Really Rules
Cambodia? Rivals Square Off," Christian Science Monitor, 1 1 March 1997. Online. No date. Available
HTTP: http//www.csmonitor.com. 26 May 1997. King Sihanouk initially resolved the crisis by declaring
himself "as head of state, prime minister, and supreme commander of the armed forces with Ranariddh and
Hun Sen as deputy premiers." See Shawcross, 25. Sianhouk, however, is largely a figurehead who spends
more time in China undergoing medical treatment than in Cambodia. Therefore, Ranariddh and Hun Sen
were left to squabble over both policy and power. Hun Sen has used his leverage with the military to gain
an upper hand and depose Ranariddh.
251 William Shawcross, Cambodia's New Deal, Contemporary Issues Paper no. 1 (Washington
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994): 79. The Carnegie Endowment "conducts
programs of research, discussion, publication and education in international affairs and American foreign
policy in an effort to promote international peace and understanding."
252Fredrick Z. Brown, "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace," prepared statement
submitted to the House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21
September 1995,44.
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these deficiencies. It has also begun to rebuild an infrastructure badly damaged by conflict in the
hope of attracting foreign investment.
There have been some positive signs: GDP is expected to sustain a seven percent rate of
growth, inflation has decreased dramatically, and Cambodia's currency (riel) has stabilized.253
Lome W. Craner, President of the International Republican Institute (IRI), notes that throughout
Cambodia "the effects of the growing economy on everyday life are evident, from the replacement
of bicycles with cyclos [motorbikes] on Phnom Penh streets to the substitution of clay tiles for
straw on the roofs of rural hamlets."254
Overall, however, while the government of Cambodia struggles to effect change, poverty
retains its tight grip on the population. Maureen S. Steinbruner, President of the Center for
National Policy, notes that the symptoms of extreme poverty, to include "lack of infrastructure, low
educational levels and a limited base of physical capital" are a double-edged sword, not only
negatively affecting the lives of average Cambodians, but "also severely limiting] the ability of
the government to function in an effective and constructive way."255 According to Shawcross, the
government has little to spend on either social welfare or capital reinvestment because of
administrative difficulties collecting revenue from entire sectors of the economy, as well as levying
253Lome W. Craner, "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace," prepared statement
submitted to the House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21
September 1995, 52. Cramer is the President of the International Republican Institute, an organization
which lists its primary goal as "advancing democracy worldwide."
254Craner, "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace," testimony before House International
Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 1995, 14.
255Maureen S. Steinbruner, "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace," prepared statement
submitted to the House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21
September 1995, 61 . The Center for National Policy is a non-profit public policy research center located in
Washington D.C.
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taxes on income and consumption.256 This economic morass is exacerbated by the rivalry between
the CPP and FUNCINPEC. Renewed conflict between these two parties has not only impeded the
government's efforts to rebuild Cambodia's infrastructure, but has also led to the cancellation of
foreign aid designed to bolster the development of democracy and chased away any hopes of
commercial investment.
Despite the economic quagmire in which the Cambodian people find themselves, they have
demonstrated remarkable resolve, patience, and perseverance with regard to the institutions and
practices of democracy. As a matter of fact, despite Hun Sen's coup, the citizens of Cambodia
could be considered a shining example of the efficacy of "democracy now." As noted earlier, 90
percent of Cambodians "braved minefields and Khmer Rouge violence to vote,"257 thereby
stamping their mark of approval on a democratic system of parliamentary government. Craner has
also documented subsequent grass-roots interest in democracy:
In villages and towns throughout the country, IRI has found a deep desire
on the part of Cambodians to learn about democracy, to participate in politics, and
to have a voice in their government.... [A] recent IRI informal poll shows how
closely held the rudiments of democracy are in rural areas. Of 1,245 provincial
part activists from all four parliamentary parties, 96 percent favored holding local-
level elections in 1996.258
Additionally, there are healthy signs of the development of an organized opposition party to
challenge the rule of the current incumbent, FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Party
(CPP). Sam Rainsy, former Finance Minister for the coalition government, has formed a new
256Shawcross, 76.
257Winston Lord, "Cambodia: Prospects for Prosperity and Peace," testimony before House
International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 1995, 5.
258Craner, prepared statement, 56.
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political party - Khmer Nation - which has received enthusiastic support from Cambodian citizens.
Unfortunately, the genesis of this party can be attributed to the undemocratic principles of
Cambodia's elected leaders. Rainsy has been a continually outspoken critic of both the
government's corruption and its surprisingly unenthusiastic support of the liberal rights guaranteed
in the Cambodian constitution. Rainsy's comments led FUNCINPEC to strip him of his party
membership and request that he be removed from his National Assembly seat.
Indeed, neither Hun Sen nor Ranariddh seemed particularly enamored of the concept of
democracy. Prior to his coup, Hun Sen threatened to cancel next year's parliamentary elections,
saying that Cambodians "can go back to farming rice."259 Meanwhile, Ranariddh equivocated on
the meaning and importance of democracy:
[Democracy is just a phrase to be talked about in idle gossip. What is one
person's democratic and human rights can be another man's poison. Discipline is
more essential in our society than democracy, though they have a need of both.
When the rural poor have sufficient food, shelter, education, and basic amenities,
then democracy can be preached and installed in abundance.260
Thus, as Craner laments, it appears that rural farmers and families are "far more interested in
human rights and democratic governance than the government of Cambodia."261
Indifference to democracy, in part, can be attributed to the affinity the ruling elite holds for
the profits that they derive from corruption. Rainsy, because of his tenure as Finance Minister,
claims to know the amount of government funds that are diverted into private pockets: "Its
hundreds of millions of dollars, those individuals keep half for themselves and give half to their
259Hun Sen, quoted in "Attack in Phnom Penh Raises Spectre of Anarchy," The Nation, 3 1 March
1997. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: NATION. 30 May 1997.
260Prince Norodom Ranariddh, quoted in Craner, prepared statement, 53.
261Craner, prepared statement, 56.
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parties." Disdain for democracy is also a likely product of the unique power-sharing arrangement
between FUNCINPEC and the CPP. Both Hun Sen and Ranariddh spent considerable energy trying
to counter the moves and initiatives of the other. In the process the rights and aspirations of the
Cambodian people have been trampled upon. Ominously foreshadowing events to come, a senior
FUNCINPEC official conceded that the CPP had derailed the best intentions of his party:
We have been swallowed and digested by the CPP. We were elected by
the people to bring peace and development. Instead we have been pushed into
adopting all the CPP's policies, including attacking the Khmer Rouge.... The CPP
have stopped us [from] keeping any of our promises. Sometimes I think that all
aid should be stopped. There is no point in giving analgesics when surgery is
required. 262
Even prior to the coup, aid donors questioned the wisdom of continuing to fund a clearly
corrupt regime that struggled to comply with the democratic principles upon which it was founded.
However, threats from France and the United States to withhold aid drew only petulant excuses:
[I]t should be understood that Cambodia has just emerged from more than
two decades of war, and the restoration of democracy in Cambodia is only at its
nascent stage because it is barely three years old. Having said this, how can one
force a three-year-old child to think and behave like an adult? This cannot be done
no matter how good the teacher is. What one must do it [sic] is to continue
nurturing and fostering the child so that he will grow up and become able to
shoulder the burden in a manner expected of a grown-up. 263
It is not only aid donors that have grown impatient and frustrated with Cambodia's
leadership. For many Cambodians, democracy offers a ray of hope, a departure from politics that
262Quoted in Shawcross, 94. The official was not named.
263
"Commentary," Phnom Penh National Radio of Cambodia Network, 5 June 1996. Online.
FBIS. Available HTTP: http://fbis.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve. 29 May 1997.
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are "synonymous with exploitation alternating with neglect."264 The democratically-elected leaders
of Cambodia squandered that state's most recent and, perhaps, best chance to institutionalize
democracy. Still, as noted by Julio A. Jeldres, a former member of Sihanouk's staff and his current
biographer, the window of opportunity may not remain closed forever:
A crisis of legitimacy may be brewing, as more and more Cambodians
come to believe that most political leaders place their own interests above those
of their country. Even in the rosiest scenario, democracy will take a long time to
put down firm roots in Cambodia. If it is to have a real chance, however, the
country's political elites must begin respecting norms of accountability and
transparency, and must get serious about fulfilling the mandate for democratization
they received from the voters in may 1993. 265
2. Economic Development: Democracy's X-Factor
Common knowledge holds that economic development and the establishment of a middle
class must precede the successful implementation of democracy. Numerous studies have certified
the veracity of this assertion. Yet, there is also a plethora of analyses that have chronicled a
definitively contrary conclusion; namely, that the concurrent development of the economy and
democracy is not only possible, but is advantageous and desirable. The lack of conclusive evidence
prohibits concrete generalizations with regard to the possible impact of economic imperatives on
the development of democracy. Instead, the consequences of economics must be examined on a
case-by-case basis. Although democracy has been derailed in Cambodia, it can be attributed more
to the imperious and belligerent attitudes of elected leaders rather than the slow pace of economic
development.
264David Chandler, A History ofModern Cambodia (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1996), 242.
265Julio A. Jeldres, "Cambodia's Fading Hopes," Journal ofDemocracy 7, no. 1 (January 1996):
155-156.
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D. DEMOCRACY IS UNIVERSALLY POSSIBLE
No country's culture, history, or economic circumstances bar it from
democracy.266
U.S. national security strategy, incorporating democratic peace theory, states that
democracies are "more likely to cooperate with each other against common threats and to
encourage free and open trade and economic development - and less likely to wage war or abuse
the rights of their people."267 From this assertion it seems logical to deduce that promoting
democracy worldwide will ultimately ensure U.S. security. And indeed, the White House's 1997
National Security Strategy For a New Century lists the promotion of democracy abroad as one its
three core objectives.268 There is, however, an important premise in this train of logic that has been
overlooked or assumed; namely, that democracy can be successfully exported. U.S. policymakers
have made a leap of faith by assuming that the intrinsic merits of democracy are both universally
appreciated and welcome. However, while democracy is universally possible it cannot be said to
be universally probable.
As demonstrated in the preceding sections, neither culture, ethnic nationalism, nor
economic imperatives prohibit the implementation of democracy. Culture consists of diverse and
complex traditions that can accommodate and even complement democratic principles, institutions,
and practices. Additionally, democracy may be the only means with which to extinguish the raging
fires of ethnic nationalist passion. Finally, while impact of economic underdevelopment remains
266Thomas Carothers, "Democracy Without Illusions," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (January/February
1997): 93. Carothers is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
267
Ibid., 2.
268Clinton, A National Security Strategyfor a New Century, i.
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somewhat nebulous, it certainly cannot be said - with absolute conviction - to prevent the
implementation of democracy.
This acknowledgment may be interpreted by some as an unequivocal endorsement for the
universal promotion of democracy. It is not. Each of the aforementioned factors do not preclude
democracy, but they certainly can impede or limit the scope of its implementation. Indeed, while
some aspects of cultural tradition are able to accommodate democracy, it may be antithetical to
other portions of the same culture. Likewise, if democracy is to be effective in quelling ethnic
nationalism, the values of compromise and consensus must receive greater emphasis from
disenchanted minority groups than the desire for unfettered self-determination.
The key is the value that is ascribed to democracy. While democracy may be universally
possible, the manner it which it is assessed and prized is not necessarily uniform. Therefore,
attempting to implement democracy where it is not acknowledged as a preeminent goal is akin to
cultivating crops in the desert: it can be done, but the time, resources, and effort expended quite
often exceed the value of the finished product. The export of democracy should not be an
ideological crusade that is clouded by rhetoric and illusions. Instead, it must resemble an
accountant's ledger sheet - that is, a pragmatic assessment that balance all potential costs against
any possible benefits. Such an assessment, within the confines of U.S. national security strategy,
will be conducted in Chapter V. The bottom line with regard to the promotion of democracy is that
it must be tangibly demonstrated to be in the best interest of the United States.
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IV. PERILS OF PEACE
It is essential...for a Prince who desires to maintain his position to have
learned how to be other than good, and to use or not to use his goodness as
necessity requires. 269
Current U.S. security strategy adheres to the tenets of democratic peace theory in an
attempt to achieve lasting peace and, ultimately, guarantee America's security for the future. This
endeavor, which involves enlarging the rolls of democracies, essentially rests on two assumptions.
The first, discussed at length in Chapter III, holds that democracy is both universally exportable
and desirable. The second assumption, to be examined in this chapter, is that the advent of peace
is sufficient to ensure a nation's security.270
At first glance it seems that the latter assumption is rather obvious, even self-evident:
while war represents the preeminent threat to a state's security, the establishment of peace denotes
that this threat has been alleviated. Therefore, the presence of peace, ipso facto, should guarantee
a nation's security. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes readily apparent that this chain
of logic is flawed.
The problem lies with both the determination of what represents a threat to national
security and the definition of "peace." Webster's dictionary defines peace as "a state of security
or order within a community," and, alternatively, "a state or period of mutual concord between
269Niccolo Machiavelli, "Recommendations for the Prince," in Phil Williams, Donald M.
Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz, eds., Classic Readings ofInternational Relations (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth Publishing, 1994), 25; excerpted from Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, N. H. Johnson, trans.,
(New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1910), 57-59.
270As stated previously, for the sake of argument, the assertions of democratic peace theory will
be accepted at face value. Therefore, the intermediate step that ties these two assumptions together -
namely, that enlarging the number of democracies worldwide will lead to peace (or at least inhibit war) - is
also assumed.
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governments."271 In contrast, democratic peace advocates narrowly define peace as simply the
absence of war. This limited definition forces a myopic focus upon the ultimate form of conflict
while shunting other, lesser clashes between states to the side, dismissing them as inconsequential
to either peace or national security. But, as Hobbes wrote in Leviathan, the absence of war cannot
necessarily be equated with peace:
For Warre, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a
tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and
therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in
the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre
or two of rain; but an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of
War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during
all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. 272
Hobbes adds that, because states cannot rely on a central authority to enforce law and order, they
must seek to help themselves. Subsequently, all states pursue what they perceive to be their
national interests in an attempt to survive and bolster their position in an anarchical international
realm. According to George Washington, this maxim holds true regardless of whether the state is
democratic or authoritarian:
A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far the
greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost every
man is more or less, under its influence. Motives of public virtue may for a time,
or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a conduct purely
disinterested; but they are not of themselves sufficient to produce persevering
271 Webster 's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1985 ed.
272Thomas Hobbes, "Relations Among Sovereigns," in Williams, 29; excerpted from Thomas
Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1909), 94-98.
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conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty. Few men are
capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private interest, or
advantage, to the common good.273
Additionally, contrary to the assertions of democratic peace theorists, the activities that
states engage in during "peace" are not always benign. Indeed, while Karl von Clausewitz
concluded that war is a continuation of politics by other means,274 the intrigue, competition, and
conflict that occurs between states that are pursuing national interests can be viewed as a
continuation of war. Certainly many of these ventures are capable ofjeopardizing the security and
sovereignty of a targeted state.
The object of this chapter is to demonstrate that a democratic peace cannot and will not
guarantee a state's security. While democracies may not go to war with one another, they do not
necessarily bask in the cooperation of a pacific union. Instead, they exhibit a remarkable proclivity
to engage in lesser, but still hostile, acts against their brethren. Of particular significance are the
activities of intelligence services, specifically covert action, economic espionage, and military
espionage. While falling far short of war, these malevolent deeds can violate a state's sovereignty
and jeopardize its security. Therefore, the promise of a democratic peace is hollow: the "peace"
that is proffered is not without perils, and often it can be downright menacing.
273George Washington, The Writings ofGeorge Washington, John C. Fitzpatrick, ed.,
(Washington: United States Printing Office, 1931-44), Vol . X, 363; quoted in Hans J. Morgenthau, "Six
Principles of Political Realism," in Williams, 36; excerpted from Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among
nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 4-6, 8-12.
274Karl von Clausewitz, On War (1832), in Columbia Dictionary ofQuotations (New York:




From time immemorial, nations have sought to affect one another's
internal affairs, if not by the egregious display of cannon, then by royal marriages
and the casuistry of envoys. Sometimes they resort to open threats and
blandishments, or foreign aid with strings, both visible and otherwise....
Especially when the stakes are high, statesmen seek secretly to alter subtly the
balance of political forces within a rival state or even suborn political violence. 275
Covert action, as defined by the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, is "an activity or
activities of the U.S. government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad,
where it is intended that the [U.S.] role.. .will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly."276 Of all
the activities in which intelligence and security services engage, covert action is the one that is most
easily identified as being blatantly incompatible with the principles of a democratic peace. The
"basic postulate of liberal international theory holds that states have the right to be free from
foreign intervention...."277 As covert action clearly violates this dictum, it is undoubtedly an
activity in which democracies should not engage, at least not against other democracies.
This type of interference in the sovereign affairs of other states, as noted earlier in this
paper, falls short of the threshold established in the definition of "war." It should not be implied,
however, that these ventures are without casualties or consequences for the targeted nation. For
example, coups and military insurgencies that are initiated through covert action can lead to
violence and upheaval that exceeds the death toll required by war while seriously compromising
the stability and security of the state. Thus, covert action, in addition to being easily identified as
275Frank R. Bamett, "Preface," in Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirementsfor the 1980s:
Covert Action (Washington D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1985), vii.
276Roy Godson, "Covert Action in the 1990s: Neither Exceptional Tool nor Magic Bullet," Covert
Action in the 1990s (Washington D.C.: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1993), 3-4.
277Doyle, "Kant, Liberal legacies, and Foreign Affairs," 10.
110
incompatible with a democratic peace, also clearly represents a challenge to the security and
sovereignty of targeted states.
For many Americans, simply mentioning the phrase "covert action" evokes a profoundly
adverse reaction: it is seen primarily "as a secret policy tool of presidents (or worse, 'rogue'
agencies)"278 that "in the absence of clear and present danger, is a controversial proposition at
best..., and is generally incompatible with a democratic foreign policy."279 This is despite the fact
that covert action can involve a broad spectrum of activities from the exotic and dramatic, to
include organizing and equipping an opposition group to overthrow the government of a targeted
state, to the relatively mundane, such as discretely providing funding to a sympathetic political
candidate. Pat M. Holt, former staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, notes that
"Almost all covert action is dirty tricks, [but] some [are] dirtier than others."280 Frank R. Barnett,
an observer of the role of intelligence in a free society, concurs, adding that:
clandestine acts need not be beastly. Indeed, many forms of "covert
operations" are non-violent and as routine - and as benign - as providing advice
and funds to politicians, labor leaders, and editors....281
Discomfort with the concept of covert action appears to be a uniquely American trait.
Indeed, Godson notes that the term "covert action" is difficult to translate into other languages
because the activities it encompasses are not considered particularly extraordinary or sufficiently
278Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards, 8.
279
Ibid., 120.




distinguishable from the other forms of influence that may be pursued:
Other states do not use the term, even if many at some point seek to exert
influence in a covert way. In any case, most states do not make a sharp distinction
between overt and covert behavior. While they may create special components
within the bureaucracy to deal with some aspects of covert tradecraft, they regard
the exertion of influence, with varying degrees of secrecy, as a normal function of
statecraft.282
Covert action - to borrow from Clausewitz - is considered by most states to be essentially the
continuation of politics by other means (short of war). Angelo Codevilla, formerly a staff member
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, agrees, stating that the "secret means of exerting
influence are part and parcel of foreign affairs, intrinsically no more and no less appropriate than
other means."283
Despite the squeamishness of the American public and occasional Congressional
displeasure, covert action is a tool that has been regularly employed by U.S. policymakers in an
attempt to exert influence abroad. And, not only has this instrument of American foreign policy
been routinely utilized, it has been routinely utilized against other democracies:
• From November 1947 to March 1948, in an attempt to affect the outcome of elections,
Truman authorized "financial assistance to Italy's Christian Democrats, the anti-
Communist Social Democrats, the more conservative Liberal and Radical parties, and
individual left-wing Socialists, plus some useful propaganda and counterpropaganda
initiatives."284
282Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards, 2-3.
283Angelo Codevilla, "Covert Action and Foreign Policy," in Godson, Intelligence Requirements
for the 1980s: Covert Action, 79.
284Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards, 3 1
.
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• In 1954, with Eisenhower's approval, the CIA financed, equipped and trained a group
of exiles to overthrow the democratically elected government of President Jacobo
Arbenz.285
• In 1964, in Chile, the CIA financed the mobilization of many interest groups in support
of the moderate Christian Democratic party. "The CIA spent $3 million, or about $1
per Chilean voter in the 1964 elections. In the U.S. election the same year, the major
party candidates together spent about 50 cents per voter."286
• In 1970, again in Chile, at Nixon's behest, the CIA began a program, the thrust ofwhich
"was to inspire a coup by the Chilean military to prevent Allende from taking office."287
Although it was not immediately successful, subsequent efforts did lead to the
overthrow of President Allende in 1973.
• Beginning in 1981, the Reagan administration authorized aid to the Contras in an effort
to topple the popularly supported Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Although
Nicaragua, at that time, could not be considered a democracy, presidential and
legislative elections were held in 1984 in which a "number of respected human rights
groups certified that the actual voting was reasonably fair and free."288
• More recently, the U.S. government has sought to influence the outcome of elections
in former communist bloc states by funding candidates that are sympathetic to U.S.
views rather than supporting the electoral process itself. Parties that were formerly
socialist (much less communist) are unable to win the trust and support of the West.
This despite the fact that many have garnered a popular mandate and adopted moderate
economic programs.289 These parties have also enthusiastically demonstrated a
willingness to abide by the principles of free and fair elections. Meanwhile, U.S.
governmental agencies such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the
International Republican Institute (IRI), both funded through the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), industriously skew and subvert the democratic
process that they profess to support in an effort to ensure that a candidate of their
choosing is elected .
285CIA activity in this case will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter.
285Gregory F. Treverton, Covert Action: The limits ofIntervention in the Postwar World (New
York: Basic Books, 1987), 180; quoted in Holt, 145.
287Holt,217.
288David P. Forsythe, "Democracy, War, and Covert Action," Journal ofPeace Research 29, no. 4
(1992), 390.




These briefcase histories clearly show that a succession of presidential administrations not
only developed an affinity for covert action, but demonstrated little compunction about utilizing
it against:
political regimes that were not only elected but which could be accurately
termed partially or basically democratic. In political or somewhat hyperbolic
terms, there was a war between the USA and these elected governments.290
That each of the aforementioned presidential administrations sought to rationalize its actions as
warranted in the face of a ubiquitous (or lingering) communist threat is not particularly relevant.
What is important is that the U.S., a purportedly shining model of democratic ideals, has, on many
occasions, subverted both popular expression and the development of democracy in other states.
In each case, a higher value was placed "on the results expected [read "national interest"] than on
the democratic process in a target country."291 As will be demonstrated in the case study on
Guatemala, it is as if U.S. policymakers have paradoxically felt that destroying existing democratic
processes was necessary in order that they ultimately be saved.
1. The CIA in Guatemala
Guatemala has a very small minority of Communists, but not as many as
San Francisco.292
On June 18, 1954, the vanguard of a revolutionary force of exiles entered Guatemala from
Honduras, ostensibly to overthrow the communist regime of President Jacobo Guzman Arbenz.
290Forsythe, 392.
291Codevilla, 85.
292William Prescott Allen, correspondence (telegram) to Eisenhower, 24 June 1952; quoted in
Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 183. Allen,
publisher of the Laredo Times and a personal friend of Eisenhower, had just visited Guatemala.
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Led by Carlos Enrique Castillo Armas, "a fugitive Guatemalan colonel"293 who was a former
military academy classmate of Arbenz, this force advanced no further than six miles into
Guatemala. While such limited success can be attributed, in part, to a lack of competency, bravery,
and daring, it must also be attributed to the fact that Armas was not really leading the vanguard of
a revolutionary army. Instead, he commanded what was described by Richard Bissell, then a
special assistant to Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, as a "rag-taggle"294 group of no more than
150 men. Funded, organized, and trained by the CIA, this group was supported by an "air force"
that consisted of a handful of Cessnas and two P-47 Thunderbolt fighter-bombers. Thus, the
"army" was not really an army. In fact, it had no hope of successfully engaging the numerically
superior Guatemalan army. Additionally, the target of its revolutionary ire was not a communist.
And, for that matter, its ire was not particularly revolutionary.
Less than a decade earlier, Guatemala underwent a true revolution when dictator Jorge
Ubico Castenada was deposed. The Guatemalan people, now free to express their wishes and
concerns via the ballot box, overwhelmingly elected Juan Jose Arevalo president on December 14,
1944. Arbenz, Arevalo's successor, also achieved the presidency through a free and fair election
in November 1950. This was a significant event. As noted by historian Richard H. Immerman,
"For the first time in the 130-year history of the Guatemalan republic, executive power had passed
peacefully and on schedule from one man to another."295
293Immerman, 3.
294Richard Bissell, quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike 's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage
Establishment (Garden City, NY.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1981): 229.
295Immerman, 61. Arbenz's election was also significant because it was the second successive
free election, an occurence that is considered by many political scientists to be the benchmark measurement
for the successful consolidation of democracy.
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Arbenz, like his predecessor, was a liberal reformer who "vowed to modernize Guatemala,
to create the conditions necessary for the country's self-sufficiency, and to increase the standard
of living for the majority of the population."296 His initiatives included labor reform, improved
health care, and a literacy program. Land reform, however, was the primary focus of the Arbenz
administration. The need for this change was readily apparent: "in a nation overwhelmingly rural,
2.2 percent of the landowners owned 70 percent of the arable land [and] the annual per capita
income of agricultural workers was $87.
"
297 Arbenz seized uncultivated land and redistributed it
to peasant farmers in an effort "to convert Guatemala from a country bound by a feudal economy
into a modern, capitalist one."298
Not surprisingly, both foreign investors and the few privileged Guatemalans who had
benefitted from the status quo were alarmed by these actions. The United Fruit Company (UFC),
a U.S. company and the single largest land-owner in Guatemala, was particularly incensed by
Arbenz's expropriation of hundreds of thousands of acres of its land.299 They began an unabashed
public relations campaign that sought to trigger U.S. government intervention. UFC vehemently
depicted Arbenz's actions as communist-inspired. Spruille Braden, former Assistant Secretary of
State for Latin American Affairs and subsequent public relations director for United Fruit, insisted
that "party members, fellow travellers, demagogues, gunmen and killers, have joined with
opportunists, extreme nationalists, some of the military, and a few misguided idealists, to make a
296Immerman, 183.
297William Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History (London: Zed Books, 1986), 79.
298Jacobo Arbenz, Discursos (Guatemala City, 1951), 14; quoted in Immerman, 63.
299While UFC complained that the land was worth 16 million, Arbenz offered to compensate the
company with approximately $600,00 in long-term, non-negotiable agrarian bonds. "The figure
$600,000...was not pulled out of thin air - it was United Fruit's own declared valuation for tax purposes."
See Ambrose, 221.
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beachhead for international Communism [in Guatemala]."300 Braden went so far as to challenge
the Eisenhower administration to take action:
Frequently it is necessary to fight fire with fire.... No one is more opposed
than I to interference in the internal affairs of other nations. But...we may be
compelled to intervene.... I should like to underscore that because Communism is
so blatantly an international and not an internal affair, its suppression, even by
force, in an American country...would not constitute an intervention in the internal
affairs of the former.... I pray that the new Administration will attack this danger
rapidly, intelligently, and energetically.301
John E. Peurifoy, U.S. ambassador to Guatemala under Eisenhower, aided UFC's character
assassination ofArbenz. In testimony before a House committee, he stated that Arbenz "talked like
a Communist, he thought like a Communist, he acted like a Communist, and if he is not one, Mr.
Chairman, he will do until one comes along."302
Peurifoy' s predecessor as ambassador to Guatemala, Richard Patterson, Jr., did not have
particularly flattering things to say about Arbenz either. He did note, however, that it is often
difficult to prove that a person is a communist. In the case of Arbenz, Patterson recommended
applying the duck test:
Suppose you see a bird walking around in a farm yard. This bird wears no
label that says "duck." But the bird certainly looks like a duck. Also he goes to
the pond and you notice that he swims like a duck. Then he opens his beak and
quacks like a duck. Well, by this time you have probably reached the conclusion
that the bird is a duck, whether he's wearing a label or not.303
300Spruille Braden, speech to the United States Inter-American Council, Houston, April 1952;
quoted in Immerman, 126.
301 Spruille Braden, "Syllabus on the Communist Threat in the Americas," lecture at Dartmouth
College, 12 March 1953; quoted in Immerman, 127.
302John E. Peurifoy, in House of Representatives, Ninth Interim Report ofHearings, 2; quoted in
Immerman, 181.
303Richard Patterson, Jr., speech to Rotary Club, 24 March 1950; quoted in Ambrose, 222.
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Apparently the Eisenhower administration misapplied the "duck test." While Arbenz was
certainly a liberal reformer who aggravated his conservative opponents, he lacked many of the
unmistakable characteristics of a communist: he encouraged freedom of the press, he did not
restrict political activity, and he did not seek to nationalize the means of production. Additionally,
while "Party members played a part in his land reform agency,...they were excluded from his
cabinet, from the national police force, and from most departments of government."304 Finally,
Arbenz was guided by an enlightened and extremely democratic constitution that, drawing upon
the theories of Montiesquieu and Thomas Jefferson, guaranteed civil rights and divided authority
between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches in a system of checks and balances that
safeguarded against the systemic abuses that formerly prevailed in Guatemala.305
If Arbenz was not a communist, and the government of Guatemala was a fully functioning
democracy that incorporated popular opinion, why did the CIA fund an armed band of
"revolutionaries" to topple Arbenz? Guillermo Toriello, Foreign Minister for the Arbenz
administration, suggests that it was the inescapable tendency of the U.S. to categorize "as
'communism' every manifestation of nationalism or economic independence, any desire for social
progress, any intellectual curiosity, and any interest in progressive liberal reforms."306 This
tendency was, in part, a product of the almost overwhelming Cold War fear that the Soviet Union
was intent on establishing world hegemony, one country at a time. That the UFC preyed on this
fear and fanned its flames to frenzied heights certainly impeded an objective evaluation of the
Arbenz regime. The end result, in this case, was that the world's leading democracy organized a
304Christopher Andrew, For The President's Eyes Only (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 206.
305Immerman, 49.
306Guillermo Toriello, quoted in Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History, 11.
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"revolutionary army" that was neither an army nor revolutionary (The men that Armas led could
be more aptly described as counter-revolutionaries and opportunists) in an attempt to topple a
"communist" who was not communist (but was, instead, quite democratic).
The absurdity of this situation was compounded by the fact that less than two weeks after
Armas concluded his "offensive" (it is not certain that he ever engaged any government troops) and
set up camp just inside the Guatemalan border to await the surrender of the government, Arbenz
complied. Arbenz's resignation was the culmination of CIA propaganda and a series of
psychological operations that not only convinced the Guatemalan people that the revolutionary
force command by Armas was much more substantial than it actually was, but that it roamed the
countryside with impunity, wreaking havoc everywhere it went. According to historian William
Blum, this was actually far from the case: "The Castillo Armas forces could not have defeated the
much larger Guatemalan army, but the air attacks, combined with the belief in the invincibility of
[an] enemy [that was believed to be backed by the U.S.], persuaded Guatemalan military officers
to force Arbenz to resign."307
While Armas was quickly being installed as the head of the new government, John Foster
Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State, orchestrated a nationwide televison and radio broadcast to report
to the American people that, "Now the future of Guatemala lies at the disposal of the Guatemalan
people themselves."308 Nothing could have been further from the truth. Armas was the first in what
was to be a long succession of dictators who, in the name of anti-communism and with the silent
acquiescence of the U.S., employed kidnaping, false imprisonment, torture, and even murder to
retain power. Ironically, as noted by historian Richard H. Immerman, it was these repressive
307Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History, 86.
308John Foster Dulles, quoted in Ambrose, 233.
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measures that "fueled the very Communist movement that the Eisenhower administration
[originally] overestimated in 1954."309 Thus, in this case study, one democratic state purposefully
and successfully engaged in activities (short of war) that endangered another democratic state's
national security and impinged on its sovereignty.
2. Summation
Almost immediately following the CIA-sponsored coup in Guatemala, Eisenhower
commissioned a secret review concerning the effectiveness of and need for covert action. Headed
by retired LTG James H. Doolittle, this Special Study Group overwhelmingly endorsed the merits
of covert action:
It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed
objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever costs. There
are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not
apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair
play" must be reconsidered. We must...learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our
enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those
used against us.310
Although both Doolittle's assessment and U.S. intervention in Guatemala were certainly products
of Cold War hysteria, neither is an anachronism in today's world. While there is no longer a Cold
War to compel U.S. covert activities, there are, and always will be, other significant challenges to
American national interests. And, as demonstrated with Arbenz and Guatemala, a democratic state
may be more than willing to sacrifice its idealism, not to mention a fellow democracy, in the name
of expediency and the pursuit of perceived national interests.
309Immerman, 200.
310James H. Doolittle, "Report of the Special Study Group on Covert Activities," 30 September
1954; quoted in Andrew, 211.
120
Because the primary tenets of democratic peace theory - cooperation and noninterference -
are unable to account for the actions of democracies in heretical cases such as this, democratic
peace advocates engage in sophistry in an attempt to overcome this dilemma. First, they dismiss
the destructive potential of covert action, noting that it pales in comparison to war. This may be
true, but, as demonstrated by the case study of CIA activity in Guatemala, it does not erase the
fact that covert action clearly has the potential to impinge on the sovereignty of a state and
jeopardize its security.
Second, democratic peace advocates assert that, because of its inherently secretive nature,
covert action cannot be mitigated, at least not in a timely manner, by the influence of an informed
and concerned citizenry. As expressed by Daniel P. Forsythe, a professor of political science,
"when we come to covert forcible action, the decisions are not taken in the open, subject to the full
range of checks and balances and popular participation."311 Forsythe adds that, in most cases, there
is little prospect of U.S. covert action leading to large numbers of U.S. casualties, and therefore,
"liberal assumptions about open decision-making and popular desires to avoid the human and other
costs of war do not affect secretive decisions using mostly foreign personnel."312 Thus, the
implication is that the chief executive's authority to engage in covert actions can be likened to the
prerogatives of an authoritarian ruler.
This is a gross exaggeration which disregards the existence of oversight mechanisms
enforced by elected representatives and undervalues eventual impact of popular opinion. Covert
action, like many intelligence service activities, is not subject to immediate public scrutiny. Over






enter the realm of public knowledge. When this occurs, the citizens of a democracy have an
opportunity to voice their displeasure over these ventures and initiate legislation to restrict their
scope. They can also ban them outright. That the American public has not taken the latter step
implies de facto recognition and acceptance of covert action as a utilitarian tool of foreign policy.
This despite the fact that it is employed against democratic and authoritarian states alike.
No matter how it is sliced, covert action leaves democratic peace theorists in a quandary.
If they assert that a democracy is unable to adequately control the covert actions undertaken by its
intelligence services, then they must also acknowledge the inability of a democratic peace to
guarantee the security of other democratic states (from this potential threat). If, on the other hand,
democratic peace advocates acknowledge that the citizens of a democracy are able to moderate the
covert activities of a state (in a manner similar to the way in which they affect decisions of war),
then they must explain why it is that, while democracies are reluctant to engage like states in war,
they are quite willing to make them targets of covert action. In the end, democratic peace
advocates are unable to adequately address the implications of covert action in their equation for
peace between democracies.
B. ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
War is relatively clear-cut: there is a winner and an eventual loser; a
beginning and an end.... [B]ut the economic struggle. ..is not clear-cut. Winners
win quietly, and losers are often either unconscious of loss, or too embarrassed to
admit it. And it is a war that does not end. The stage for the studiously low-key
dramas of economic espionage is set.. .in a kind of perpetual limbo [between war
and peace].313
313John J. Fialka, War By Other Means: Economic Espionage in America (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 1997), xii-xiii.
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Intelligence has been described as the "pursuit of secret advantage,"314 the ultimate high-
stakes competition against "both external and internal enemies - or even friends."315 The latter
portion of this statement may come as a surprise to many Americans. We are not accustomed to
having our allies spy on us. Peter Schweizer, author of Friendly Spies, explains:
...Americans see our allies as partners in the fight against hostile enemy
services, working courageously to protect Western secrets.... [Although this
country's allies have indeed oftentimes been gallant in their efforts to counter
Soviet intelligence activities and espionage perpetrated against the West, they have
all too often engaged in the same activities with the United States as their victim.
And they have been enormously successful.316
With few exceptions, it has only been in the last decade that friendly spying has received
significant public scrutiny. This is despite the fact that, according to Godson, it has been an almost
commonplace occurrence: "Other governments will be friendly to overall U.S. interests and will
even cooperate on some issues, such as terrorism and organized crime [yet] even the services of
many friendly governments will devote a portion of their resources to learning U.S. secrets...."317
Admiral Bobby Inman, former director ofNational Security Agency (NSA) and ex-deputy director
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), attributes the dearth of publicity to the rigors of the Cold
War:
Industrial espionage only received attention when the Soviets were
involved. In those instances where the activity of friendly intelligence services
have been particularly abhorrent, Washington has handled the matter quietly rather
314Thomas Powers, "The Truth About the CIA," New York Review ofBooks xi, no. 9 (13 May
1993); quoted in Porch, 470.
315Porch, 470.
316Peter Schweizer, Friendly Spies (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993), 3.
317Godson, 253.
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than by going public and raising a huge international stink that would fracture
relations with our Cold War allies. 318
Thus, Senator David Boren was not entirely accurate when he announced in 1990, with a degree
of alarm, that an "increasing share of espionage directed against the United States comes from
spying by foreign governments against private American companies aimed at stealing commercial
secrets to gain a national economic advantage."319 Friendly espionage activity existed prior to the
demise of the Soviet Union, and it remains a fact of life today.
Economic espionage, a specific subset of espionage, is defined by the U.S. Federal Bureau
of Investigation as "foreign-power sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity directed at the
U.S. government or U.S. corporations, establishments, or persons for the purpose of unlawfully
obtaining proprietary economic information."320 While this definition is impressively authoritative,
the activity that it describes is far from compelling. To most observers, economic espionage lacks
the drama required to maintain even a cursory interest. After all, it does not involve the intense
suspense and death-defying risks that characterize the genre of spy thrillers with which most of us
are familiar. Additionally, it is difficult to causally link economic espionage activities to an
observable reduction in the overall security of the state. Such links do exist, but they are not easily
discerned or quantified. While the FBI confidently asserts that over 50 countries tried to covertly
obtain proprietary advanced technologies from U.S. industries in 1996, it is far less certain of the
318Admiral Bobby Inman, in a conversation with the author, Schweizer, Friendly Spies 6.
319Senator David Boren, New York Times, 3 April 1990; quoted in Schweizer, Friendly Spies, 12.
320Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Economic Espionage and Protection of Proprietary Economic
Information Act of 1996," Federal Bureau ofInvestigation Proposal, 4 December 1996, 2; quoted in
Edwin Fraumann, "Economic Espionage: Security Missions Redefined," Public Administration Review 57,
no. 4 (July/August 1997): 304.
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actual annual cost of economic espionage to American industry. 321 Depending upon how it is
calculated, the figure could be as little as $50 billion or as much as $240 billion. 322 A study by the
White House Office of Science and Technology estimates losses to U.S. businesses to be
somewhere in between, in the $100 billion range.323 In contrast, the consequences of covert action
and military espionage are, for the most part, much more immediate and apparent. As discussed
previously, the U.S.-sponsored covert action readily and transparently deposed the Arbenz
government in Guatemala. As for military espionage, the Soviet theft of nuclear weapons
technology from the U.S., an event which dramatically altered the balance of power during the
initial years of the Cold War, serves to demonstrate the tangible impact of "conventional" spying.
Perhaps because of its amorphous nature, many critics claim that the threat posed by
economic espionage is nonexistent or, at the very least, greatly exaggerated. Howard M.
Metzenbaum, former Senator from Ohio, has characterized it as a ploy to retain funding:
...I have the feeling that intelligence agency officials sort of thought that
the Congress might be thinking of cutting back on the budget for intelligence
activities and said, "well we'd better find another area where we can be claiming
we're doing more work. Let's get into this whole field of economic intelligence
and let's make this the issue."324
John F. Hayden, then a corporate vice-president of Boeing, also has downplayed the threat of
3211
'U.S. Senate Hearings on Economic Espionage, 104th Congress, 2nd session S. 1556 (1 February
1996): 104-359; quoted in Frauman, 303.
322Sam Perry, "Economic Espionage and Corporate Responsibility," Criminal Justice
International 1 1, no. 2 (date unknown): 3; quoted in Fraumann, 303.
323White House Office of Science and Technology, quoted in Arlen Specter, "Economic
Espionage," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence - Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Information Technology and Government Information, 28 February 1997, 10.
324Howard M. Metzenbaum, "Economic Intelligence," prepared statement the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, 5 August 1993, 2.
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economic espionage to American industry, quantifying it as a 'two" on a scale of one to ten (with
one being a very slight problem, ten a very serious problem).325 Additionally, according to a study
done by the American Society of Industrial Security, seventy percent of economic espionage cases
can be attributed to simple "internecine warfare among corporate competitors, most of which pits
one American firm against an unscrupulous rival,"326 rather than intrigue perpetrated by foreign
intelligence agencies.
Those that warn of the dangers of economic espionage are not swayed by these arguments.
According to Reinhard Vogler, a former East German intelligence officer who advises
multinational companies on economic espionage, American corporations are deluding themselves
if they do not believe that espionage poses a substantial threat:
The level of sophistication of espionage operations directed against U.S.
companies is extraordinary. American companies are like innocent children in the
forest. They have no idea how many wolves are after them. 327
Therefore, it is quite likely that the cost of economic espionage, in terms of national security as well
as real dollars, is severely underestimated. According to Louis Freeh, director of the FBI, losses
go unreported because companies are unaware or unwilling to admit that they have been
victimized:
...U.S. industry is reluctant to publicize occurrences of foreign economic
espionage. Such publicity can adversely affect stock values, customers'
confidence, and ultimately competitiveness and market share. Therefore,
325John F. Hayden, "Economic Intelligence," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 5 August 1993, 28.
326Robert Dreyfuss, "Spy vs. No-Spy," New Republic 21 5, no. 26 (23 December 1996): 10.
327Rienhard Vogler; quoted in Ronald E. Yates, "Corporate Cloak-and-Dagger," Chicago Tribune,
1 September 1996, p. 1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: CHTRIB. 15 August 1997.
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gathering the empirical data to quantify the damage is problematic. But regardless
of the exact number, the damage caused by economic espionage is significant. 328
Schweizer adds that impact of economic espionage is far more sinister than what is immediately
perceived:
Economic espionage can grossly disrupt trade and corrode a nation's
science and technology base. It is a parasitic act, relying on others to make costly
investments oftime and money. And to destroy the rewards of investment [in this
manner] is to destroy the incentive to innovate.329
Is economic espionage truly a threat? It stands to reason that if economic espionage was
not a profitable enterprise in which to engage, the field of "competitors" would not be so crowded.
Judging from the comments provided by spokesmen from various foreign governments, economic
spying is not only a commonplace occurrence, but a growth industry. An unidentified German
official, commenting on U.S. allegations that the French had established a prioritized list of
American industrial espionage targets, was remarkably nonchalant:
Being Europeans, we are not surprised when someone is not breaking into
our briefcases. No self-respecting intelligence agency would not obtain
information in this manner but you have to maintain the golden rule that you do
not get caught.330
And, although the French denied this particular accusation, they appear at ease with the practice
328Louis Freeh, "Economic Espionage," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence - Subcommittee on Terrorism, Information Technology and Government Information, 28
February 1997, 13.
329Peter Schweizer, "The Future of Spying is Business," Baltimore Sun, 31 March 1996, p. 5E.
Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: BALSUN. 15 August 1997.
330David Silverberg, "Spy Charges Fray Ties Between U.S., France," Defense News, 3 May 1993,
p. 1. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: DEFNEW. 15 August 1997.
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of spying on their compatriots. They demonstrate a facile ability to balance the competing
responsibilities of cooperation and national self-interest. Economics falls into the latter category.
Pierre Marion, former chief of the Direction Generate de la Securite Exterieure (DGSE), explains:
[Y]ou have to separate very clearly what are the fields which are covered
by an alliance and the fields which are not covered by an alliance. It's clear that
when you are allies, you have certain sectors. I'm speaking of the armaments. I'm
thinking of diplomatic matters where normally you should not try to gather
intelligence. But in all of the other fields, being allied does not prevent the states
from being competitors.... In economics, we are competitors, not allies. I think
that even during the Cold War getting intelligence on economic, technological, and
industrial matters from a country with which you are allies is not incompatible
with the fact that you are allies.331
It should be no surprise then, that the Russians, upholding the finest tradition of the KGB, also
shamelessly indulge in economic espionage. Indeed, Yeltsin has been quoted as saying that he
expects foreign intelligence to "produce the information needed for the adoption of fundamental
state decisions on the...implementation of our economic policy and the securing of scientific and
technical progress."332 Finally, while the U.S. is an extremely vocal critic of economic espionage,
other countries are quick to point out that America's behavior has not been above reproach. In
March 1995, five CIA agents were expelled from France for attempting to divine information
concerning that country's position during the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
negotiations. That same year the U.S. was accused of spying on Japan during auto trade talks.
More recently, in March of this year, the German newspaper Der Spiegel reported that a CIA agent
working under diplomatic cover tried to recruit senior government officials to steal secrets related
"'Pierre Marion, quoted in Schweizer, Friendly Spies, 9. DGSE is responsible for French foreign
intelligence.
332President Boris Yeltsin, speech at the Foreign Intelligence Service headquarters; in Rossiiskaia
gazeta, 29 April 1994, p. 3; quoted in Knight, 128.
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to high-technology projects. The U.S. intelligence community, in accordance with presidential
direction, is prohibited from engaging in economic espionage and according to Freeh, the incidents
in question were counterintelligence operations designed to ferret out the activities of foreign
intelligence services. Whether the Director's spin on these events is true or not is not particularly
relevant to the countries involved. They are unlikely to be convinced that the information in these
operations would not ultimately be used to serve the interests of American businesses.
The government policymakers and captains of industry who are the targets of this
unwelcome attention undoubtedly find the practice of economic espionage to be wholly disturbing.
They are joined in their discomfort by democratic peace theorists who are unable to account for the
use of devious shortcuts to gain the upper hand financially. It is not unreasonable for democracies
to compete in the realm of economics - indeed, one of Kant's prerequisites for a liberal regime is
a market economy, which inherently involves thriving competition. Yet, one would anticipate that
the competition between democracies at the interstate level would be conducted with the same
normative values, practices, and restraints that are employed domestically. As Layne reminds us,
democratic states assume that "other democracies also subscribe to pacific methods of regulating
political competition and resolving [domestic] disputes, and that [they] will apply these norms in
their external relations with fellow democracies."333 If these normative values are sufficient to
regulate political competition, they should also be sufficient to regulate economic competition.
Judging from the attitudes and actions of numerous democracies, however, they are not. To add
insult to injury, commerce is expected to "create cross-cutting transnational ties that serve as
3Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," 161.
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lobbies for mutual accommodation."334 Instead, when espionage is factored into the equation,
economics often serves as a source of dissension.
The problems for democratic peace theorists do not stop there. Traditional conceptions of
national security have revolved around the threats "posed by military forces, political ideologies,
and the foreign policies of actual or potential adversaries...."335 Today, however, when U.S. leaders
"think about external events, actions, or developments that could cause injury to members of the
U.S. population or to their ability to pursue of life, liberty, happiness, or prosperity on their own
terms, [they ] think about economic matters."336 According to William Webster, former director
of the CIA, that sentiment has global relevance: "there is now universal recognition that economic
strength is key to global influence and power...."337 A recent RAND study underscores this point,
emphasizing "the connection between a country's economic performance and its ability to pursue
the traditional aims of national-security policy [such as] maintaining and projecting military forces,
influencing the behavior of other nations, controlling its own destiny, and generally remaining a
great power."338 The report notes that, "It was, after all, the economic failures of Communist
regimes that were in a large measure responsible for the decline in the military and political power
of the Soviet Union and its former allies."339
334
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Certainly the Clinton administration considers economics to be a vital part of national
security - bolstering America's economic revitalization is a central component of both Engagement
and Enlargement and A Strategyfor a New Century. Warren Christopher, former U.S. Secretary
of State, adds that "national security is inseparable from our economic security."340 Because
economic espionage threatens economic security, it follows that it also impinges upon national
security. The Clinton administration considers economic espionage to be a threat. The President's
1995 annual report to Congress on foreign economic collection and industrial espionage confirms
this point:
While a military rival steals documents for a state-of-the-art weapon of
defense system, an economic competitor steals a U.S. company's proprietary
business information or government trade strategies. Just as a foreign country's
defense establishment is the main recipient of U.S. defense-related information,
foreign companies and commercially oriented government ministries are the main
beneficiaries of U.S. economic information. The aggregate losses that can mount
as a result of such efforts can reach billions of dollars per year, constituting a
serious national security concern.341
Therefore, state-sponsored economic espionage, instead of merely being an annoying violation of
the normative values of democratic interaction, can be elevated to consideration as a substantial
threat to the well-being of a state. It is, if you will, a subtle, indirect means of engaging in warfare
that a democratic peace is powerless to prevent.
340Warren Christopher, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4 November
1993; quoted in Freeh, 11.
"'President William J. Clinton, Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and
Industrial Espionage, July 1995. Online. National Security Institute. No date. Available HTTP:http://nsi.
org/Library/Espionage/indust.htm. 18 August 1997. It is ironic that the Clinton administration, in its
national security strategy, extols the virtues of a zone of peace where democracies cooperate, yet, in this
report, decries the devious methods that these same democracies use to compete against America.
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1. Case Study: The French Secret Services
Simply put, the French are trying to rob American industry blind. 342
In August of 1996, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a CIA
assessment that concluded that a half-dozen governments have "extensively engaged in economic
espionage"343 against the United States. At the top of this list of offenders is the government of
France. Despite the vociferous protests of the French embassy, this was not a particularly
surprising revelation. Indeed, the most recent directors of French intelligence, have, in succession,
commented favorably on the utility of economic espionage. Count Henri de Marenches, who
served as director of the French secret service from 1970 to 1981 (known then as the Service de
Documentation Exterieure et Contre-Espionage (SDCE)), admitted in his memoirs that:
Spying in the proper sense is becoming increasingly focused on business
and the economy, science and industry - and very profitable it is.... This form of
espionage prevails not only with the enemy but to some extent among friends.... 344
Marenches' successor, Pierre Marion, has been quoted previously in this chapter rationalizing the
dichotomy between cooperating with and spying upon allies (see page 124). And, most recently,
Claude Silberzhan, named to head the DGSE in 1989, has stated that "Espionage today is
essentially economic, scientific, technological, and financial."345
342Frank Wolf, quoted in Bruce Bartlett, "Misguided Spying for Economic Prizes?," Washington
Times, 15 March 1997, p. CI. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: WTIMES. 15 August 1997.
343CIA assessment dated 10 May; quoted in Reuters "CIA Names Names on Espionage," Chicago
Tribune, 15 August 1996, p. 8. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: CHTRIB. 15 August 1997.
344Henri de Marenches, Dans les Secrets des Princes (Paris: Editions Stock, 1986); quoted in
Schweizer, Friendly Spies, 13.
345Claude Silberzhan; quoted in Porch, 487.
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In a case of actions speaking even louder than words, the French have routinely sought
access to U.S. technology in an effort to bolster both their defense industrial base and their arms
export industries. According to classified French documents mysteriously delivered to Frank
Greve, a reporter for Knight-Ridder syndicated newspapers, the French government has "targeted
49 high-tech companies, 24 financial institutions and six U.S. government agencies with important
roles in international trade."346 Greve also reports that the French planned to focus "on research
breakthroughs and marketing strategies of leading-edge U.S. aerospace and defense contractors that
compete directly with French companies."347 A study conducted by the General Accounting
Office (GAO) notes that "these cutting-edge technologies [are] needed to compete with U.S.
systems in the international arms market."348
The methods that the French employ to garner proprietary economic information range
from very sophisticated, intricately planned operations to opportunistic and downright crude
machinations. The former includes planting moles in selected high-technology companies such as
Texas Instruments, Corning, and IBM,349 and recruiting disgruntled former employees with access
346Frank Greve, "Documents Reveal French Plans to Spy on 49 U.S. Companies," Orange County
Register (Calif), 18 April 1993, p. A12. Online LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: Not listed. 15
August 1997. The 21 -page memo, written in French, on French paper, was delivered unsigned, undated,
and stamped "Defense Confidential." Greve states that it appears to have been prepared by the DGSE in
1989 or 1990, and claims that it is "considered authentic by senior U.S. experts." The French, in return,
insist that it is a fraudulent.
347
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348United States General Accounting Office, "Economic Espionage," Economic Espionage:
Information on Threat From U.S. Allies, report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence -
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Information Technology and Government Information, 28 February 1997, 19.
This GAO report does not specifically name names for reasons of political sensitivity and plausible
deniability, but the identity of each country that is discussed is fairly obvious.
349Schweizer, "The Future of Spying is Business."
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to targeted technology.350 The lower end of the scale involves rifling through unattended briefcases,
electronic eavesdropping equipment, "data dipping, in which corporate computer databases are
breached by expert hackers... [and] dumpster diving, in which industrial spies retrieve secret
company paperwork from the trash...."351
Although the DGSE has demonstrated considerable imagination and determination in its
pursuit of economic secrets - enough to at least earn the CIA's righteous indignation - there are
those that still doubt the magnitude of the threat presented by the French secret service. Douglas
Porch, the author of a substantial volume on French intelligence agencies, aptly titled The French
Secret Services, argues that "industrial spying by official French agencies is likely to be fairly small
potatoes [when compared to the damage done by corporate competitors]."352 He suggests that the
ease with which economic espionage can be conducted, combined with virtually negligible risk -
few countries have adequate laws to protect against or discourage economic espionage - and the
potential for substantial gain, encourages private corporate espionage. Additionally, he notes that
there are numerous impediments to incorporating any worthwhile intelligence that may be gleaned
by the state, to include social and communication barriers between those who gather intelligence
and the enarque elite who might apply it, the lack of formally defined economic espionage
requirements, and the inability ofcorporations to easily safeguard classified material.353 Ultimately,
Porch points to the recent failures of French businesses in head-to-head competition for contracts
350Charles M. Sennott, "New Cold War: Spies Target Corporations," Boston Globe, 19 January
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with U.S. companies as evidence that the French economic espionage effort is only marginally
effective. 354
Many of Porch's points concerning the awkwardness of spying for corporate entities are
valid. Still, the incentive to gain an edge in this "life-or-death economic war"355 is tremendous.
And, since espionage provides a relatively easy means to achieve an economic advantage
(according to Porch) it is also likely to be difficult for the state to ignore any opportunity to do so.
This is particularly true for the French because the state subsidizes many businesses. Norman R.
Augustine, president and CEO of Lockheed Martin Corporation, explains:
[E]conomic espionage is a particular concern with nations in which there
is either state ownership of businesses, or an extremely close cooperative
relationship between industries and the state. Obviously, when there is no clear
separation between business and government agencies, the likelihood increases
that the intelligence agency of the government would view the economic success
of the business as part of its official business. 356
Thus, when one points out that there are incentives for corporations, rather than the state, to spy on
competitors, in the case of the French, it begs the following question: How do you distinguish
between the two? As for the failings of French companies such as Airbus and Thompson CSF in
head-to-head competition with Boeing and Raytheon, their American counterparts, it must be noted
that espionage is only a tool to be used to tilt the playing field to your advantage. It cannot
guarantee a successful outcome, particularly when, as in the cases mentioned above, the competitor
is able to counter your information advantage by bringing overpowering political pressure to bear
354Porch, 489.
355Norman R. Augustine, "Economic Espionage," prepared statement submitted to the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence - Subcommittee on Terrorism, Information Technology and Government




on the prospective client. Additionally, it is important to note that while DGSE setbacks have
received tremendous publicity, it is the successes which, in all likelihood, go unnoticed that are a
threat.
FBI Director Freeh recently testified that friendly and neutral governments, as well as
traditional opponents, are increasing their economic espionage efforts. Given the potential rewards
and negligible risks, it is a safe bet that this trend will continue unabated. And, despite the recent
setbacks mentioned above, the French government is likely to follow suit.
2. Summation
That state-sponsored economic espionage occurs is an established fact. It is also evident
that, given a sufficient number and magnitude of occurrences, economic espionage can jeopardize
national security. All that remains is to quantify "sufficient" and then to gauge the degree of
success our economic adversaries have had breaching the ramparts of economic security. It would
be a gross understatement to say that such an undertaking would be a divisive task.
Critics claim that "McCarthy-style hyperbole"357 concerning the threat of economic
espionage is used to rationalize institutionalized xenophobia and justify assaults on civil liberties.
They also portray it as a make-work program for Intelligence Community alarmists. The
"alarmists," in turn, warn that the threat is real. They point to existing cases and claim that they
are only the tip of the iceberg. "Alarmists" assert that most cases go unreported - leading to an
underestimation ofthe threat posed by espionage - because most companies are either unaware that
they have been had or are unwilling to publicize the fact.
For the purposes of this thesis, the magnitude of the economic espionage problem is not
particularly important. Instead, it is intent that matters. In this case, democracies are willfully
357Dreyfus, 9.
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engaging in acts that jeopardize the well-being of other democracies. Although not all would agree
that it can be equated with a lesser form of "war," clearly economic espionage represents a potential
threat to a targeted state's security. As such, it is antithetical to the tenets of democratic peace
theory.
C. MORE "FRIENDLY" ESPIONAGE
Gentlemen do not read each other's mail.358
Contrary to the sentiments expressed above, according to Allen Dulles, former director of
the CIA, "When the fate of a nation and the lives of its soldiers are at stake, gentlemen do read each
other's mail - if they can get their hands on it."359 They also lie, steal, and cheat, not to mention tap
phone lines, plant moles, and blackmail or bribe those who have access to information in an effort
to learn each other's secrets. And, while the preceding sections discussed the lengths that an
intelligence service, whether an adversary or friend, might go to obtain economic intelligence, it
should be noted that military, political, and technical information are also pursued. Indeed, in many
cases, it is difficult to distinguish among them. Once again, Director Freeh explains:
[P]ieces of economic and technological information seldom exist in a
vacuum. Foreign countries collect sensitive economic intelligence frequently to
enhance both their military capabilities and their economic stability and
competitiveness. Likewise, the line separating purely economic intelligence from
political intelligence is as difficult to draw as that between technical and military
intelligence. 360
358Henry L. Stimson, in Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and
War (1948); in Jay M. Shafritz, ed., Words On War (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1990), 204.
Stimson, then U.S. Secretary of State, offered these words as an explanation for dismantling the U.S.
government's codebreaking capability.
359Allen Dulles, The Craft ofIntelligence (1963); in Shafritz, 205.
360Freeh, 12.
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Having acknowledged that intelligence information cannot always be distinctly parsed according
to a particular discipline, the remainder of this chapter will concern itself with espionage that
targets more traditional types of information: namely, such things as military capabilities, political
intentions, and technical specifications.
Newspapers in recent years have been peppered with stories about U.S. spies who have
betrayed their country: CIA counterintelligence expert Aldrich Ames, FBI agent Earl Pitts, and
former CIA chief of station Harold Nicholson. What these "gentlemen" had in common was that
they were enticed to become agents by an American adversary, the Soviet Union (and subsequently
Russia). Dismaying as that fact might be to Stimson, he would be aghast to learn that it is not just
America's adversaries, but our allies as well that attempt to illicitly "read our mail." In September
of 1996, Robert Kim, a computer specialist for the Office ofNaval Intelligence (ONI), was arrested
for passing secrets - not to an enemy, but to the Republic of Korea (ROK), a steadfast ally of the
United States. In a similar situation, just over a decade earlier, Jonathan Pollard, also employed
by Naval Intelligence, was arrested for passing secrets to another ally. 361 In this case it was Israel.
As discussed previously, such incidents of "friendly" espionage are on the rise. William Sessions,
former director of the FBI, acknowledged this disturbing trend by announcing in October of 1990
that his organization would begin to devote greater assets to counter "the intelligence activities
against U.S. interests by so-called 'friendly' intelligence services."362
Finding a spy in your midst is certainly a frustrating revelation. But when that spy is from
a country that you consider to be an ally, frustration and anger are often outweighed by
361 Pollard's adventures in espionage will serve as the case study for this section and, therefore, will
be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
362William S. Sessions, speech before the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, New York,
25 October 1990; quoted in Schweizer, Friendly Spies, 4.
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disappointment and confusion. In response to the news that Israel had been spying on the U.S.,
Ronald Reagan is reported to have declared, with equal measures of pain and puzzlement, "I don't
understand why they are doing it."363 Still, those who know the profession well acknowledge that
"friendly" espionage is not an uncommon occurrence. Wolf Blitzer, CNN correspondent and
author of a book that details Pollard's traitorous escapades, states that all countries engage in
"friendly" espionage:
[A] 11 countries spy - not only on their adversaries but on their friends as
well.... Friends, after all, can take actions that may have serious and damaging
consequences. Therefore, although the United States and Israel are allies, their
interests do not always overlap - no two countries, no matter how close, always see
eye to eye.... Thus the United States understandably and legitimately wants to
know what's going on in Israel - and vice versa.364
Anecdotal evidence derived from open-source reporting appears to support Blitzer' s claim
that the U.S. spies on its allies, particularly Israel. Yitzhak Rabin, former prime minister of Israel,
in response to the uproar concerning Pollard's arrest, noted that five U.S. spies had been discovered
in the late 1970s and early 1980s in sensitive nuclear and industrial facilities. 365 Authors Daniel
Raviv and Yossi Melman also note that David Durenberger, then chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, acknowledged that the CIA accepted information from an Israeli
military walk-in during the war in Lebanon in 1982.366 Finally, the New York Times reported earlier
363Ronald Reagan, Los Angeles Times, 27 November 1985; quoted in Daniel Raviv and Yossi
Melman, Every Spy a Prince (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 318.
364Wolf Blitzer, Territory ofLies (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), 302.
365Raviv, Every Spy a Prince, 307.
366Daniel Raviv and Yossi Melman, "A Clash of Cultures in the Spy Game," Chicago Tribune, 19
April 1994, p. 23. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: CHTRIB. 15 August 1997.
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this year that "American intelligence eavesdropped on a conversation between the Israeli embassy
here [in Washington D.C.] and Tel Aviv."367
Assuming that Blitzer's claim is true, that all countries do spy on their friends, two
questions come to mind. The first: what motivates this behavior? Although Schweizer asserts that
the "U.S. effort has never been as extensive as that of our allies," he concedes that U.S. operations
against allied countries "almost always hinge on a need or desire to know about the internal military
and political developments in friendly countries or on a need or desire to influence events
overseas."
368 In the case of South Korea, the ROK military, "has engaged in a broader, systematic
effort to spy on its closest ally and protector out of fear that Washington is withholding intelligence
data or that it is secretly dealing directly with North Korea."369 According to Donald Gregg, former
U.S. ambassador to Seoul, "We are very close working partners, but it is fair to say that there is a
continued residue of suspicion in Seoul."370 Israel spies ostensibly to ensure its survival as a state.
While Joseph Sisco, former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, has insisted that
"Israel can get ninety-eight percent of what it wants"371 from normal intelligence-sharing
367Steven Erlanger, "FBI Inquiry: Is Israel Using a Mole in U.S.?," New York Times, 8 May 1997,
p. A15. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: NYT. 15 August 1997. It is interesting to note that
the vision statement for the National Security Agency (NSA), the U.S. organization responsible for
acquiring information derived from signals and information systems, declares that NSA will work to give
"us an information advantage over our adversaries and competitors." The same vision statement later
asserts that the single goal ofNSA is "information superiority for America and its Allies." These
statements are somewhat contradictory as America's allies are often also its competitors. See Kenneth A.
Minihan, National Cryptologic Strategyfor the 21st Century (June 1996), 4.
368Schweizer, Friendly Spies, 15.
369David Johnston, "Korean Spy Case More Serious Than Was Thought," New York Times, 3
October 1996, p. A8. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: NYT. 15 August 1997.
370Donald Gregg, in Johnston.
371Joseph Sisco, quoted in Blitzer, 159.
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arrangements, Blitzer paints a far different picture:
[Njervous Israeli officials, living on a very thin margin of security and
always worried about a worst-case threat, were not convinced of [Sisco's] logic.
Cooperation - while significant - was by no means that complete. There were still
many secrets which Washington, for one reason or another, refused to share with
Israel.
372
"Friendly" espionage may also be motivated by a desire to acquire military technology that will aid
a state's efforts to compete in the arms export market (a la the French), a need to confirm existing
intelligence from yet another source, or a hope to trade information stolen from one country to a
third country in exchange for political favors or goods and services.
The second question that must be asked with regard to friends spying on friends is, What
is the harm in these actions? Alternatively, is the security of the targeted state jeopardized? If the
latter question is placed in the context of the democratic peace, the answer would surely seem to
be "no." After all, even if a democracy spies on a fellow democracy, the two should never have
cause to take up arms against one another. Therefore, the information that is gained through
espionage will not be used to further a hostile course of action (toward another democracy). In
reality, however, espionage, whether conducted by an adversary or ally, does have the potential to
weaken a state's security. This is because once information has been compromised, even by an ally
that makes every effort to safeguard it within its own intelligence services, there are no guarantees
that it will not also find its way to an adversary.
The greatest danger to a state that is targeted for espionage is that the information that is




valuable than what was initially stolen. Blitzer explains:
[Intelligence services are primarily concerned with protecting their
sources and methods in the collection of vital information. Sometimes it takes
years to plant an agent; other times it can take years to crack a code. Developing
appropriate technical means of gathering intelligence can cost huge sums of
money. Very often, friendly countries do not exchange information because they
fear it would compromise these very sensitive sources and methods: The other
country might innocently initiate some action which might tip off a hostile force
that it has been penetrated.373
Additionally, the state that initiates the espionage effort may have a mole within its own
organization and can, therefore, unwittingly leak any information that is gained to an actual
adversary. Finally, the state that steals the information may only be interested in trading it on the
open market to the highest bidder (figuratively speaking). In each of these scenarios, the state that
has been targeted must deal with the sobering loss of sources and methods that, although they will
not be necessary to protect against aggression from the "friendly" state that conducted the
espionage in the first place, were vital to ensuring national security in the face of other, truly
adversarial states. Thus, "friendly" espionage, despite its benign name, has potentially severe




1. Case Study: Jonathan J. Pollard
I've never met a man who had better motives for all the trouble he's
caused. 374
On 21 November 1985, Jonathan J. Pollard was arrested outside the compound of Israel's
embassy in Washington D.C. while attempting to seek asylum. A civilian analyst who worked for
the Naval Investigative Service at the Anti-Terrorist Alert Center, Pollard was charged, convicted,
and ultimately sentenced to life imprisonment for utilizing his access to classified information to
pass secrets to the government of Israel. Pollard handed over a wealth of material to the Israelis,
including top secret documents, classified message traffic, satellite photos, and communications
information:
[I]n the seventeen months of Pollard's activities, more than 1,000
classified documents - 360 cubic feet ofthem - were compromised. The majority
of these were "detailed analytical studies containing technical calculations, graphs
and satellite photographs." Some ofthem were hundreds of pages long and more
than 800 were classified "Top Secret."375
Was Pollard, as he seems to be arguing by quoting Greene, guided by the best of intentions
and motives? A Jew and ardent Zionist, Pollard asserts that he was driven to spy by the U.S. refusal
to share intelligence vital to Israel's survival: "my sole objective in this affair was to provide Israel
with information concerning threats to its existence."376 While Pollard's claim that the U.S. held
374Graham Greene, The Quiet American (London: Penguin Books, 1973); quoted by Jonathan
Pollard in Blitzer, xvi. In Greene's novel, the protagonist, an international news correspondent,
characterizes an acquaintance of his - an American diplomat - with these words. Pollard, a great fan of
Greene's, offered this line when Blitzer asked how he ended up in the predicament that he did. Pollard
added that the quote "aptly characterizes both my motives and my subsequent involvement in this affair."
3750fficial damage assessment report, quoted in Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel 's Secret Wars
(New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 420.
376Jonathan J. Pollard, quoted in Blitzer, 92.
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back information is accurate, it is a feeble attempt to deflect blame and cannot be used to justify
his actions. U.S. intelligence officials do not share information with any state if they feel that doing
so will compromise future sources and methods of intelligence collection and, ultimately, endanger
America's security. Caspar Weinberger, then the U.S. Secretary of Defense, noted this fact in a
written statement to the judge presiding over Pollard's case:
Unauthorized disclosures to friendly powers may cause as great a harm to
the national security as to hostile powers because, once the information is removed
from secure control systems, there is no enforceable requirement nor any incentive
to provide effective controls for its safekeeping. Moreover, it is more probable
than not that the information will be used for unintended purposes. Finally, such
disclosures will tend to expose a larger picture of U.S. capabilities and knowledge,
or lack thereof.... 377
Israel, in turn, protects its classified information in the same manner. As an experienced
intelligence analyst, Pollard knew that this was the primary rule of the intelligence-sharing game
and must have understood that by violating it to pass extremely sensitive information to Israel,
ostensibly to bolster Israeli security, he was jeopardizing the security of the United States.
Despite his assertions to the contrary, U.S. prosecutors maintain that Pollard was motivated
by a multitude of other, less honorable factors, to include revenge for personal slights, the
excitement and allure of being a spy and, above all, unadulterated greed. The Israelis, for their part,
took the chance of damaging their relationship with their strongest ally and most generous
benefactor because of a deep-seated fear that the U.S. does not share all that it can concerning
threats to Israel. Additionally, there was the simple fact that the information Pollard provided was
"breathtaking"378 in both scope and detail.
377Caspar Weinberger, official damage assessment report, quoted in Blitzer, 225.
378Unnamed U.S. intelligence official, quoted in Blitzer, xxii.
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It is unlikely that the Pollard case was the first time that the Israelis have sought to enhance
the quality of information that they receive from the U.S. by tapping sources with direct access to
classified information. Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, authors of Merchants of Treason,
claim that the Israelis have attempted to blackmail a consular employee in Jerusalem, sought to
recruit the U.S. Marines responsible for security at the embassy, and tapped phones and bugged
offices in U.S. offices and residences in Israel.379 Additionally, Allen and Polmar insinuate that the
Israelis successfully recruited a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff. 380 Nor
is it likely that the Pollard case will be the last incident. Indeed, just this year, U.S. intelligence
officials frantically attempted to determine if another Israeli spy was operating in their midst. A
harried search was initiated because a communications intercept of a conversation between an
Israeli intelligence officer at the embassy in Washington D.C. and his superior in Tel Aviv alluded
to a source of information, codenamed "Mega," inside the U.S. government (see page 140). David
Bar-Ilan, chief spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, quickly denied that any
such source existed: "Israel does not indulge in any kind of illegal action in information gathering
in the United States."381
Israel, via Bar-Ilan's quick denial, eagerly sought to avoid dredging up the animosity that
lingers from the Pollard case. That a residue of ill-will remains, despite the fact that this was an
instance of "friendly" espionage between allies, is testament to the amount of damage that can be




381David Bar-Ilan, quoted in Erlanger.
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inflicted in such cases. Pollard has stated all along that it was not his intention to spy against the
U.S.:
I had absolutely no intention of spying on the United States or to provide
any critical national defense information to a belligerent. At no time did I ever
compromise the names of any U.S. agents operating overseas, nor did I ever reveal
any U.S. ciphers, codes, encipherment devices, classified military technology, the
disposition and orders of U.S. forces, war fighting plans, secret diplomatic
initiatives and obligations, classified organizational [wiring] diagrams or phone
books, vulnerabilities of nuclear stockpiles, or communications security
procedures.382
Rather, he sought only to spy^br Israel and aid that state's defense: "The collection effort was
clearly directed against the Soviets and those Arab states which pose a clear and present danger to
Israel's security."383 Pollard adds that, in his mind, assisting Israel in this manner did not equate
to betraying the U.S.:
I never thought for a second that Israel's gain would necessarily result in
America's loss. How could it? Both states are on the same side of the geopolitical
barricade. 384
The preceding statement is simplistic, irresponsible, and frankly, unbelievable. While
Pollard, as noted above, may not have directly provided information to a belligerent, he had to be
aware that by passing such sensitive material to Israel he was taking the risk that, if the Israelis
acted on the information, U.S. sources and collection methods would be revealed, albeit indirectly,
to America's adversaries. Blitzer's discussion of the compromise of a communications handbook
382






illustrates this chain of events:
[T]he most important single document Pollard provided to Israel consisted
of a lengthy, extremely sensitive U.S. handbook on communications intelligence
that had been his handlers' number one priority.... The United States had no
intention of ever sharing it with Israel or any other country because that could
endanger the future collection of that kind of intelligence. If Israel knew what was
in the handbook, U.S. officials said, it would undertake certain actions that would
almost certainly signal to hostile powers that the United States had penetrated their
most sensitive communications. 385
The official damage assessment of Pollard's actions provides yet another example of compromise:
"Numerous classified analyses of Soviet missile systems reveal much about the way the U.S.
collects information, including information from human sources whose identity could be inferred
by a reasonably competent intelligence analyst."386 Thus, despite Pollard's denials, he clearly
jeopardized America's ability to collect intelligence information and, subsequently, national
security. Indeed, Weinberger's assessment to the court stated that "The defendant has substantially
harmed the United states, and in my view, his crimes demand severe punishment."387 In fact, he
considered the betrayal so devastating that, in a telephone conversation with the Israeli ambassador,
he stated unequivocally that "Pollard should have been shot."388
2. Summation
Why is spying on a friendly state, particularly a fellow democracy, such a big deal?








repercussions from their client's actions:
This case is lacking the essential ingredient that would make this a heinous
crime: the beneficiary was not, and is not, the enemy, but one our closest
friends.... [T]he punishment must be appropriate to the actual severity of his
criminal conduct. Applying that measure, no harm has come to this country.
Accordingly, Mr. Pollard's sentence ought to reflect this indisputable fact.389
Democratic peace theorists are likely to agree. After all, democracies do not attempt to obtain this
information so that they might initiate hostilities against their brethren, but seek to gain a greater
measure of security from adversaries.
The Pollard case demonstrates, however, that if information is compromised, even to an
ally, it can quite easily find its way into an enemy's hands. Therefore, despite the best of
intentions, an attempt to garner military, political, and technological information through "friendly"
espionage is an inherently hostile act that endangers the overall security of the targeted state. A
democracy that engages in such acts against another democracy damages the intelligence collection
capability of that state and, subsequently, reduces its options in the event of hostilities with a true
adversary. Ultimately, such activity is inimical the premise of a democratic peace.
D. PEACE AMONG DEMOCRACIES
With the support ofthe American public, I am committed to sustaining our
active engagement abroad in pursuit of our cherished goal - a more secure and
prosperous America in a more peaceful and prosperous world where democracy
and free markets know no limits.390
Democratic peace advocates enthusiastically assert that democracies do not go to war with
one another. National security strategy, embracing this theory of international relations, equates
security with the presence of democracies (and therefore, the absence of war) which leads to
389Richard A. Hibey and Gordon A. Coffee, rebuttal to the official damage assessment report;
quoted in Blitzer, 230.
390Clinton, Strategyfor a New Century, iii.
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prosperity and peace for American citizens. The Clinton administration has prescribed the manner
in which U.S. security can be attained as follows:
In designing our strategy, we recognize that the spread of democracy
supports American values and enhances both our security and prosperity.
Democratic governments are more likely to cooperate with each other against
common threats and to encourage free and open trade and economic development -
and less likely to wage war [against each other] or abuse the rights of their people.
Hence, the trend toward democracy and free markets throughout the world
advances American interests. 391
Thus, the adaption of democratic peace theory to current U.S. national security strategy can be
nicely crammed into a single quote. Unfortunately, the practical application of this strategy is not
nearly so simple.
A definition ofpeace and, thus, security as simply to the absence ofwar is of limited utility.
Democracies, like all states, pursue national interests and embrace expediency in an attempt to
compete and ensure their self-preservation in the international realm. In doing so they engage in
many activities, to include covert action and espionage, that may impinge on the sovereignty and
threaten the security of other states. These actions may be taken against authoritarian regimes or,
as demonstrated in the case studies of this chapter, against fellow democracies. The scope of these
activities may pale in comparison to the havoc and destruction that accompanies war, but the
bottom line is that they still threaten the well-being of a state. Certainly, Jacobo Arbenz would
vouch for the ability of covert action to jeopardize a state's sovereignty. Similarly, FBI Director
Louis Freeh has testified that economic espionage is a significant detriment to a state's economy
and, subsequently, its national security. Finally, Caspar Weinberger has emphatically sworn that
"'Clinton, Strategyfor a New Century, 2.
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"friendly" espionage is an insidious misnomer that belies the threat such an activity poses to the
defense and well-being of a state.
That democracies frequently indulge in covert action and espionage against other
democracies serves to demonstrate that the peace - defined as the simple absence of war - that is
promised by a democratic peace is of extremely limited utility. Assuming that such a peace will
guarantee a state's security could prove perilous.
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF AN INAPPROPRIATE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
It is folly to bolt a door with a boiled carrot. 392
U.S. national security strategy assumes that democracy is a universally desirable
commodity and that, if the world is filled with democratic states, the international environment will
be inherently peaceful and secure. However, as noted in Chapter III, democracy may be universally
possible but it is not, in fact, universally welcome across the globe. Chapter IV, in turn,
demonstrated that the existence of a growing community ofdemocratic states, despite their inherent
reluctance to engage in war with one another, will not guarantee the national security of the United
States. The end result is a mismatch between U.S. national security strategy - which attempts to
adapt democratic peace theory into a cogent formula for lasting peace and stability - and the gritty
realities of international relations. This mismatch has clear consequences for U.S. foreign policy,
national military strategy, and the efforts of America's intelligence community.
A. FOREIGN POLICY: THE VAIN PURSUIT OF DEMOCRACY
[There are several] long-standing tendencies of American foreign policy -
missionary zeal, bewilderment when the world refuses to conform to American
expectations and a belief that for every problem there is a quick and easy
solution.393
The goal of the A National Security Strategyfor a New Century is to "create conditions in
the world where our interests [and security] are not threatened...."394 The key to success is, of
course, the promotion of democracy. This commodity is viewed as a means to an end: its
392English proverb, in Tripp, 569.
393Stephen J. Steadman, "The New Interventionists," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 4.
394Clinton, A National Security Strategyfor a New Century, 5.
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successful spread, it is believed, will bring with it economic growth, global stability and, inevitably,
security for the United States: "All of America's strategic interests - from promoting prosperity
at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory - are served by
enlarging the community of democratic and free-market nations."395
That the community of democracies is growing, "enhancing the prospects for political
stability, peaceful conflict resolution and greater hope for the people of the world,"396 is
undoubtedly gratifying to U.S. policymakers. Now, if the ball can only be kept rolling. U.S.
direction is deemed indispensable to this effort:
Never has American leadership been more essential - to navigate the
shoals of the world's new dangers and to capitalize on its opportunities. American
assets are unique: our military strength, our dynamic economy, our powerful ideals
and, above all, our people. We can and must make the difference through our
engagement....397
Engagement and Enlargement explicitly maps out the direction that U.S. foreign policy
must take to foster democracy: First, America needs to strengthen the economic and security
cooperation between existing democracies. Then, through careful and persuasive diplomacy, the
U.S. must enlist the support of these fellow democracies in the crusade to further expand their
fraternity. Specific steps to be taken to accomplish this goal include mobilizing resources and
expertise to ease the transition to democracy for potential candidates, offering the fullest benefits
of integration into foreign markets, strengthening the state's civil society, and combating
395Clinton, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, 32.
396Clinton, A National Security Strategyfor a New Century, i.
397Clinton, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, i.
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corruption. 398 Additionally, the U.S. must publicly proclaim an interest in preventing anti-
democratic reversals and, if necessary, use force to combat that possibility:
[0]ur global interests and ideals lead us to oppose those who would
endanger the survival or well-being of their peaceful neighbors. At the same time,
all nations should be able to expect their borders and their sovereignty will be
secure; however, this does not mean we or the international community must
tolerate gross violations of human rights within those borders.399
The preceding paragraphs outline an overly optimistic view of how to obtain national
security. In actuality, the promotion of democracy is not a crucial, unconditional determinant of
this nation's well-being. Its spread cannot guarantee the attainment of U.S. national interests such
as prosperity, stability, and peace. Indeed, single-minded pursuit of this goal has hidden costs and
can prove to be a counterproductive drain on resources whic can serve to imperil national security.
Kissinger has noted that "The growth of democracy will continue as America's dominant
aspiration, but it is necessary to recognise the obstacles it faces at the moment of its seeming
philosophical triumph."400 The first such stumbling block is the prohibitive cost that is involved.
Nurturing a burgeoning democracy to fruition requires a tremendous investment of time, energy,
and resources. While Engagement and Enlargement states that the selective use of military force
may be necessary to "provide a window of opportunity"401 for democracy to take root, it does not
address how large that window must be or how long it will need to stay open. Thomas Falkenberg,
an alumnus ofNaval Postgraduate School and a Major in the German Air Force, believes that the
398Clinton, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, 33-34.
399
Ibid., iii.
400Kissinger; quoted in "The Bloodhounds of History," The Economist. Online. Available HTTP:
http//:www.economist.com/issue/12-04-97/sf0860.html. 12 May 1997.
40lClinton, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, iii.
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requirements for this "window" - and the subsequent investment of resources - are almost always
greater than initially anticipated. To demonstrate this point he suggests that, despite the complete
reconstruction of government institutions following World War II and more than a half-century of
extensive economic and political support, not to mention the presence of occupying armies,
democracy is still not comfortably consolidated in either Germany or Japan.402
Cambodia is another example of the expense associated with installing democracy. The
bill for the UNTAC operation was estimated to be $3 billion, an international investment
unprecedented in size and scope.403 Yet, the operation was, ultimately, unsuccessful: democracy
did not take.
The Cambodia example points to the second problem associated with making the
advancement of democracy the primary emphasis for U.S. foreign policy: despite the potentially
exorbitant outlay of resources, a return on the investment is not guaranteed. Walter Russell Mead
vividly illustrates this point, comparing democracies to assorted members of the animal kingdom:
[W]e see beautiful democratic butterflies clawing their way out of
authoritarian cocoons. It is a lovely and comforting metaphor, but countries take
longer than butterflies to escape their cocoons. Sometimes much longer.
[Additionally, when] butterflies escape their cocoons, it's a one-way trip.
Butterflies don't turn back into caterpillars. With countries, it's different. Some
are more like groundhogs than butterflies: They emerge for a few minutes, see
their shadows and head back to the cave.404
402Thomas G. Falkenberg, classroom discussion, Civil-Military Relations and Transitions to
Democracy (NS4225), 14 May 1997.
403Barbara Crossette, "Outsiders Gone, Cambodia Unravels," New York Times, 3 December 1995.
404Walter Russell Mead, "The Delicate Birth of a Democracy," The National Times
(January/February 1997). Online. Available HTTP: http://www.nattimes.com/tntissues/i0297/delicate
_birth.html. 19 July 1997. This op-ed article was originally printed in the Los Angeles Times on 29
September 1996.
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Stromberg concurs, noting that the world seems to waver "endlessly back and forth between
democracy and antidemocracy, finding neither tolerable for long."405 According to Thomas
Carothers, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, there is an extensive list of
states which once reached out for democracy but which are now are moving, like a pendulum, in
the opposite direction:
[PJolitical life in Russia is still only very partially democratic, and not
especially stable.... Elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, Belarus has quietly
sunk into dictatorship. The Central Asian states are a dispiriting collection of
politically retrograde entities. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan are under
absolutist rule.... In sub-Saharan Africa, the surge away from one-party regimes
toward democracy has fragmented.... [M]any of the more than 30 countries that
experienced political openings early in the decade have gone seriously off
course.... The transition to democracy in Algeria, once held out as a model for
Arab countries, was abruptly derailed in 1992 by a military takeover after Islamist
victories in national elections, and has since degenerated into a vicious civil war.
Yemen's surprising experiment with democratization in the early 1990s...collapsed
in 1994....406
Carothers adds that these failures demonstrate that "democratization will not be an end-of-the-
century global deliverance from the strife, repression, and venality that afflict political life in so
many parts of the world."407 They also indicate the ultimate futility of making the unflagging
promotion of democracy the principle foundation for U.S. foreign policy.
The difficult transition to democracy for these states has been hampered by the uneven
commitment of American support. Despite fervent declarations of advocacy and the





408Clinton, A National Security Strategyfor a New Century, iii.
155
patronage of fledgling democracies has been inconsistent. This can be attributed, in part, to the
difficulty of steadfastly pursuing particular policy objectives inherent to all democracies. As noted
earlier in this thesis, democratic decision-making is the product of concessions and compromises
between different branches of the government, political parties, and personalities. The end result
is not necessarily the coherent, consistent execution of policy. Indeed, as Alexis de Tocqueville
wrote in Democracy in America:
It is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies
appear to me to be decidedly inferior to other governments. Foreign politics
demands scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they
require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is
deficient.409
The effect of the complicated and intricate machinations of democratic politics upon
foreign policy is most easily demonstrated by the battle for control of the budget. The Clinton
administration has sought funding to back its "democratic peace" rhetoric. The Republican
Congress, however, has been somewhat skeptical ofthe utility ofthe requested appropriations. The
end result, according to J. Brian Atwood, is the inability of the U.S. to put its money where its
mouth is: "The budget cuts put us in the ironic position of having encouraged democratic change
but not having the resources to effectuate change."410 Funding for democracy in Russia is a
pertinent example: initially pegged at $1 .6 billion in 1994, it has since dwindled to $147 million.411
409Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1836); quoted in Mead, "The Delicate Birth of a
Democracy."
410
J. Brian Atwood, interview, in Robin Wright, "Democracies in Peril: Hope Turns to Frustration
as Wave of Freedom Ebbs," Los Angeles Times, 19 February 1997, p. A13. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS.
Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 30 May 1997.
41
'Richard L. Morningstar, "Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance Programs in Russia, Ukraine,
Armenia, and the Other Newly Independent States," prepared statement for the House Committee on
International Relations, 13 June 1996, 48. Ambassador Morningstar is a Special Adviser to the President
and Secretary of State for Assistance to the Newly Independent States (NIS). The wide disparity between
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According to Charles W. Maynes, former editor ofForeign Policy, the tendency to be miserly with
aid to Russia and other former Communist states, has probably cost the U.S. a "decisive moment
of influence."412
Budgetary machinations may not be the only reason for lapses in America's drive to
promote democracy. Despite routine expresions of idealism in American foreign policy, it seems
that more than a hint of realism has crept into the Clinton administration's pursuit of national
interests and security. Certainly this is not without precedent. Author G. Pope Atkins notes that
historically:
U.S. attempts to extend the practices of representative democracy and
protection of human rights have been ambiguous and vacillating. When resources
have been committed to the goal of democratic development, it has usually been
viewed as an instrumental objective aimed at achieving. ..other.. .long-range
goals.413
For the current administration, an overriding interest in short-term economic prosperity is clearly
one of the "other long-range goals" that occasionally sidetracks the stated idealism of U.S. foreign
policy. Thomas W. Lippman, staff writer for the Washington Post, concurs:
[W]hile concern over human rights abuses and restrictions on freedom are
the determining factors in relations with some countries - notably Cuba and Burma
- they are often subordinated to economic and strategic interests. The Clinton
administration has made that choice most dramatically in the case of China.
these two figures is only partially explained by the plan to front-load funding in the first year so that the
program would get off to a running start. The precipitous decline in allocations for subsequent years can be
attributed to budget-cutting measures.
412Charles W. Maynes, "The New Pessimism: Wasn't the Cold War Better?," Current, no. 378
(December 1995). Online. LEX1S-NEXIS. Library: NEWS. File: ASAPII. 30 May 1997.
413G. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,
1989), 1 1 1-1 12; quoted in Laurence Whitehead, "The Imposition of Democracy," in Abraham F.
Lowenthal, ed., Exploring Democracy: The United States and Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1991), 218.
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Strategic and economic concerns there are so powerful that Albright, Vice
President Gore, and President Clinton are all planning to visit this year despite
what yesterday's [U.S. State Department human rights] report called "widespread
and well documented human rights abuses."414
Whether the frequent reversals in U.S. foreign policy are caused by partisan bickering and
the resulting budgetary pressures, or momentary lapses into pragmatism, they can be frustrating and
bewildering to the states that are the recipients of this inconsistent attention. And, if "do as I say,
not as I do" is not a particularly effective method for a parent to raise a child, it is especially
inappropriate for the global promotion of democracy. Jose Ramos-Horta, 1996 Nobel Peace Prize
winner, agrees, noting that skepticism "about U.S. good intentions or professed ideals about
promoting democracy" generally prevails because "U.S. policy is full of complex
contradictions."415
Indeed, the growing skepticism ofthe global audience has become yet another impediment
to the successful achievement of national security through the promotion democracy. Cynics
suggest that the policy reversals discussed above reveal the true nature of both the Clinton
administration and U.S. policy in general: idealistic and moralistic proclamations, such as those
found in the two most recent statements national security strategy, serve as propaganda for public
consumption, while the U.S. pursues a policy of uninhibited, unabashed self-interest. Certainly this
414Thomas W. Lippman, "State Dept. Human Rights Report Chastises Several U.S. Allies,"
Washington Post, 31 January 1997, p. A 16. Online. Available HTTP: http:/wp4.washingtonpost.com
/wp-srv/searches/mainsrch.htm. 17 August 1997.
415Jose Ramos-Horta, quoted in Wright, "Democracies in Peril: Hope Turns to Frustration as Wave
of Freedom Ebbs."
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is how many states perceive the U.S. crusade for democracy. As Niebuhr wrote:
[W]e are still inclined to pretend that our power is exercised by a
particularly virtuous nation. The uniqueness of our virtue is questioned both by
our friends and our enemies.416
Given the exorbitant expense involved, the ephemeral nature of any possible successes,
partisan political quarrels over funding, unpredictable shifts toward pragmatism, and general
skepticism about U.S. motives and intentions, the current basis of national security strategy, that
U.S. foreign policy be used as a tool to promote democracy in order to secure peace and stability,
is simply unrealistic. The time, energy, resources, and political capital that would have to be
expended in this endeavor would be better applied to less grandiose, more practicable goals.
B. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY: STRETCHED TOO THIN
The means of security can only be regulated by the means and dangers of
attack. They will in fact be ever determined by these rules and no others....417
Engagement and Enlargement proclaims that U.S. "military might is unparalleled"418 and
that our armed forces are "the best-equipped, best-trained and best-prepared fighting force in the
world."419 Moreover, "the United States is the only nation able to conduct large-scale and effective
military operations far beyond its borders."420 The only thing that the U.S. military lacks is a
416Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children ofLight and the Children ofDarkness (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1960), ix; quoted in Muravchik, 23.
4I7James Madison, in James E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan
University Press, 1961); quoted in Harry G. Summers, Jr., The New World Strategy (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1995), 59.






formidable adversary. Since the end of the Cold War no single state is able to challenge U.S.
military supremacy.
America's leaders have responded with a two-pronged plan of attack designed to wring a
peace dividend from this happy post-Cold War state of affairs. First, they cut defense spending and
downsized the military; not a particularly novel course of action. Major George C. Marshall
remarked in 1923 that, "We continue to follow a remarkable cycle of the doing and undoing of
measures for the National Defense."421 Second, they have sought to get more bang for their buck
by employing the military in new missions that support U.S. values and interests. Chief among
these missions - and this should not be a surprise - is the promotion of democracy. By securing
peace and stability, the military can provide the "window of opportunity" for democracy to thrive.
According to Strategyfor a New Century, the scope of operations in which U.S. forces
might be employed to achieve national objectives is quite varied:
The U.S. military conducts smaller-scale contingency operations to
vindicate national interests. These operations encompass the full-range of military
operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance,
peacekeeping, disaster relief, no-fly zones, reinforcing key allies, limited strikes,
and interventions.422
The use of military force at a lesser level of conflict is justified by the hope that it will alleviate the
need for a more substantial commitment later: "Taking reasonable risks for peace keeps us from
being drawn into far more costly conflicts."423 And, of course, there is the obligatory, almost
421George C. Marshall, "The Effect of School Histories on National Defense," Report ofthe Tenth
Annual Conference ofthe Association ofMilitary Colleges and Schools ofthe United States, 7-8 March
1923; quoted in Summers, 133.




instinctive acknowledgment that any deployment of troops must serve U.S. national interests: "We
must be selective in the use of our capabilities, and the choices we make always must be guided by
advancing our objectives of a more secure, prosperous and free America."424
The U.S. military has not been particularly enthusiastic about its new set of missions. In
November 1994, William Perry, then Secretary of Defense, accepted the new emphasis on
operations other than war (OOTW), but groused:
[0]rdinarily the Defense Department will not be involved in humanitarian
operations because of the need to focus on its war-fighting missions. We field an
army, not a Salvation Army.425
Still, the military, as it always does, has responded to this new direction with a crisp salute and an
hearty "Yes, Sir." General John M. Shalikashvili, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
confirmed acceptance of these new requirements: "Under this national strategy we will enhance
our security by maintaining a strong defense capability, promoting cooperative security measures,
working to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth, and promoting democracy
abroad."426 He added that "the challenge of the new strategic era is to selectively use the vast and
unique capabilities of the Armed Forces to advance national interests in peacetime while
maintaining readiness to fight and win when called upon."427
424Clinton, A National Security Strategyfor a New Century, 3.
425William Perry, "Rules of Engagement," speech, 4 November 1994, reprinted in Defense Issues
9, no. 84 (1994); quoted in Summers, 167.
426John M. Shalikashvili, cover letter, National Military Strategy (Washington D.C.: U.S.




The most recent National Military Strategy (1995), responds to A National Security
Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement and the findings of the Bottom-up Review. It has three
pillars: Fight and Win, Deterrence and Conflict Prevention, and Peacetime Engagement. Fight and
Win, as explicitly explained by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell, is the U.S.
military's primary mission:
Let me begin by giving a little bit of a tutorial about what an armed force
is all about. Notwithstanding all ofthe changes that have taken place in the world,
notwithstanding the new emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace
engagement, preventive diplomacy, we have a value system and a culture within
the Armed Forces of the United States. We have this mission: to fight and win
this nation's wars.428
As Powell has indicated the remaining two pillars of national military strategy are
concerned with OOTW that are designed to promote U.S. national interests. The missions that fall
within this spectrum of operations are referenced by a confusing and sometimes redundant array
of titles such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace engagement, humanitarian operations,
nation assistance, nation building, and preventive diplomacy. It is sufficient to understand that they
are military operations with the possibility of conflict (on a scale less than war) which are pursued
to achieve national interests. Frequently, the national interest in question is, of course, the
opportunity to promote democracy:
The community of democratic nations and free-market economies is
growing throughout the world - a trend consistent with U.S. interests. The United
States is committed to supporting nations transitioning into this community and
therefore will assist in efforts to defend against threats to democratic and economic
reform....429
428Colin L. Powell, press conference for The Bottom-Up Review, 1 September 1993; quoted in
Summers, 85.
429Shalikashvili, cover letter, National Military Strategy, 3.
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A robust, flexible military is the key to any nation's security. Without such a force to fight
conflicts when called upon, security becomes a hopeless illusion. U.S. national security strategy
recognizes this fact: "military force remains an indispensable element of our nation's power."430
But, at the same time, it levies inordinate requirements - in the form of these operations other than
war - that compromise the ability of the U.S. armed forces to act effectively in time of conflict.
In addition to the OOTW discussed previously, the military must be able to fulfill the
requirement to simultaneously win two major regional contingencies (MRCs): "For the foreseeable
future, the United States, in concert with regional allies, must remain able to deter credibly and
defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."431
To be able to meet this requirement, the military must invest in "readiness," that is, training,
operations, and maintenance, which allow "forces, units, weapons systems, or equipment to deploy
without unacceptable delays to perform the tasks for which they were designed."432 According to
Joint Vision 2010, the military's template for future warfighting, "Realistic and stressful training
has been the primary way to keep readiness high and prepare our men and women to face the
challenges of combat."433 Such training, whether it is scaled for an individual, a crew, or a larger
organization, costs money. As does the requirement to "maintain the technological superiority of
U.S. forces"434 through selective modernization.
430Clinton, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, iii.
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If all of these requirements are balanced against the trend of flat or decreasing defense
budgets, the figures will not balance. According to political scientist Dennis S. Ippolito, even the
most creative of accounting techniques cannot possibly make the math work:
Assuming that planned forces can adequately support official strategy, can
projected budgets maintain these forces at prudent levels of readiness and
modernization? Here, the overwhelming consensus is that funding will prove to
be inadequate....435
Although Franklin C. Spinney, an analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, takes a slightly
different tack with his examination of the Quadrennial Defense Review, he reaches essentially the
same conclusion: "Many observers, including myself, do not believe this force structure is large
enough to execute these strategies, particularly when the high rates of overseas rotations reduce
readiness by wearing out equipment, degrading training, and depressing morale."436
It is an understatement to suggest that the repeated use of the military for lesser
contingencies, whether in pursuit of valid national interests or not, "confronts military thinkers with
a host of nettlesome doctrinal, training, financial, and operational issues...."437 At some point you
simply cannot "do more with less." Clearly, something has to give, and it does not appear that it
is going to be the myriad of operations other than war in which U.S. forces increasingly find
themselves engaged. Despite rhetoric that promises that the U.S. will only engage in peace
operations that are clearly vital to the nation's interests, American participation has climbed from
435Dennis S. Ippolito, Federal Budget Policy and Defense Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, Penn.:
Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 1.
436Franklin C. Spinney, "Quadrennial Defense Review: What Went Wrong? How to Fix It,"
position paper, 20 June 1997 (version 2.3), 1.
437Hans Binnedijk, Strategic Assessment 1996 (Washington D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1996), 129.
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25 operations in the period from 1982 to 1985 to triple that figure for the same time period a decade
later.
438
So far, the preoccupation with OOTW has not impeded America's ability to respond to a
major regional contingency. But, this may be due more to luck than skillful planning. Harry G.
Summers, Jr., a retired Army Colonel who is now an author and commentator on military affairs,
suggests that the U.S. narrowly avoided catastrophe when, in the midst of humanitarian support
operations in Rwanda, a crisis flared in Korea.439 Eric Schmitt, a correspondent for the New York
Times, reported that the U.S. Army "sent five ships full of trucks medical supplies and tents from
Saipan, Thailand and Diego Garcia - supplies earmarked to supply American troops in Korea if a
war erupts there - to the crisis in central Africa."440
While the U.S. has not (yet) been forced to hurriedly disengage from a peace operation to
answer the call to war, its ability to do just that may already be compromised. Excessive
participation in peace operations and other lesser contingencies has accompanying baggage in terms
of opportunity costs, hidden costs, and actual expenses which, more often than not, are borne by
operational units. The opportunity costs for units involved in these operations include postponed
or neglected maintenance periods and an excessive rate of wear and tear on equipment. More
significant is the missed training time for troops. Although participation in peace operations can
provide an excellent learning experience that strengthens problem-solving skills and fosters unit
cohesion, it may also lead to a diminution of that unit's war-fighting capability. The General
438Stinson Center, in Binnedijk, 129. The U.S. engaged in 81 peace operations from 1992-1995.
439Summer, 166.
^Eric Schmitt, "Military's Growing Role in Relief Missions Prompts Concerns," New York
Times, 31 July 1994; quoted in Summer, 166.
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Accounting Office reports that:
Combat skills can atrophy if not used or practiced repeatedly. Each peace
operation offers unique conditions that may affect combat capabilities differently,
depending upon the nature and duration of the mission and other variables (such
as the type of unit involved and the skills employed). These variables also affect
the amount oftime needed to recover war-fighting skills after a peace operation.441
There are also hidden costs associated with maintaining excessive operational tempo
(OPTEMPO) to satisfy the myriad U.S. commitments to lesser contingencies. These include a
reduction in retention rates, lowered morale, and personnel problems such as declining
performance, substance abuse, and divorce. A GAO analysis that attempted to quantify these
hidden costs was inconclusive due to a lack of data. The report did note, however, that, over a four-
year period, high-deploying units
had elements that were deployed for more than one-half of each year.
Peace operations were the driving force behind the increases, accompanied by
smaller increases in joint activities.... [Djiscussions with officials in major
commands revealed pronounced concerns about [the relationship between]
personnel problems [and this rate ofOPTEMPO].442
While the hidden and opportunity costs are a difficult burden to bear for the units that
deploy in response to a particular contingency, the actual expenses associated with those operations
becomes a hardship for the units that stay behind:
Despite repeated involvement in peace operations since the end of the
Cold War, advance funding has not been provided. Therefore, in order to offset
contingency costs, the Services must draw upon the Operations and Maintenance
Accounts (OMA) of units that are not deployed. This, in turn, means that bill-
'"'U.S. General Accounting Office, Peace Operations: Effect of Training, Equipment, and Other




paying units will have to curtail training, defer maintenance or replenishment of
supply stocks, or take some other action that will likely undermine short- and
perhaps long-term readiness. If reimbursement is delayed too long, the effects of
the initial shirts cascade....443
And, according to Gordon Sullivan, then Chief of Staff of the Army, the system for reimbursement
has "failed to provide for timely reimbursements or reprogramming of funds, and when it has done
so, it has never been at 100% of our costs."444
Thus, for U.S. troops, involvement in a seemingly endless number of operations other than
war has resulted in an overall decline in combat readiness. It should not be suggested, however,
that the U.S. completely abandon these operations. Indeed, Denis McLean, former Ambassador
to the United States from New Zealand, notes that such a course of action may, in the long run, be
even more costly: "Peace operations start at the 'ounce-of-prevention' end of the scale of conflict
resolution; a relatively modest, timely collective effort can accomplish much and avoid the need
for a much more demanding unilateral 'pound of cure' later."445 Instead, we must apply the
"rigorous criteria"446 that is promised in the national security strategy to determine whether U.S.
armed forces should be deployed, rather than respond reflexively to the provocative images
displayed on CNN. And, there must be realistic expectations both on the part of politicians and the
public concerning what the deployment of U.S. troops will actually accomplish. Confidence in
their ability to restore peace is certainly warranted. However, faith in their ability to create a
"^Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Raach, "Beyond Fighting and Winning," in Chayes, 12.
^Gordon Sullivan, letter to Senator John McCain, 7 December 1994; quoted in George T. Raach,
"Military Perspectives on Peace Operations," in Chayes, 92.
^Denis McLean, Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace, June 1996), ix.
446Clinton, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, 23.
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window of opportunity to resolve centuries-old animosities and build democratic institutions is
simply unrealistic. As recognized by General Shalikashvili, a balance must be struck between
circumspection and intervention:
The notion that we exist, first and foremost, to fight our nation's wars I
subscribe to. But I also say "In this new world we cannot deny our government
a very important tool to try to manage crises, bring stability to an area, deal with
operations that overwhelm traditional humanitarian organizations." But you have
to be selective - or you could fritter away resources and capabilities.447
U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: FRAGMENTED SUPPORT
The reason why the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the
enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men
is foreknowledge.448
The U.S. intelligence community faces a problem that is quite similar to that of the armed
forces: an era of increasing requirements and decreasing budgets. Engagement and Enlargement
outlines, in general terms, what is expected of the U.S. intelligence community: "Strong
intelligence capabilities are needed to protect our nation by providing warning of threats to U.S.
national security, by providing support to the policy and military communities to prevail over these
threats and by identifying opportunities for advancing our national interests through support to
diplomacy."449
The specific tasks of this community begin with traditional, bread-and-butter intelligence
missions. These include indications and warning of war or other forms of conflict, support for
military operations, assessment of emerging situations and problems in support of decision-making
447John M. Shalikashvili, New York Times Magazine, 21 May 1995; quoted in McLean, 13.
448Sun Tzu, The Art of War; quoted in Binnendjik, 69.
449Clinton, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, 24.
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by national command authority (NCA) and other policymakers, monitoring emerging advanced
technologies, providing protection against hostile foreign intelligence services
(counterintelligence), and the ability to undertake covert action.
Support for military operations is an especially important function of the intelligence
community, particularly "at a time when we have a smaller military that is being asked to take on
a wider number of different challenges in remote and unfamiliar areas of the world."450 In turn, the
fact that the intelligence support must match the broader scope of operations now borne by the
military directly contributes to the difficulties that the intelligence community has in making ends
meet. Indeed, Les Aspin, former Secretary of Defense, once noted that, "Using the military to
protect our values overseas. ..drives the intelligence community crazy because there is no way to
anticipate where values issues might crop up next."451
The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a "New World Order," complete with novel
opportunities and challenges. Not coincidentally, it brought with it a host of new intelligence
missions. The first of these is derived from the recognition that future U.S. military action is more
likely than not to be in concert with a multinational coalition:
No matter how powerful we are as a nation, we cannot always secure [our]
goals unilaterally.... [T]he threats and challenges we face frequently demand
cooperative, multinational solutions.452
Intelligence support to coalition activities presents a unique set of problems. These include the
sanitization of shared intelligence so that U.S. sources or methods are not revealed, devising timely
450John Deutch, speech to the graduating class of the National Defense University, 1995; quoted in
Binnedijk, 69.
451Les Aspin, quoted in Binnedijk, 65.
""Clinton, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, 12.
169
but secure means of dissemination at multiple levels of security, and ensuring that there are
provisions for the proper storage and protection of classified material once it has been relinquished
to a coalition partner. Although these extra requirements are somewhat of a hindrance, it is
generally accepted that, because it is "in our national interest to proceed in partnership with others
to preserve, maintain and restore peace,"453 the benefits accrued far outweigh any costs and
inconveniences.
This is not necessarily the case with some of the other, less conventional tasks now
assigned to the intelligence community. Engagement and Enlargement states that, "The collection
and analysis of economic intelligence will play an increasingly important role in helping
policymakers understand economic trends," and adds that, "Intelligence must also identify
emerging threats that could affect the international economy and the stability of some nation
states...."
454 The fact that there are experts on Wall Street who do just this sort of thing for a living,
at considerably higher salaries than most government employees, seems to have been ignored. If
members of the intelligence community were able to perform this function as well the bankers and
brokers that do it now, they would probably quickly trade their uniforms in for three-piece suits.
Other missions, such as the requirements to combat drug trafficking and track
environmental damage, are extraneous, often futile tasks designed to provide the facade of political
correctness. The size of the former problem exceeds the resources of the community and places
intelligence organizations uncomfortably close to the realm of domestic spying. The latter
requirement demands expertise that is more likely to be found in the halls of academe than in the
453Clinton, A National Security Strategyfor a New Century, 12.
454Clinton, A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement, 25.
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intelligence community. And both demand resources that, if applied elsewhere, would be more
effective in obtaining the ultimate goal of national security.
Finally, there is the completely nebulous and impracticable: "Intelligence support is also
required to develop and implement polices to promote democracy abroad."455 How, exactly, does
one go about accomplishing this task? What concrete, practical steps can be taken by the
intelligence community to further this objective?
The National Defense University's Strategic Assessment 1996 sums up the dilemma
currently facing America's intelligence organizations: "the post-Cold War poses unprecedented
challenges for the U.S. intelligence community: it must function effectively, against a broad range
of threats, in an environment of unparalleled openness and oversight, but with dwindling
resources."
456 The New World Order is, in fact, quite disorderly, with crises and conflicts erupting
across the globe. While the intelligence community has tried to cope with these new challenges,
it has not been able to dispense with any of its old concerns. Intelligence collection designed to
provide indications and warning of war on the Korean peninsula continues today, as do attempts
to track Russian naval combatants, or monitor Chinese nuclear weapons testing. The preceding
discussion concerning the demands that are placed on the military also holds true for the
intelligence community: increasing requirements while reducing resources is not a prudent way
to conduct business. Hard choices must be made to determine exactly which intelligence activities
will best serve this nation's security.





Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be
unfurled, there will her [America's] heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be.
But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher
to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only
of her own....457
Current U.S. national security strategy, premised on democratic peace theory, delineates
democracy as the key to this nation's well-being. As democratic states do not go to war with one
another, democracy is deemed to be the single most important criterion by which we choose both
our friends and our causes. It is the password to an exclusive club of fraternal states, as well as a
clarion call for help that immediately summons American aid and intervention. Democracy is
ultimately viewed as the means to achieve desired ends, namely, national interests and, of course,
national security. But political scientist John L. Harper states this view is not only inaccurate, it
is perilous: "the democratic peace hypothesis does more than misrepresent the way the world
actually works: it is a dangerous and misleading recipe that, if followed will cause America's
leaders to neglect the country's true security needs."458
The heart of the problem is that U.S. policymakers frequently confuse values with
interests. Democracy is a value rather than a national interest. And, while it may be universally
possible, democracy has proven to be exceedingly difficult to consolidate in states throughout the
457John Quincy Adams, speech, 4 July 1921, in Norman A. Graebner, ed., Readings in the
Intellectual Tradition ofAmerican Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); quoted in
Summers, 32.
458John L. Harper, "The Dream of Democratic Peace," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 3 (May/June 1997):
118.
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world. Indeed, the unrestrained promotion of democracy appears to be a vain pursuit that garners
little in exchange for the time, energy, and resources that are expended.
Nor can the spread of democracy be viewed as an effective means to achieve sought-after
ends. An expanded community of democratic states will not guarantee peace, stability, economic
prosperity, or the nation's security. Indeed, in some instances, these interests directly conflict with
the promotion of democracy:
The world. ..is a messy place. What happens...when the quest for
democracy conflicts with other U.S. interests? A desire to support democratic
change in China runs up against our economic interests. Strategic interest in the
Middle East have led Washington to keep quiet about the lack of democracy
in...Saudi Arabia.459
Democracies, like all states, pursue a course of action that is deemed to be in their best interests.
In doing so, they may engage in many activities that threaten the security of other states, whether
those states are fellow democracies or not. Harper concurs, noting that "a country may feel
solidarity toward other countries with similar political values and institutions," but the "one
indispensable factor in forming reliable partnerships is not democracy or the lack of it, but self-
interest, and there is not the slightest reason to think that will change."460
If every other state in the international realm pursues a course of action dictated by national
interest, the U.S. can hardly afford to abstain from this process. Indeed, "moral impulses are
dangerous if not accompanied by a sense of pragmatic self-interest."461 Certainly it makes sense
to pursue national goals directly rather than hope that they will be realized incidentally through the
459Mead, "The Delicate Birth of a Democracy."
460Harper, 117, 120.
461
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blessings of universal democracy. U.S. financial assistance to Russia is a prime example: aid
designed to foster democratic institutions has not been particularly successful in contributing to
"significant changes in Russia's political, legal, or social system"462 and is generally deemed to be
to be a less important than independent economic and political factors.463 In contrast, direct U.S.
funding to destroy stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction - a pursuit clearly in this nation's
interest - has been an unqualified success. According to John Ruberto, Deputy Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs for Defense
Conversion, "the CTR [Cooperative Threat Reduction] program contributed to thousands of nuclear
warheads being removed from their missiles and [safely] transported to storage areas for
subsequent disposition, to hundreds of missiles, submarines, bombers and intercontinental ballistic
missile silos being destroyed, and to the overall nuclear threat to the United States being greatly
reduced."464
The key to national security is therefore quite apparent: the U.S. must clearly define
tangible goals that are in this nation's interests, such as deterring regional adversaries, opening
markets to U.S. trade, reducing weapons of mass destruction, and combating international
organized crime. Then, appropriate resources must be allocated so that direct action can be taken
to achieve these goals. This prescription for national security is not particularly novel, nor is it
revolutionary. In fact, A Strategyfor a New Century echoes these sentiments: "Our resources are
finite...so we must be selective in our responses, focusing on challenges that most directly affect
462U.S. General Accounting Office, Promoting Democracy: Progress Report on U.S. Democratic
Development Assistance to Russia, February 1996, 2.
463
Ibid., 3.
464John Ruberto, "Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance programs in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and the




our interests and engaging where we can make the most difference."465 It is just that something has
been lost somewhere between the proclamation of this policy and its practical implementation.
While defining national interests may seem to some to be a simple, almost self-evident
task, it is, in fact, a difficult endeavor. Interests tend to be moving targets that are subject to both
the particular perspectives of the leaders that invoke them and the vicissitudes of the international
environment. Indeed, the concept of national interest itself has long been criticized as a
meaningless term of convenience which can be used to justify any course of action in any
circumstance. Despite the amorphous, unsatisfactory nature of this term, it cannot be denied that
leaders and polities are compelled by some force, perhaps self-preservation or the simple desire to
improve their lot in life, to pursue certain objectives. For the pursuit to be successful, U.S.
policymakers must first adequately define what it is they are looking for and then set a course of
action to attain it. If national interests can be successfully expressed in terms of definitive
expectations and tangible results, it will help ensure that U.S. armed forces and the intelligence
community that supports them are funded and deployed in a realistic and effective manner to
pursue these objectives.
Finally, U.S. national security strategy should comply with truth-in-advertising restrictions.
That is, not only should the U.S. reserve the right to take actions that it deems to be in its national
interests, but it should state, straightforwardly, that it intends do to so in cases where interests
conflict with a professed attachment to idealistic values. In doing so, the United States will
alleviate a great source of consternation, frustration, and suspicion among allies, friends, and
potential partners.
465Clinton, A National Security Strategyfor a New Century, 14.
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A national security strategy grounded in self-interest should not be viewed as a dictate to
"purge our foreign policy of all sentimentality"466 as Kissinger phrases it. Rather, it is a call to
subject idealism to realistic, obtainable, practicable and profitable goals. If promoting a democratic
leader in a particular state meets these criteria, then that course of action should be wholeheartedly
pursued. But, as explained by Mead, caution must be exercised:
We should not bark at the moon. While furthering democracy in other
countries can...play a role in U.S. diplomacy, we can't base our global strategy on
the illusion that the permanent victory of democracy is just around the corner.467
Muravchik concurs, noting that "at times we must choose lesser evils, that idealism must be
expressed with due respect for reality, and that policies must be judged by their consequences, not
by their nobility of intentions."468
Current U.S. national security strategy is long on idealism and good intentions, but
distressingly bereft of realistic and practical direction. Its simple prescription of democracy as the
key to securing national interests relies on convoluted and fallacious logic. Ultimately, the pursuit
of democracy at all costs expends valuable resources and leaves the U.S. unprepared to meet
challenges to national security. Therefore, democratic peace theory is a perilous proposition upon
which to gamble this nation's security.
466
"The Bloodhounds of History."
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